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Abstract	  
The	   thesis	   explores	   the	   roles	   and	   reponsibilities	   of	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   deployed	   under	   the	  Regional	   Assistance	  Mission	   to	   Solomon	   Islands,	   established	   in	   2003.	   	   Their	  work	   under	   this	  banner	   continues	  a	  growing	   trend	   that	   sees	   the	  deployment	  of	   constabulary	  police	  officers	   to	  post-­‐conflict	  societies	  to	  re-­‐establish	  order	  and	  build	  a	  framework	  for	  sustainable	  peace.	  Where	  the	  existing	  literature	  considers	  the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	  this	  trend,	  this	  thesis	  looks	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  interaction	  between	  international	  police	  officers	  and	  citizens	  of	  post-­‐conflict	   societies.	   In	  particular,	   it	   asks	  questions	  about	   the	  suitability	  and	  sustainability	  of	   the	  community	  policing	  model;	  a	  model	  that	  has	  developed	  over	  several	  decades	  in	  an	  internal	  law-­‐enforcement	  context	  but	  is	  relatively	  new	  to	  the	  peace-­‐building	  sphere.	  	  	  The	  research	  focus	  is	  drawn	  from	  the	  extensive	  literature	  on	  the	  use	  of	  community	  policing	  in	  domestic	  contexts	  but	  is	  adapted	  in	  order	  to	  speak	  back	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  peace-­‐bulding	  and	  international	  policing.	  	  The	   everyday	   experiences	   of	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   were	   deployed	   to	   Solomon	   Islands	   were	  explored	   through	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews.	   In	   particular,	   the	   thesis	   found	   	   that	   officers	  experiences	   little	   of	   the	   ethnic	   conflict	   that	   had,	   according	   to	   international	   media,	   been	   the	  hallmark	  of	  the	  Tension	  period	  and	  that	  they	  showed	  a	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  climate	  of	  the	  communities	  they	  operated	  in.	  It	  further	  found	  that,	  while	  officers	  were	  often	  keen	  to	  show	  respect	  for	  local	  tradition	  and	  local	  power	  structures,	  they	  also	  saw	  that	  in	  some	   cases	   these	   structures	  needed	   to	  be	  broken	  down	   for	   the	   safety	   and	  well-­‐being	  of	   local	  people,	   particularly	   women	   and	   children.	   The	   New	   Zealand	   style	   of	   community	   policing	  sometimes	   clashed	   with	   that	   other	   contingents	   but	   overall	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   personal	   and	  professional	  relationships	  they	  had	  with	  those	  they	  worked	  with	  was	  the	  most	  decisive	   factor	  influencing	  their	  experience.	  While	   much	   of	   the	   discussion	   centres	   on	   the	   community	   model,	   the	   findings	   highlight	   the	  importance	   of	   people	   in	   the	   peace-­‐building	   process.	   The	   model	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	  facilititating	   a	   broad-­‐based	   policing	   initiative	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   but	   it	   was	   the	   personal	  investment	   by	   individual	   officers	   going	   about	   their	   everyday	   work	   that	   was	   often	   crucial	   in	  breaking	   down	   the	   barriers	   to	   peace.	   The	   finding	   points	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   empowering	  communities	   in	  exercising	  ownership	  over	   the	  peace-­‐building	  process	  and	  the	  role	   that	  police	  officers	  from	  another	  country	  can	  play	  in	  encouraging	  that	  process.	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The	  first	  cases	  of	  police	  officers	  being	  utilised	  in	  a	  peacekeeping	  capacity	  saw	  Ghanaian	  officers	  deployed	   in	  1960	  under	   the	  United	  Nations	  Observer	  Mission	   in	  Congo	   to	  work	   in	   support	  of	  local	  forces	  (Greener	  2009a).	  Since	  these	  early	  exercises,	  the	  practice	  has	  developed	  to	  become	  an	   integral	  component	  of	  many	  multilateral	  peacekeeping	  missions.	  The	  practice	  grew	  rapidly	  through	  the	  1990s	  with	  UN	  Police	  being	  deployed	  to	  missions	  in	  Namibia,	  Angola,	  El	  Salvador,	  Western	   Sahara,	   Cambodia,	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia,	   Somalia,	   Mozambique,	   Haiti,	   Rwanda,	  Guatemala,	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic,	  East	  Timor	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  (Australian	  Federal	  Police	  2006).	   Between	   1995	   and	   2010,	   the	   total	   number	   of	   UN	   Police	   officers	   authorised	   to	   serve	  under	  UNPOL	  rose	  from	  5,840	  to	  over	  17,500	  (UNPOL	  2013).	  	  The	  adoption	  of	   international	  policing	   forms	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  shift	   that	  has	  seen	   the	  expansion	  and	   reconfiguration	   of	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   post-­‐conflict	   intervention	   following	   the	   end	   of	   the	  Cold	  War.	   It	   is	  representative	  of	  a	  renewed	  effort	  by	   international	  powers	  to	  police	   the	  global	  order	  and	  combat	   cases	  of	   local	  or	   regional	   instability	   in	  a	   increasingly	   interconnected	  global	  space	   (Goldsmith	   &	   Sheptycki	   2007).	   It	   also	   reflects	   the	   increased	   attention	   given	   to	   the	  institutional	   dimensions	   and	   coercive	   capacity	   of	   states	   in	   strategic	   assessments	   of	   global	  stability	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  9/11	  (Doornbos	  2002;	  Hameiri	  2008;	  Milliken	  &	  Krause	  2002).	  	  Recent	  efforts	   to	  broaden	   the	   terms	   for	   international	   intervention	   (Chandler	  2004)	  have	  seen	  international	   policing	   move	   closer	   to	   the	   centre	   of	   many	   peace-­‐building	   and	   state-­‐building	  strategies.	   In	   these	   roles,	   international	   police	   perform	   a	   broad	   and	   multi-­‐faceted	   function,	  involving	   not	   only	   peace-­‐keeping,	   but	   increasingly	   the	   more	   comprehensive	   work	   of	   peace-­‐building.	   UN	   Secretary	   General	   Ban	   Ki-­‐Moon	   (2013)	   writes:	   “In	   addition	   to	   protecting	  individuals,	   they	   [UN	   Police]	   help	   society	   as	   a	   whole	   by	   redefining	   the	   role	   of	   policing	   in	  countries	  emerging	  from	  conflict,	  forging	  trust	  in	  uniformed	  police,	  establishing	  faith	  in	  national	  justice	  systems	  and	  fostering	  confidence	  in	  peace	  processes.”	  Performing	   this	   role	   in	   a	   post-­‐conflict	   setting	   is	   not	   without	   its	   difficulties.	   In	   2006	   the	  Commissioner	  of	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police	  (AFP),	  a	  policing	  organisation	  that	  has	  played	  a	  significant	   role	   in	   recent	   international	   policing	   missions,	   stated	   that	   “sending	   police	   into	   a	  foreign	   land	   to	  make	  peace	   is	   a	   very	  different	   role	   to	   the	   one	  we	  performed	   in	   the	  past”	   and	  outlined	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  that	  have	  emerged	  as	  police	  organisations	  have	  moved	  into	  the	  “foreign	   policy	   space”.	   His	   outline	   of	   the	   many	   political,	   professional	   and	   personal	   issues	  associated	  with	  the	  shift	  highlights	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  change	  for	  both	  police	  organisations	  
8	  	  
and	   policy-­‐makers	   alike.	   In	   a	   speech	   titled	   “Policing	   in	   a	   Foreign	   Policy	   Space”,	   the	  Commissioner	  commented:	  
The	   AFP	   has	   been	   steeped	   in	   the	  Western	   tradition	   of	   impartiality	   and	   the	   prevention	   of	  
crime	   but	   is	   that	   best	   suited	   to	   the	   conduct	   of	   international	   peacekeeping	   operations	   in	  
morally	   ambiguous	   circumstances?	   In	  many	   cases,	   police	   in	   these	   situations	   are	   forced	   to	  
operate	   and	   co-­‐operate	   with	   governments	   and	   individuals	   who	   are	   either	   corrupt,	   or	  
involved	   in	   illegal	   or	   immoral	   activities.	   This	   can	   be	   a	   confronting	   and	   disheartening	  
experience	   for	   those	   police	   officers	   involved,	   and	   it	   can	   have	   ramifications	   both	   for	   the	  
success	  of	   the	  mission	  and	   for	   the	  perspective	  of	   those	   individual	  police	  officers	   involved...I	  
think	   we	   need	   to	   have	   it	   clear	   in	   our	   own	   minds	   whether	   we	   are	   engaging	   in	   these	  
interventions	  out	  of	  a	  genuine	  attempt	  to	  build	  better	  community	  or	  are	  we	  more	  concerned	  
about	  our	  own	  national	  security...or	   is	   it	  a	  combination	  of	  both?	  (Australian	  Federal	  Police	  
2006).	  
The	   Commissioner’s	   comments	   highlight	   the	   sense	   of	   uncertainty	   that	   many	   police	  organisations	   have	   come	   up	   against	   as	   they	   transition	   into	   the	   international	   peacekeeping	  space.	  Deployed	  in	  this	  role,	  international	  police	  officers	  operate	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  a	  myriad	  of	   local,	   national	   and	   international	   forces;	   a	   position	   that	   requires	   that	   the	   demands	   of	  international	   donors	   are	   balanced	   against	   local	   social	   and	   political	   realities	   as	   well	   as	  organisational	   and	   logistical	   capabilities.	   This	   challenge	   is	   present	   not	   only	   for	   policy-­‐makers	  and	   strategists	   but	   also	   for	   individual	   police	   officers	   engaging	   and	   interacting	   with	   the	   host	  society	  and	  its	  problems	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  	  As	  international	  policing	  has	  become	  more	  widespread,	  observers	  have	  begun	  to	  look	  closer	  at	  some	   of	   these	   challenges.	   Various	   efforts	   have	   been	   made	   to	   understand	   the	   philosophy	  underlying	   international	   policing,	   analyse	   its	   political	   implications,	   and	   review	   its	   practical	  implementation.	  	  Much	   of	   the	   academic	   literature	   thus	   far	   has	   been	   directed	   at	   the	   appropriateness	   and	  effectiveness	   of	   international	   policing	   as	   a	   form	   of	   post-­‐conflict	   intervention	   or	   capacity	  development.	   In	   a	   similar	   way	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   military-­‐led	   peacekeeping,	   the	  contributions	   here	   focus	   on	   some	   of	   the	   legal	   and	   logistical	   issues	   associated	   with	   involving	  police	  organisations	  in	  large-­‐scale	  integrated	  peace-­‐keeping	  mandates	  (Dupont	  &	  Tanner	  2009;	  Greener	   2009b;	   Hills	   1998;	   Oswald	   &	   Bates	   2010;	   Rausch	   2002).	   They	   highlight	   challenges	  posed	   by	   the	   integration	   of	   policing	   practices	   and	   ethics	   into	   what	   are	   typically	   military-­‐led	  operations	   as	   well	   as	   those	   associated	   with	   the	   re-­‐integration	   of	   officers	   back	   into	   their	  domestic	  departments.	  These	  more	  practical	  concerns	  are	  of	  vital	   importance	   to	   the	  structure	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and	   functioning	   of	   international	   policing	   missions	   and	   the	   contributions	   offer	   various	  recommendations	  through	  which	  to	  improve	  its	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency.	  	  A	   further	  strand	  of	   the	   literature	  considers	  the	  global	  dimensions	  of	   the	  practice.	  Anchored	   in	  discussions	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	   the	  changing	  global	  order,	  much	  of	   the	   focus	   in	   this	  section	  of	  the	  literature	  centres	  on	  “...how,	  if	  at	  all,	  the	  rise	  in	  international	  policing	  represents	  any	  kind	  of	  qualitative	   shift	   with	   regards	   to	   broader	   concepts	   of	   intervention”	   (Greener	   2009a:5-­‐6).	  Contributors	  highlight	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  international	  policing	  affects	  the	  traditional	  distinction	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  and	  how	  the	  practice	  is	  connected	  to	  broader	  normative	  shifts	  in	  the	  international	  socio-­‐political	  landscape.	  	  These	   are	   important	   and	   interesting	   discussions	   and	   their	   findings	  will	   not	   be	   ignored	   here.	  However,	   the	   intention	   here	   is	   to	   analyse	   the	   issue	   from	   within	   a	   different	   conceptual	  framework,	   paying	   greater	   attention	   to	   local	   level	   dynamics	   and	   the	   experience	   of	   individual	  officers	  as	  peace-­‐builders	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  society.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  more	   about	   the	   interactions	   between	   officers	   of	   a	   highly	   organised	   and	   professional	  international	   police	   force	   and	   members	   of	   fragile	   local	   communities	   emerging	   from	   violent	  conflict.	  	  The	   starting	   point	   for	   this	   research	   is	   not	   to	   consider	   international	   policing	   as	   something	  entirely	  new	  for	  police	  organisations	  but	  as	  a	  further	  step	  in	  their	  development	  as	  a	  professional	  police	  force.	  	  Approaching	  the	  issue	  in	  such	  a	  way	  reveals	  that	  dealing	  with	  issues	  surrounding	  cultural	   difference,	   trust,	   and	   legitimacy	   is	   not	   new	   to	   the	   police.	   Throughout	   their	   modern	  history,	   police	   organisations	   have	   come	   up	   against	   such	   issues	   and	   been	   forced	   to	   negotiate	  them.	   Such	   experiences	   have	   shaped	   the	   practices	   of	   policing	   in	   contemporary	   societies	   and	  affected	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   officers	   interact	   with	   and	   relate	   to	   the	   community	   they	   police.	  Through	  this	  process	  has	  developed	  a	  series	  of	  policing	  strategies	  that	  have	  come	  to	  re-­‐define	  how	  police	  officers	  carry	  out	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  task	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  how	  police	  forces	  interact	  with	   the	   community	   they	   operate	   in.	   Known	   broadly	   as	   community	   policing,	   the	   approach	  represents	   an	   attempt	   to	   re-­‐orient	   and	   enhance	   police-­‐community	   relations	   in	   urban	  neighbourhoods	  and	  rural	  communities.	  While	  community	  policing	  has	  been	  used	  domestically	  for	  several	  decades,	  recent	  shifts	  towards	  more	  advanced	  forms	  of	  intervention	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  now	  being	  utilised	  as	   a	  model	   for	  post-­‐conflict	  peace-­‐building	   in	  many	  mission	  environments	  around	  the	  world	  (Emmott	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Mobekk	  2002;	  Murphy	  2007).	  The	   literature	   surrounding	   the	   development	   of	   community	   policing	   provides	   a	   particularly	  useful	   lens	   for	   understanding	   international	   policing	   as	   it	   focuses	   primarily	   on	   the	   interface	  between	   officer	   and	   citizen	   and,	   through	   this,	   better	   isolates	   the	   social,	   political	   and	   cultural	  dimensions	   of	   their	   interaction.	  Using	   this	   literature	   as	   a	   base	   can	   allow	   for	   a	   greater	   insight	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into	   the	   dynamics	   of	   international	   policing	   in	   a	   post-­‐conflict	   society	   and	   some	   of	   the	  implications	  that	  flow	  from	  the	  deployment	  of	  international	  police	  forces	  into	  host	  communities.	  	  This	  research	  uses	  the	  Regional	  Assistance	  Mission	  to	  Solomon	  Islands	  (RAMSI)	  as	  a	  case	  study	  for	   exploring	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   that	   arise	   at	   the	   interface	   between	   members	   of	   RAMSI’s	  Participating	  Police	  Force	  (PPF)	  and	  local	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities.	  It	  aims	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  wider	  international	  policing	  literature	  by	  providing	  a	  window	  into	  the	  local-­‐level	  challenges	  associated	   with	   missions	   of	   this	   kind.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   aims	   to	   discover	   more	   about	   the	  successes	   and	   difficulties	   that	   come	   out	   of	   the	   export	   of	   the	   community-­‐oriented	   policing	  approach	  to	  the	  “foreign	  policy	  space”.	  The	  thesis	  begins	  with	  a	  background	  to	  the	  case	  study.	  The	  chapter	  looks	  back	  at	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  as	  well	  as	  its	  unravelling	  in	  the	  years	  prior	  to	  RAMSI’s	  arrival.	  As	  well	  as	  providing	  a	  chronological	  outline	  of	  the	  ‘Tension’	  years	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  the	  chapter	  also	   aims	   to	  map	   some	  of	   the	   key	  hallmarks	   of	   the	   local	   socio-­‐political	   landscape.	   Identifying	  and	  discussing	   these	  hallmarks	   at	   the	   outset	   helps	   to	   provide	   some	   context	   to	   the	  discussion	  that	  follows	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  clearly	  directed	  research	  focus.	  The	  chapter	  then	  outlines	   the	   background	   and	   build-­‐up	   to	   the	   deployment	   of	   RAMSI	   as	   well	   as	   some	   of	   the	  important	  features	  of	  the	  policing	  approach	  being	  utilised	  by	  the	  PPF.	  The	  focus	  in	  chapter	  three	  shifts	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  modern	  policing	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  policing	  models.	  In	  particular,	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  development	  of	  community-­‐oriented	  policing;	  the	  model	  that	  informs	  much	  of	  the	  work	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  PPF	  under	  RAMSI.	  After	  establishing	  its	  core	  doctrine	  and	  outlining	   its	  primary	  dimensions,	   the	  chapter	  reviews	  the	   literature	  surrounding	  the	   development	   of	   community-­‐oriented	   policing	   and	   raises	   questions	   about	   how	   the	   unique	  dynamics	   of	   police-­‐community	   interaction	  within	   a	   post-­‐conflict	   society	  might	   help	   or	   hinder	  the	  search	  for	  a	  durable	  peace	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  Before	   discussing	   the	   research	   findings	   in	   chapter	   five,	   chapter	   four	   sets	   out	   the	   qualitative	  research	  design.	  Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  New	  Zealand	  members	  of	  the	  PPF	  are	  used	  to	  learn	  more	  about	   their	  experience	  policing	  at	   the	  street-­‐level	   in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  The	  chapter	  outlines	  the	  benefits	  and	  limitations	  of	  using	  such	  a	  methodology	  and	  discusses	  how	  these	  affect	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  research	  as	  a	  result.	  	  The	   final	   chapter	   (chapter	   five)	   discusses	   the	   findings	   of	   those	   interviews	   and	   analyses	   their	  implications	   for	   the	   research	   questions.	   The	   various	   achievements	   and	   challenges	   faced	   by	  individual	  officers	  are	  described	  so	  as	  to	  give	  an	  insight	  into	  some	  of	  the	  local-­‐level	  dynamics	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  community	  policing.	  Their	  experiences	  reveal	  that	  such	  efforts	  can	  be	  hindered	  by	  a	   myriad	   of	   local	   factors	   and	   made	   more	   difficult	   by	   the	   complex	   and	   sometimes	   confusing	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nature	   of	   communal	   behaviour.	   They	   also	   reveal,	   however,	   the	   significant	   gains	   that	   can	   be	  made	   through	   small	   gestures	   and	   ultimately	   the	   importance	   of	   strong	   personal	   relationships	  both	  within	  the	  policing	  contingent	  and	  with	  local	  communities.	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Communities	  and	  Conflict	  in	  Solomon	  Islands:	  1998-­‐2003	  
Learning	   more	   about	   the	   interaction	   between	   international	   police	   officers	   and	   local	  communities	   in	  post-­‐conflict	  societies	  requires	  an	  assessment	  of	   the	  wider	  social	  and	  political	  context	  in	  which	  that	  interaction	  takes	  place	  as	  well	  as	  some	  understanding	  of	  how	  that	  context	  contributes	   to	   conceptions	   of	   order,	   authority	   and	   social	   cohesion	   in	   those	   communities.	   Not	  only	  does	  this	  allow	  for	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  insight	  into	  the	  complexities	  and	  nuances	  of	  the	  host	  society,	   it	   also	  helps	   to	  provide	  a	  picture	  of	  what	  would	  have	   faced	  many	   international	  police	  officers	  upon	  their	  arrival.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Solomon	  Islands,	   the	  work	  of	  the	  Participating	  Police	  Force	   (PPF)	   sits	   within	   a	   much	   wider	   restructuring	   effort	   aimed	   at	   re-­‐building	   the	   central	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  state	  and	  establishing	  a	  sustainable	  peace.	  This	  as	  well	  as	  recent	   political	   upheaval	   and	   social	   dislocation	   add	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   complexity	   to	   the	  process	   of	   reform	   and	   heightens	   the	   need	   for	   sensitivity	   in	   pursuing	   such	   changes.	   It	   is	  important	  therefore	  to	  understand	  some	  of	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  state,	  society,	  and	  political	  experience	  before	  progressing.	  	  In	   fast-­‐moving	  and	  rapidly-­‐evolving	  post-­‐conflict	  environments	   it	   is	  often	  tempting	  to	   look	  for	  simplistic	  explanations	  rather	  than	  look	  deeper	  into	  historical	  or	  structural	  processes	  that	  may	  help	   to	   identify	   problems	   or	   provide	   solutions.	   For	   this	   reason,	   some	   time	   is	   spent	   here	  documenting	   the	   recent	   history	   of	   Solomon	   Islands	   and	   the	   unique	   circumstances	   that	   police	  reformers	   face	   in	   their	   task	   to	   implement	   an	   effective	   and	   equitable	   community	   policing	  programme.	  	  The	  period	  of	  violent	  conflict	  and	  disorder	  that	  broke	  out	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  from	  1998-­‐2003,	  known	  as	  ‘The	  Tensions’,	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  unique	  combination	  of	  historical	  grievances,	  newly-­‐emerging	  socio-­‐economic	  pressures,	  and	  more	  immediate	  catalyst	  events	  that	  served	  to	  turn	  a	  collection	  of	  disparate,	  yet	  interdependent,	  communities	  against	  one	  another.	  While	  conflict	  has	  for	  a	   long	   time	  been	  a	  component	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  political	   life	   (Allen	  &	  Dinnen	  2010),	   the	  violent	  conflict	  that	  defined	  the	  Tensions	  was	  not	  an	  inevitable	  product	  of	  its	  history.	  Rather	  it	  represented	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  number	  of	   long-­‐term	  and	  short-­‐term	  factors	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	   re-­‐drawing	   of	   social	   boundaries	   and	   the	   colonisation	   of	   the	   political	   sphere	   by	   militant	  leaders	   (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Commission	  2012;	  Dinnen	  2002;	  Hameiri	  2007;	  Kabutaulaka	  2001).	  	  It	   has	   become	   commonplace	   to	   explain	   the	   conflict	   through	   an	   ethnic	   lens,	   describing	   the	  Tensions	   as	   a	   conflict	   between	   the	   indigenous	   residents	   of	   Guadalcanal	   (represented	   by	   the	  Isatabu	  Freedom	  Movement)	  and	  settler	  Malaitans	  (represented	  by	   the	  Malaitan	  Eagle	  Force).	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While	   the	  conflict	  between	  these	   two	  groups	  was	  significant,	   to	   focus	  solely	  on	   this	  particular	  cleavage	  obscures	  the	  much	  deeper	  social	  conflicts	  (Kabutaulaka	  2001),	  evident	  at	  a	  number	  of	  levels,	  that	  turned	  fragmentation	  into	  exclusion	  and	  fuelled	  the	  violence	  that	  became	  the	  surface	  expression	   of	   the	   Tensions.	   To	   better	   isolate	   the	   dimensions	   of	   this	   conflict	   requires	   some	  appreciation	   of	   both	   the	   historical	   context	   and	   the	   key	   trends	   defining	   the	   Solomon	   Islands	  political	  and	  social	  sphere	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to,	  and	  during,	  the	  Tensions.	  	  Authority,	  Order	  and	  Development	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  Solomon	  Islands	  gained	  its	  independence	  from	  Britain	  in	  1978.	  Colonial	  rule	  defined	  the	  nature	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  government	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  its	  national	  institutions.	  The	  Westminster	  parliamentary	   system	   that	   Solomon	   Islands	   inherited	   created	   national	   governing	   institutions	  alongside	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   indigenous	   governance	   systems.	   Despite	   pressure	   for	   federal	  government	   from	   several	   Guadalcanal	   groups,	   political	   power	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   remains	  relatively	   centralised	  with	  a	  unicameral	  Westminster	  parliament	  of	  50	  members	   representing	  50	   constituencies	   governing	   national	   affairs.1	   The	   Prime	   Minister	   is	   elected	   from	   within	   the	  National	  Parliament.	  	  While	  the	  structure	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  other	  Westminster	  parliaments,	  its	  functioning	  is	  more	  unique.	   Governments	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   have	   struggled	   to	   produce	   legitimate	   and	   effective	  leadership	   with	   only	   a	   small	   few	   managing	   to	   survive	   for	   a	   full-­‐term	   in	   the	   years	   since	  independence	   (Australian	   Strategic	   Policy	   Institute	   2003).	   Governing	   coalitions	   remain	   only	  marginal	  in	  terms	  of	  relevance	  to	  the	  everyday	  lives	  of	  Solomon	  Islanders	  with	  most	  Members	  relying	   on	   local	   networks	   and	   welfare	   systems	   that	   developed	   prior	   to	   the	   arrival	   of	   a	  centralised	  state	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Steeves’	  (1996)	  	  concept	  of	  ‘unbounded	  politics’	  provides	  a	  useful	  model	  for	  understanding	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  party	  system	  as	  well	  as	  the	  broader	  political	  culture.	  Unbounded	  politics	  refers	  to	  the	  weakness	  of	  political	  parties	  to	  command	  the	  loyalty	  of	  elected	  members	  and	  thus	  their	  inability	   to	   control	   the	   legislative	   agenda.	   It	   also	   describes	   the	   tenuous	   nature	   of	   coalition	  governments	   made	   up	   of	   a	   range	   of	   different	   interests	   and	   a	   high	   number	   of	   independent	  Members.	   Political	   parties	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   are	   loose	   formations	   with	   little	   organisation	  beyond	   the	   elites	   and	   an	   absence	  of	   strong	   ideological	   leanings	   or	   established	   constituencies.	  Because	  of	  their	  relative	  youth	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  strong	  civil	  society	  or	  mass	  media	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	   they	   have	   little	   presence	   outside	   of	   parliament,	   and	   even	   less	   in	   rural	   areas	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  A	  degree	  of	  regional	  autonomy	  is	  provided	  with	  10	  provincial	  assemblies,	  which	  are	  again	  divided	  into	  local	  wards,	  administering	  regional	  affairs.	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(Kabutaulaka	   2006).	   This	   fluidity,	   both	   Steeves	   (1996)	   and	   Kabutaulaka	   (2006)	   argue,	   is	   a	  central	   cause	   of	   government	   instability	   as	   members’	   allegiances	   lie	   primarily	   with	   local	  patronage	  networks	  rather	  than	  party	  doctrine.	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   other	   explanations	   for	   the	   perceived	   failure	   of	   successive	   national	  governments	   to	  develop	   into	  meaningful	   institution	   in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  Kwa’ialoa	   (2007:113)	  writes	  from	  a	  Malaitan	  perspective	  and	  argues:	  
We	   now	   know	   that	   Solomon	   Islands	   gained	   independence	   too	   early,	   because	   our	   leaders	  
encouraged	  us	  to	  admire	  and	  respect	  them	  and	  led	  us	  into	  a	  system	  which	  did	  not	  serve	  the	  
needs	  or	   interests	  of	  the	  people.	  This	  has	  put	  us	   into	  three	  categories;	  the	  governing	  group	  
who	  became	  rich	  overnight,	  the	  middle	  group	  who	  tried	  business	  without	  much	  success,	  and	  
the	  grassroots	  who	  had	  nothing	  to	  develop	  themselves	  with.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  the	  rich	  have	  
got	  richer	  and	  the	  poor	  have	  got	  poorer,	  and	  a	  deprived	  man	  is	  an	  angry	  man,	  who	  will	  steal	  
and	  rape	  or	  even	  kill.	  
Whether	   more	   time	   under	   colonial	   rule	   would	   have	   prevented	   these	   problems	   is	   unclear.	  However,	  many	  agree	  with	  Kwa’ialoa	   that	   the	  governing	   institutions	  Solomon	  Islands	  was	   left	  with	  contributed	   to	  a	  disjuncture	  between	  state	  and	  society	  with	   the	   result	   that	  governments	  struggled	   to	   become	   relevant	   to	   the	   people	   that	   they	   governed	   (Dinnen	   2002;	   Moore	   2004;	  Wainwright	  2003).	  Like	  in	  other	  places,	  colonial	  rule	  was	  unevenly	  applied	  and,	  in	  several	  cases,	  actively	  resisted	  (Allen	  &	  Dinnen	  2010).	  This,	  in	  effect,	  made	  the	  centralised	  state	  an	  “ill-­‐fitting	  overlay”	   that	   was	   unable	   to	   control	   more	   powerful	   and	   more	   resilient	   customary	   practices	  (Wainwright	  2003:488).	  	  An	   alternative	   view	   is	   provided	   by	   those	  who	   characterise	   the	   relationship	   between	   colonial	  institutions	   and	   customary	   practices	   as	   being	   one	   of	   interdependence,	   rather	   than	  incompatibility	   (Fraenkel	  2004;	  Hameiri	  2007).	  Hameiri	  argues	   that	   in	  attempting	   to	  map	  out	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  custom	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  observers	  often	  de-­‐contextualise	  them	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  portray	  them	  as	  static	  entities.	  While	  there	  are	  key	  points	  of	  differences	  between	   traditional	   and	   modern	   practices,	   decades	   of	   interaction	   between	   the	   two	   has	  contributed	   to	   a	   unique	   fusion	   of	   customary	   processes	  with	   introduced	   systems.	   “Introduced	  institutions	   have	   been	   thoroughly	   indigenised,”	   Fraenkel	   (2004:43)	  writes.	   Thus,	   rather	   than	  frame	   the	   relationship	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   traditional-­‐modern	   binary,	   both	   Hameiri	   and	  Fraenkel	   instead	   aim	   to	   highlight	   the	   points	   of	   interaction	   between	   the	   two,	   particularly	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   customary	   processes	   have	   provided	   a	   mechanism	   for	   mitigating	   tension	   and	  fostering	  development.	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In	  describing	  the	  fluidity	  of	  national	  politics	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  Hameiri	  (2007:422)	  highlights	  the	  influence	  of	  political-­‐economy	  in	  defining	  the	  nature	  of	  conflict	  and	  cooperation	  at	  the	  elite	  level:	  	  
This	   is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	   traditional	  versus	  modern	   institutions,	  but	  one	  of	  political	  coalition	  
making	  in	  the	  context	  of	  limited	  and	  unsustained	  economic	  development,	  which	  is	  reliant	  on	  
foreign-­‐owned,	   resource-­‐intensive,	   and	   migrant	   labor-­‐dependent	   export	   industries,	   in	   a	  
geographically	  and	  ethnically	  fragmented	  country.	  	  
This	  perspective	  offers	  a	  more	  nuanced	  depiction	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  society	  than	  that	  advanced	  by	  Kwa’ioloa	  (2007)	  and	  others.	  It	  demonstrates	  the	  ability	  of	  local	  people	  and	  local	  institutions	  to	  adapt	  to	  new	  processes	  but	  also	  highlights	  the	  destabilising,	  and	  sometimes	  harmful,	  effects	  that	  these	  processes	  can	  have.	  	  For	  international	  observers,	  it	  points	  to	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	   social,	   political,	   economic	   and	   cultural	   phenomena	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   society	   and	   the	  importance	  of	  empowering	  local	  communities	  to	  engage	  with	  those	  phenomena.	  It	  is	  necessary,	  therefore,	   to	   explore	   some	  of	   these	   connections	   and	  understand	  what	   they	   reveal	   about	   local	  communities	  and	  local	  institutions.	  Economically,	   Solomon	   Islands	   was	   intended	   by	   Britain	   to	   be	   self-­‐sustainable,	   however	   its	  isolation	   prevented	   significant	   expansion	   and,	   instead,	   tended	   to	   exacerbate	   unequal	  development	   across	   the	   different	   islands.	   The	   result	   forced	  many	   Islanders	   into	   selling	   their	  labour	  offshore	  and	  significant	  internal	  migration	  (Allen	  2012;	  Bennett	  1987).	  For	  decades	  the	  economy	   has	   been	   largely	   dependent	   on	   a	   small	   number	   of	   industries	   centred	   on	   resource	  extraction.	  The	  economy	  came	   to	  be	  dependent	  on	   timber,	   fisheries	  and	  palm-­‐oil.	  Throughout	  the	  1970s	  logging	  constituted,	  on	  average,	  31.4	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  exports,	  with	  fishing	  and	  palm	  oil	  making	  up	  23.9	  per	  cent	  and	  4.6	  per	  cent,	  respectively.	  By	  the	  1990s,	  logging	  contributed	  44.8	  percent,	  and	  palm	  oil	  increased	  to	  11.6.	  Fishing	  increased	  to	  38.1	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  1980s	  before	  receding	  to	  a	  26.5	  per	  cent	  share	  of	  exports	  through	  the	  1990s	  (Fraenkel	  2004).	  	  These	   industries	  were	   largely	   controlled	  by	   foreign	   interests	  with	   little	   input	   from,	  or	  benefit	  for,	   locals.	   Growth	   in	   these	   core	   industries	   often	   came	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   more	   traditional	  enterprise	  with	  crops	  provided	  by	  smaller-­‐scale	  growers	  declining	  substantially	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  Copra’s	  contribution	  to	  overall	  export	  earnings	  declined	  from	  34.7	  per	  cent	  through	  the	  1970s	   to	   just	   5.3	   per	   cent	   through	   the	   1990s	   (Fraenkel	   2004).	   On	   the	   whole,	   economic	  development	  remains	  uneven	  or	  incomplete.	  Approximately	  85	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population	  still	  reside	   in	   rural	   areas	   (Allen	   &	   Dinnen	   2010)	   with	   around	   75	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   population	  dependent	   on	   primary	   production	   and	   subsistence	   agriculture	   (Australian	   Government	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  Economic	  Analytical	  Unit	  2004).	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In	  1971,	  Solomon	  Islands	  Plantation	  Limited	  (SIPL)	  was	  established	  to	  extract	  palm-­‐oil	   from	  a	  block	   of	   almost	   1500	   hectares	   on	   Guadalcanal.	   While	   the	   operation	   attracted	   an	   estimated	  8,000-­‐10,000	   workers	   from	   outside	   of	   Melanesia,	   it	   provided	   little	   benefit	   to	   the	   Guale	  population	  who	  only	  owned	  2	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  company	  and	  received	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  rent	  for	  the	   land	   each	   year	   (Allen	   2012;	   Kabutaulaka	   2001).	   In	   addition,	   the	   rapid	   influx	   of	   migrant	  workers	   placed	   pressure	   on	   local	   societies	   and	   contributed	   to	   a	   severe	   breakdown	   of	   social	  bonds	  within	  landowning	  groups	  on	  Guadalcanal	  (Allen	  2012).	  	  Continued	  uneven	  development	  in	  the	  years	  following	  independence	  led	  many	  to	  question	  the	  makeup	   of	   the	   economy	   and	   its	   effect	   on	   Solomon	   Islands	   society.	   	   In	   1992,	   Prime	   Minister	  Solomon	  Mamaloni	   stated	   that	   "our	   natural	   resources	   are	   rapidly	   being	   depleted,	   not	   for	   the	  welfare	  of	  those	  who	  own	  them	  but	  to	  finance	  a	  government	  system	  that	  is	  far	  remote	  from	  the	  masses."	  (qtd.	  in	  Kabutaulaka	  2001).	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  more	  effective	  national	  government	  and	  sustainable	  and	  reliable	  employment,	  indigenous	   governance	   systems	   continued	   to	   have	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   relevance	   to	   the	   lives	   of	  Solomon	  Islanders	  and,	  for	  many,	  remained	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  their	  loyalty.2	  Foremost	  among	  these	   governance	   systems	   is	   wantokism,	   defined	   by	   Brigg	   (2009:152)	   as	   “a	   system	   of	  generalised	   obligations	   and	   supports	   that	   permeates	   contemporary	   Melanesian	   social	   and	  political	   life”.	  Under	  the	  system,	  primary	  allegiances	  are	  to	  the	  more	  basic	  social	  units,	  namely	  kin	   groups,	   clans	   and	   tribes	   (Braithwaite	   et	   al.	   2010).	   These	   patterns	   of	   reciprocity	   and	  interdependence	   define	   relations	   not	   only	  within	   the	  wantok	   (literally	   translated	   as	  one-­‐talk)	  but	  also	  between	  different	  wantoks.	  Ride	  and	  Bretherton	  (2011:94-­‐95)	  write:	  	  
An	   individual’s	   daily	   life	   is	   determined	   by	   obligations	   to	   several	   layers	   of	   family,	   kin,	   and	  
social	  networks.	  This	  begins	  with	  the	  inner	  circle	  of	  immediate	  family,	  then	  broadens	  to	  the	  
extended	  family	  (laen	  or	  tribe,	  kin	  networks,	  sometime	  including	  peoples	  believed	  to	  be	  from	  
the	   same	   ancestor/s)	   –	   and	   then	   further	   broadens	   to	   fellow	   members	   of	   their	   local	  
community	  and	  language.	  The	  latter	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “wantok”	  (one-­‐talk),	  although	  wantok	   is	  used	  generally	   to	  refer	   to	  anyone	  with	  a	   familial	  or	  community	  connection	  with	  
which	  a	  person	  has	  shared	  social	  origins	  and	  obligations.	  
The	  wantok	  system	  evolved	  from	  earlier	  forms	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  grew	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  commonality	   between	   family	   lineages	   and	   the	   desire	   to	   support	   one	   another	   as	   colonial	   rule	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Again,	  it	  is	  important	  not	  to	  idealise	  these	  systems	  or	  to	  portray	  them	  as	  the	  antithesis	  of	  more	  recent	  introductions.	   As	   Fraenkel	   (2004:12)	   writes,	   “What	   was	   initially	   introduced	   has	   been	   deeply	   and	  irreversibly	  absorbed,	  and	  has	  become	  as	  much	  a	  part	  of	  perceived	  custom	  as	  that	  which	  has	  some	  formal	  continuity	  with	  the	  age-­‐old	  culture.”	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brought	   about	   new	   settings	   in	  which	   to	   do	   so.	   It	   is	   thus	   a	   relational	   term	  whose	   boundaries	  depend	  on	  the	  wider	  social	  context	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Brigg	  writes	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  one’s	  wantok	  will	  expand	  or	  contract	  as	  one	  moves	  between	  the	  local	  village	  to	  the	  larger	  city	  or	  further	   to	   an	   international	   context.	   It	   is	   this	   adaptability	   that	   has	   allowed	   it	   to	   function	   at	   a	  number	  of	  different	   levels,	   from	  village	  affairs	   to	  national	   issues	  of	  conflict	  and	  reconciliation.	  While	  several	  observers	  have	  identified	  wantokism	  and	  other	  indigenous	  governance	  systems	  as	  obstacles	   to	  development	   and	  prone	   to	   corruption	   (Fukuyama	  2008),	  more	  nuanced	  analyses	  have	  highlighted	  its	  centrality	  to	  building	  and	  strengthening	  social	  ties	  both	  within	  and	  across	  local	   communities	   (Brigg	   2009).	   Negative	   portrayals	   of	   the	   wantok	   system	   stem	   from	   its	  association	  with	  another	  core	  tenet	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  society;	  big-­‐man	  politics.	  	  Alongside	   traditional	   chiefs,	   priests	   and	   warriors,	   a	   central	   leadership	   figure	   in	   many	  Melanesian	   communities	   is	   the	   big-­‐man.3	   Big-­‐men	   gain	   their	   authority	   	   by	   exercising	   strong	  leadership	  capabilities	  through	  which	  they	  can	  bring	  together	  different	  family	  lineages,	  mobilise	  resources,	  and	  distribute	  goods	  and	  services	  among	  the	  wantok	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  While	  family	  lineage	  is	  important	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  big-­‐man,	  their	  approach	  to	  leadership	  and	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  community’s	  well-­‐being	  are	  also	  important	  in	  gaining	  the	  required	  respect	  and	  authority	  over	  the	  group.	  Zimmer-­‐Tamakoshi	  (1997:107)	  writes	  that	  “they	  singlehandedly	  command	   the	   labor,	   resources	   and	   hearts	   of	   followers	   (both	  male	   and	   female)	   through	   their	  unparalleled	  powers	  of	  persuasion	  and	  personal	  forcefulness.”	  Their	  leadership,	  however,	  is	  not	  entirely	  authoritarian.	  In	  their	  discussion	  of	  land	  and	  leadership	  among	  the	  Kwara’ae	  people	  of	  Malaita,	  Burt	  and	  Kwa-­‐ioloa	  	  (1992:31)	  describe	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  obligation	  and	  reciprocity	  are	  again	  central	  to	  leadership:	  	  
The	  leader	  wanted	  to	  let	  many	  people	  do	  things,	  because	  if	  he	  gave	  help	  to	  people	  they	  would	  
help	  him	   in	  return	  and	   they	  would	   look	  up	   to	  him	  as	   their	   important	  head	  man.	  However,	  
doing	  things	  depended	  upon	  seniority.	  So	  anyone	  who	  wanted	  to	  do	  something	   in	   the	   land	  
must	   first	  be	  sure	  that	  they	  were	  born	  of	  man	  or	  born	  of	  woman	  of	  the	   leading	  clan	  of	  the	  
land.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Keesing	  describes	  three	  different	  kinds	  of	  leadership	  in	  Melanesian	  societies:	  big-­‐men,	  warrior-­‐leaders	  and	  priests.	  Big-­‐men	  played	  a	  key	  governance	  role	  in	  that	  their	  function	  was	  to	  distribute	  resources	  and	  maintain	  the	  wantok’s	  livelihood.	  While	  big-­‐men	  were	  important,	  Keesing	  argues	  that	  the	  role	  of	  warrior-­‐leaders	  and	  priests	  has	  been	  under-­‐valued	  by	  the	  literature.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  warrior-­‐leader	  was	  to	  defend	  the	  wantok	  and	  act	  on	  its	  behalf	  in	  cases	  where	  reprisal	  actions	  needed	  to	  be	  taken	  against	  other	  groups.	  Strength	   and	   aggression	   characterised	   their	   leadership.	   Priests	   aimed	   to	  maintain	   a	   strong	   connection	  between	  the	  wantok’s	  members	  and	  its	  ancestors.	  Outside	  of	  this,	  chiefly	  or	  hereditary	  systems	  are	  also	  evident	   in	   some	   communities	   and	   McDougall	   (2003)	   identifies	   and	   discusses	   the	   leadership	   role	   that	  women’s	  groups	  have	  played	  in	  more	  recent	  times.	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The	  ethos	  of	  reciprocity	  is	  similarly	  evident	  in	  the	  community-­‐level	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  where	  big-­‐men	  are	   required	   to	   facilitate	   consultation	  and	  discussion	  among	   the	  group.	   In	   the	  case	   of	   the	   Kwara’ae,	   big-­‐man	   style	   leadership	   requires	   an	   ability	   to	   identify	   with	   their	  community	  and	  represent,	  rather	  than	  dictate,	  their	  views:	  “The	  person	  who	  was	  senior	  among	  these	  line	  descendants	  was	  called	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  clan	  or	  the	  head	  of	  the	  clan.	  It	  was	  this	  leader	  who	  spoke	  about	  things	  on	  behalf	  of	  his	  clan.	  But	  he	  could	  not	  decide	  by	  himself	  because	  he	  was	  just	  a	  part	  of	  his	  clan”	  (Burt	  &	  Kwa-­‐ioloa	  1992:17).	  It	  is	  thus	  a	  system	  of	  localised	  and	  personalised	  loyalty	  that	  has,	  in	  recent	  years,	  come	  to	  infuse	  parliamentary	   politics	   and	   define	   the	   responsibilities	   associated	   with	   representation	   at	   the	  national	   level	   (Brigg	  2009).	  There	   is	   an	  expectation	  among	  many	   that	  elected	   representatives	  will,	   in	   line	  with	  Melanesian	  customs	  of	  reciprocity	  and	  mutual	  obligation,	  provide	  benefits	   to	  their	  local	  wantoks	  in	  return	  for	  their	  support.	  In	  Solomon	  Islands,	  these	  benefits	  often	  come	  in	  the	   form	   of	   financial	   payments,	   paid	   to	   the	   representative	   by	   various	   logging	   and	   fishing	  interests	  and	  then	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  community	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  It	  is	  here	  that	  several	  observers	  have	   identified	  wantokism	  and	  big-­‐man	   leadership	   as	   a	   central	   cause	  of	   corruption	  and	  the	  basis	  of	  rent-­‐seeking	  governments.	  	  Others,	  however,	  see	  it	  as	  a	  dynamic	  system	  aimed	  at	  mediating	  between	  the	  broader	  political	  environment	   and	   the	   local	   village.	   Brigg	   (2009)	   rejects	   arguments	   that	   frame	   custom	   as	   a	  barrier	   to	   national	   development,	   highlighting	   that	   corruption	   is	   evident	   in	   many	   ‘modern’	  institutions	   and	   not	   limited	   or	   endemic	   to	   customary	   societies.	   Under	   custom,	   respect	   and	  authority	  accrue	  to	  those	  big-­‐men	  who	  not	  only	  generate	  wealth	  but	  distribute	  it	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  improves	  the	  overall	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  group	  (Zimmer-­‐Tamakoshi	  1997).	  This	  brings	  with	  it	  expectations	   and	   obligations	   that	   regulate	   the	   practices	   of	   big-­‐men	   and	   help	   to	   prevent	   the	  accumulation	  of	  wealth	  or	  power	   in	  one	   location.	  As	  Brigg	   (2009:157)	  writes:	   “The	  big-­‐man’s	  abilities	   and	   capacities	   can	  be	   realised	  only	   in	   a	   social	   network—and	   this	   same	  network	   also	  polices	  behaviour”.	  In	  addition	  to	  customary	  practices	  and	  identities,	  a	  number	  of	  other	  features	  define	  the	  socio-­‐political	   space	   in	   Solomon	   Islands.	   A	   particularly	   significant	   one	   is	   that	   of	   the	  Masta	   Liu;	   the	  unique	   culture	   that	   has	   developed	   among	   (mainly	   unemployed)	   youth	   residing	   in	  Honiara	   as	  well	  as	  other	  Melanesian	  cities.	  Most	  have	  come	  from	  villages	  into	  Honiara	  to	  find	  employment	  but	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  have	  failed	  to	  establish	  a	  stable	  income.	  Poverty	  is	  central	  to	  their	  urban	  existence	  and	  for	  some	  Masta	  Liu	  this	  leads	  to	  violence	  or	  crime.	  Jourdan	  writes:	  “Drifting	  in	  and	  out	  of	  jobs,	  in	  and	  out	  of	  hope,	  they	  are	  very	  often	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  delinquency”	  (Jourdan	  1995:202).	  Adopting	  a	  unique	  fusion	  of	  indigenous	  and	  foreign	  cultural	  symbols,	  Masta	  Liu	  have	  carved	   out	   an	   identity	   that	   stems	   from	   and	   reflects	   their	   roots	   in	   social	   and	   economic	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disadvantage.	   In	   times	   of	   conflict,	   they	   value	   masculinity	   and	   express	   their	   identity	   through	  aggression	  and	   competition.	  Their	   identity	   reflects	   elements	  of	   local	  kastom,	  such	  as	  warrior-­‐like	  leadership,	  fused	  with	  Western	  imagery	  and	  symbols,	  and	  is	  often	  framed	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  institutions	  of	  state	  power	  (Macintyre	  2008).	  	  The	  Masta	  Liu	  are	  the	  embodiment	  of	  a	  process	  of	  exchange	  and	  interaction	  that	  has	  taken	  place	  among	  many	  Solomon	   Islands	   communities	  over	  previous	  decades.	  Their	   fusion	  of	   customary	  and	  Western	  symbols	  highlights	  the	  ability	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities	  to	  engage	  with	  and	  adapt	   to	   introduced	   cultures	   whilst	   maintaining	   a	   uniquely	   Melanesian	   identity.	   Their	  experience	   demonstrates	   the	   limited	   utility	   of	   fixed	   concepts	   of	   ‘traditional’	   and	   ‘modern’	   in	  Solomon	   Islands	   and	   thus	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   recognising	   the	   degree	   of	   fluidity	   and	  diversity	   that	   characterises	   communities	   across	   the	   Islands.	   During	   the	   Tensions,	   elements	  within	  the	  Masta	  Liu	  were	  to	  become	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  the	  hostility	  and	  aggression	  that	  drove	  the	  conflict.	  They	  can	  therefore	  be	  problematic	  for	  peace-­‐builders	  who	  have	  little	  understanding	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  resistance	  that	  defines	  their	  identity	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Like	   the	   Masta	   Liu,	   most	   communities	   within	   Solomon	   Islands	   have	   shown	   enthusiasm	   to	  borrow	   from	   introduced	   systems	   and	   cultures,	   in	   order	   to	   better	   engage	   with	   an	   expanding	  social	  and	  political	  sphere.4	  Colonialism	  and	  economic	  development	  have	  provided	  a	  number	  of	  avenues	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   these	   new	   ideas	   and	   symbols.	   However,	   two	   further	   sources	  have	  been	  the	  Waku	  community	  and	  the	  church.	  Both	  have	  been	   important	  actors	   in	  Solomon	  Islands	  recent	  history,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  they	  played	  during	  the	  Tensions.	  	  
Waku	  initially	  referred	  to	  the	  Chinese	  community	  but	  has	  more	  recently	  come	  to	  encompass	  the	  wider	  Asian	  community,	  including	  Malaysian,	  Filipino	  and	  Japanese	  immigrants,	  who	  are	  more	  recent	   arrivals	   in	   Solomon	   Islands.	  While	   the	  Waku	   community	   is	   diverse,	   it	   is	   divided	  more	  arbitrarily	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  is	  viewed	  by	  Solomon	  Islanders.	  ‘Old’	  Chinese	  are	  those	  who	  have	  resided	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  for	  generations	  and	  who,	  according	  to	  locals,	  pay	  greater	  respect	  to	  Solomon	  Island	  traditions	  and	  culture	  (Moore	  2008).	   ‘New’	  Chinese	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  the	  same	  respect	  from	  Solomon	  Islanders	  due	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  their	  wealth	  is	  a	  central	  cause	  of	  corruption	  and	  their	  ownership	  of	  the	  logging	  and	  fishing	  industries.	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  April	  2006	  riots,	  Moore	  (2008)	  highlights	  how	  this	  distinction	  between	   ‘new’	  and	   ‘old’	  shaped	  the	   rioters’	  behaviour,	  with	  many	  shops	  owned	  by	   ‘old’	  Waku	   left	  untouched.	  Thus,	   the	  Waku	  identity	  carries	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  political	  significance	  in	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  public	  space.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   Efforts	   have	   been	   made	   by	   some	   to	   resist	   the	   intrusion	   of	   ‘modern’	   concepts	   into	   Solomon	   Islands	  culture.	  Most	  notable	  among	  these	  was	  the	  effort,	  under	  colonial	  rule,	  by	  the	  Moro	  Movement	  on	  Weather	  Coast	  which	  aimed	  to	  reject	  the	  encroachment	  of	  both	  the	  state	  and	  the	  church.	  The	  Movement	  was	  later	  mobilised	   by	   the	   Isatabu	   Freedom	   Movement	   during	   the	   Tensions,	   despite	   significant	   differences	   in	  philosophy	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  (Braithwaite	  2010).	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distinction	  between	  ‘old’	  and	  ‘new’	  Waku	  highlights	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  identity	  formation	  is	  a	  deeply	  political	  process,	  shaped	  by	  social	  and	  economic	  processes	  and	  sometimes	  vulnerable	  to	  simplistic	  constructions	  of	  boundaries	  and	  behaviour.	  	  Religious	  groups	  are	  another	  important	  component	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  society	  and	  one	  that	  has	  further	  contributed	  to	  its	  intricacy.	  Religious	  leaders	  have	  been	  key	  figures	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  historically.	  Keesing	  (1985)	  outlines	  the	  role	  that	  priest-­‐leaders	  have	  historically	  played	  among	  Kwaio	   communities	   in	   Malaita	   alongside	   others	   such	   as	   big-­‐men	   and	   warrior	   leaders.	   He	  illustrates	   how,	   historically,	   priest-­‐leaders	   helped	   secular	   leaders	   to	  mediate	   the	   relationship	  between	   a	   community	   and	   its	   ancestral	   linkages.	   Keesing	   (1985:248)	  writes	   that	   “Using	   such	  powers	   a	   descent	   group	   seeks	   to	   maintain	   its	   internal	   cohesion,	   preserve	   its	   external	  boundaries	   through	   peace	   and	   prestige-­‐building	   exchange,	   and	   maintain	   the	   relations	   with	  ancestors	  on	  which	  stability,	  prosperity,	  and	  life	  itself	  depend,”	  In	  more	  practical	  terms,	  priest-­‐leaders	  served	  as	  dispute	  moderators	  and	  recently	  the	  church	  has	  come	  to	  be	  an	  important	  civil	  society	  actor.	  	  Like	   priest-­‐leaders	   before	   them,	   modern	   churches	   continue	   to	   act	   as	   a	   moderating	   force	  between	  the	  influences	  of	  the	  global	  and	  local	  and	  help	  to	  establish	  networks	  through	  which	  this	  process	  can	  be	  navigated.	  McDougall	  (2003:62)	  writes:	  “Not	  only	  is	  a	  church	  the	  centre	  of	  nearly	  every	  village	  community	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  but	  churches	  also	  link	  local	  communities	  in	  island-­‐wide,	   provincial,	   national,	   and	   regional	   networks.”	   Their	   functioning	   during	   the	   Tensions	  provided	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  Solomon	  Islanders	  to	  indigenise	  introduced	  concepts	  and	   use	   them	   in	  ways	   that	   helped,	   in	   some	  ways,	   to	   resolve	   local	   issues.	   Groups	   such	   as	   the	  Melanesian	   Brotherhood	   and	   the	   Solomon	   Islands	   Christian	   Alliance	  worked	   to	   provide	   vital	  services	   during	   the	   fighting	   and	   facilitate	   early	   peace-­‐building	   efforts	   (Zaku	   2006).	   The	  involvement	  of	  the	  church	  in	  mediating	  conflict	  has	  been	  particularly	  significant	  for	  women	  who	  have	   traditionally	   found	   it	   difficult	   to	   access	   justice	   through	   formal	   dispute	   resolution	  mechanisms	  (Nagarajan	  2009).	  Churches	  provide	  a	  less	  patriarchal	  environment	  for	  women	  to	  voice	   their	   grievances	   than	   some	   formal	  or	   customary	  mechanisms.	  McDougall’s	   (2003)	  work	  examines	  the	  partnership	  between	  women’s	  groups	  and	  the	  church	  in	  the	  village	  of	  Ranongga	  that	  aimed	  to	  bring	  about	  reconciliation	  between	  militants	   from	  Malaita	  and	  Guadalcanal.	  The	  effort	  represented	  an	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  a	  vision	  of	  community	  based	  on	  Christian	  fellowship	  and	  a	  narrative	  that	  could	  bring	  together	  diverse	  and	  disparate	  groups	  under	  a	  common	  set	  of	  beliefs	   (McDougall	   2003).	   The	   importance	   of	   the	   church	   in	   modern	   times	   and	   of	   religious	  leaders	   historically,	   is	   evidence	   of	   an	   attempt	   to	   form	   links	   between	   local	   communities	   and	  transcendent	  identity	  discourses.	  It	  again	  highlights	  the	  dynamic	  relationship	  that	  has	  evolved	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between	   modern	   and	   customary	   practices	   and	   the	   responsiveness	   of	   local	   cultures	   to	  introduced	  phenomena.	  	  Conflict	  and	  Constructions	  during	  the	  ‘Tensions’	  The	  many	  different	  actors	  and	  institutions	  that	  define	  Solomon	  Island	  communities	  makes	  the	  social	   and	   political	   climate	   a	   fluid	   one	   in	   which	   the	   interactions	   between	   different	   elements	  contributes	   to	   identities	   that	   are	   multi-­‐layered	   and	   complex.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   environment	   of	  overlapping	   identities	   and	   sometimes	   divided	   loyalties	   that	   the	   primary	   conflict	   between	   the	  Isatabu	  Freedom	  Movement	  and	  the	  Malaitan	  Eagle	  Force	  emerged	  to	  shape	  the	  breakdown	  of	  law	  and	  order	   that	  occurred	   from	  1998-­‐2003.	  Much	  of	   the	  violence	   seen	  during	   the	  Tensions	  was	  centred	  around	  clashes	  between	  residents	  of	  Guadalcanal	  and	  settlers	  from	  Malaita.	  	  However,	   such	   a	   simplistic	   description	   is	   of	   little	   value	   in	   explaining	   the	   intricacies	   of	   the	  conflict	   and	   far	   less	   for	   understanding	   the	   deeper	   political	   processes	   that	   undermined	   the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  function	  and	  local	  communities’	  ability	  to	  contain	  the	  violence.	  	  The	  Malaitan-­‐Guale	  divide,	  or	  more	   specifically	   the	  political	   significance	  attached	   to	   it,	   has	   its	  roots	   in	   the	   colonial	   era.	   When	   the	   city	   of	   Honiara,	   on	   Guadalcanal,	   became	   the	   capital	   the	  employment	  and	  opportunities	  it	  provided	  exacerbated	  the	  already	  uneven	  development	  across	  Solomon	  Islands	  and	  saw	  northern	  Guadalcanal	  and	  some	  western	  islands	  develop	  much	  faster	  than	  others,	  namely	  Malaita	  (Allen	  2012).	  This	  drove	   internal	  migration	  and	  the	  settlement	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  Malaitans	  around	  the	  capital	  as	  well	  as	  other	  employment	  hubs,	   such	  as	   the	  SIPL	   operation	   and	   the	   Gold	   Ridge	   Mine.	   In	   many	   cases,	   migrants	   were	   able	   to	   settle	   on	  customary	  land	  and	  use	  informal	  land	  transactions	  to	  secure	  their	  residence	  on	  the	  island	  (Allen	  2012).	  The	  sale	  of	  land	  was	  (and	  continues	  to	  be)	  a	  particularly	  contentious	  issue.	  	  On	  much	  of	   the	   land	  on	  Guadalcanal	  ownership	  or	  custodianship	   flows	  along	  matrilineal	   lines	  (Kabutaulaka	   2001).	  However,	   this	   did	   not	   prevent	  many	  Guale	  men	   selling	   land	   to	  migrants	  from	   other	   islands,	   often	   without	   consultation	   with	   the	   rightful	   owners.	   Such	   sales	   built	   up	  resentment	   from	   younger	   generations	   (who	   consider	   the	   land	   their	   birth	   right)	   and	  women,	  who	   rarely	   saw	   any	   benefit	   from	   the	   sales	   (Dinnen	   2002;	   Kabutaulaka	   2001).	   Intermarriage	  further	   complicated	   the	   issue	   with	   Malaitan	   men	   gaining	   ownership	   of	   land	   through	   their	  marriage	   to	   Guale	   women	   (Moore	   2004).	   The	   tension	   that	   these	   land	   transactions	   created	  within	   laens	   (tribes)	   and	   wantoks	   was	   not	   insignificant.	   Allen	   writes:	   “It	   seems	   that	   the	  breakdown	   of	   relationships	   within	   landowning	   groups	   was	   just	   as	   pertinent	   to	   the	   land	  evictions	   as	   the	   disintegration	   of	   relationships	   between	   settlers	   and	   landowners.”	   (Allen	  2012:174).	   With	   the	   expansion	   of	   Honiara	   and	   the	   squatter	   settlements	   that	   surrounded	   it,	  greater	   pressure	   was	   placed	   on	   land	   ownership.	   As	   Malaitan	   settlement	   became	   more	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established	   and	   inequality	   worsened,	   the	   cleavage	   between	   settler	   and	   landowner	   gradually	  gained	  political	  salience.	  	  Increasing	   inequality	   between	   residents	   of	   the	   different	   islands	   as	   well	   as	   sporadic	   acts	   of	  violence	   on	   Guadalcanal	   provided	   the	   conditions	   under	  which	   certain	   elements	   succeeded	   in	  restructuring	  representations	  of	  identity	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities.	  While	  the	  Malaitan-­‐Guale	  divide	  had	  some	  basis	  in	  political	  and	  economic	  realities,	  it	  was	  only	  with	  more	  concerted	  efforts	  by	  those	  in	  key	  positions	  of	  power	  that	  such	  a	  frame	  was	  able	  to	  take	  precedence	  over	  competing	  narratives	  of	   struggle	   in	  Solomon	   Islands.	  The	   issues	   facing	  Solomon	   Islands	   could	  have	  been	  framed	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  Mamaloni’s	  earlier	  criticism	  of	  “a	  government	  far	  remote	  from	   the	   masses”	   and	   an	   economy	   controlled	   by	   foreign	   interests	   aimed	   to	   highlight	   the	  hierarchy	  of	  power	  relations	  that	  kept	  Solomon	  Islanders	  close	  to	  the	  bottom.	  His	  emphasis	  was	  on	   the	  horizontal	   cleavages	   that	  prevented	  upward	  mobility	  and	  effective	   representation.	  The	  ethnic	   frame,	   centred	   on	   the	   Malaitan-­‐Guale	   divide,	   was	   more	   vertical	   in	   nature	   in	   that	   it	  stressed	   the	   divisions	   between	   social	   groups.	   The	   frame	   became	   convenient	   for	   the	   more	  militant	   elements	   of	   the	   Guadalcanal	   and	   Malaitan	   communities	   who	   achieved	   political	   gain	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  common	  enemy.	  	  Kabutaulaka	   (2001)	   argues,	   however,	   that	   it	   was	   the	   media	   and	   the	   state	   who	   were	   more	  effective	   in	   cementing	   the	  ethnic	   lens	   as	   the	  primary	  explanation	   for	   the	   conflict.	  Throughout	  the	   conflict,	   both	   local	   and	   international	   media	   were	   reluctant	   or	   unable	   to	   go	   beyond	   this	  simple	   construction.	   Many	   foreign	   journalists	   had	   no	   experience	   of	   the	   Solomon	   Islands’	  political	   culture	   and	   faced	   pressure	   for	   headlines.	   While	   their	   intention	   may	   have	   been	   to	  convey,	   in	   a	   concise	   manner,	   the	   conflict	   to	   an	   international	   audience,	   they	   were,	   in	   effect,	  “constructing	   knowledge...about	   a	   group	   of	   people	   they	   had	   never	   met	   or	   spoken	   with.”	  (Kabutaulaka	  2001).	  Likewise,	  state	  actors	  in	  their	  handling	  of	  the	  violence	  preferred	  to	  use	  the	  ethnic	  frame	  as	  a	  way	  of	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  it	  and	  its	  underlying	  causes.	  By	  using	  terms	  such	   as	   “ethnic	   tension”,	   “militants”	   and	   “criminals”,	   successive	   governments	   aimed	   to	   de-­‐contextualise	   the	   violence	   and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   deny	   that	   it	   was	   rooted	   in	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  governing	   elite	   to	   address	   uneven	   development	   and	   inequality	   across	   Solomon	   Islands	  (Kabutaulaka	  2001).	  	  Seemingly	   primordial	   distinctions	   allowed	   grievances	   to	   be	   divorced	   from	   their	   complex	  histories	  and	   instead	  connected	  to	  a	  much	  simpler	  overarching	  narrative.	  The	  adoption	  of	   the	  ethnic	   frame	  by	  both	   the	  media	  and	   the	  state	  amplified	   the	  claims	  of	   those	  who	  were	  already	  seeking	   to	   impose	   it	   on	   a	   diverse	   population.	   It	   gave	   those	   elements	   the	   ability	   to	   define	   the	  nature	   of	   grievances	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   and,	   through	   this,	   mobilise	   the	   various	   strands	   of	  discontent	  and	  frustration	  under	  a	  common	  agenda.	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A	   formal	   representation	  of	  Guale	  discontent	  came	   in	  1988	  with	   the	  release	  of	   “The	  Bona	  Fide	  Demands	  of	  the	  Indigenous	  People	  of	  Guadalcanal”.	  Drafted	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  public	  officers	  and	   politicians,	   the	   petition	   made	   a	   number	   of	   demands	   aimed	   at	   resolving	   both	   land	   and	  governance	   issues	   on	   Guadalcanal.	   They	   included:	   an	   immediate	   response	   to	   the	   murder	   of	  Guale	  residents	  allegedly	  by	  Malaitan	  settlers;	   the	  shifting	  of	   large-­‐scale	  development	  projects	  away	   from	   Guadalcanal;	   the	   repatriation	   of	   settlers	   and	   greater	   restrictions	   on	   internal	  migration;	   registration	  of	   customary	   land;	  and,	   in	   line	  with	   the	  recommendations	  of	   the	  1987	  Constitutional	  Review	  Committee,	  a	  federal	  government	  allowing	  for	  greater	  Guale	  control	  over	  Guadalcanal	  (cited	  in	  Parliamentary	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee	  2009).	  5	  Like	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Constitutional	   Review	   Committee,	   the	   petition	   was	   presented	   to	   parliament	   but	   never	   acted	  upon.	   The	   demands	   were	   again	   presented	   to	   the	   government	   following	   the	   rape	   of	   a	   Guale	  woman	  by	  Malaitan	  settlers	  in	  May	  1998	  but	  again	  were	  not	  acted	  upon	  (Parliamentary	  Foreign	  Relations	   Committee	   2009).	   The	   continued	  marginalisation	   of	   Guale	   interests	   at	   the	   national	  level,	   alongside	  events	   such	  as	   the	   rape	   incident,	   served	   to	   further	   radicalise	   elements	  within	  the	  Guadalcanal	  population.	  	  The	   sale	   of	   the	   government’s	   30	   per	   cent	   share	   in	   SIPL,	   a	   year	   earlier,	   had	   also	   angered	   the	  Guale	   community	   who	   wanted	   to	   see	   the	   share	   given	   to	   the	   Guadalcanal	   Provincial	  Government.6	   The	   election	   in	   1998	   of	   former	   Prime	   Minister	   Ezekiel	   Alebua7	   as	   Premier	   of	  Guadalcanal	  provided	  further	  incitement	  as	  he	  and	  other	  Guale	  leaders	  sought	  to	  gain	  political	  momentum	  through	  inflaming	  the	  Malaitan-­‐Guale	  divide	  (Moore	  2004).	  It	  was	  these	  short-­‐term	  factors	  that	  served	  to	  bring	  long-­‐term	  pressure	  and	  resentment	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  political	  discourse.	  	  In	  November	  1998,	  Premier	  Alebua	  issued	  a	  demand	  for	  $2.5m	  in	  compensation	  for	  the	  murder	  of	  25	  Guadalcanal	  residents	  by	  settlers	  and	  for	  the	  use	  of	  Honiara	  as	  the	  national	  capital.	  Veiled	  threats	   of	   violent	   reprisals	   were	   not	   taken	   seriously	   and	   the	   demands	   were	   again	   not	   acted	  upon.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A	  Constitutional	  Review	  Committee	  was	  established	  in	  1987	  to	  address	  some	  of	  the	  concerns.	  Alongside	  other	  changes,	  it	  recommended	  a	  federal	  governing	  structure	  for	  Solomon	  Islands.	  The	  recommendations,	  however,	  were	  never	  acted	  upon	  by	  the	  Parliament	  (Parliamentary	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee	  2009).	  	  6	  The	  government’s	  30	  per	  cent	  share	  was	  divided	  into	  two	  parcels.	  20	  per	  cent	  was	  sold	  to	  the	  British-­‐owned	   Commonwealth	   Development	   Corporation	   while	   the	   remaining	   10	   per	   cent	   was	   to	   be	  administered	   on	   behalf	   of	   Solomon	   Islanders	   by	   the	   Investment	   Corporation	   of	   Solomon	   Islands	  (Kabutaulaka	  2001).	  7	  Ezekiel	  Alebua	  was	  Prime	  Minister	  at	   the	   time	   the	   ‘Bona	  Fide	  Demands’	  were	   initially	  presented	  as	  a	  petition	  in	  1988.	  He	  took	  no	  action	  because	  he	  believed	  his	  proper	  role	  was	  to	  govern	  Solomon	  Islands	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  not	  seek	  to	  advance	  one	  group’s	  agenda	  against	  another	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010)	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The	  culmination	  of	  the	  building	  tension	  was	  a	  campaign	  led	  by	  a	  group	  of	  Guadalcanal	  militants,	  known	   first	   as	   the	   Guadalcanal	   Revolutionary	   Army	   (GRA)	   and	   later	   as	   the	   Isatabu	   Freedom	  Movement	  (IFM),	  8	  to	  forcefully	  evict	  the	  mainly	  Malaitan	  settlers	  from	  their	  land.	  	  Isolated	  incidents	  between	  the	  groups	  had	  occurred	  over	  the	  preceding	  years	  but	  it	  was	  only	  in	  July	   1998	   that	   the	   situation	   descended	   into	   armed	   conflict.	   A	   raid	   on	   the	   police	   armoury	   at	  Yandina	   yielded	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   high-­‐powered	   firearms	  which	  were	   then	   distributed	  across	   Guadalcanal	   (Solomon	   Islands	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	   Commission	   2012:58).	   Early	  violent	   episodes	   were	   concentrated	   in	   western	   Guadalcanal,	   particularly	   Tambea	   and	   Lambi	  Bay,	  where	  the	  influx	  of	  migrant	  workers	  had	  been	  particularly	  high.	  Malaitan	  houses,	  cars	  and	  businesses	  were	   targeted	   and	   road	   blocks	  were	   established	   to	   both	   control	   the	  movement	   of	  people	  and	   to	   intimidate.	  Raids	  on	   foreign-­‐owned	  resorts	  were	  also	  common.	  Militant	  activity	  increased	  in	  March	  1999	  when	  militant	  Guale,	  Harold	  Keke	  and	  his	  brother	  Joseph	  Sangu,	  were	  released	  on	  bail	  (Moore	  2004).	  By	  November	  1999,	  a	  total	  of	  35,309	  people	  had	  been	  displaced	  by	  the	  violence	  (Fraenkel	  2004).	  	  The	  Royal	  Solomon	  Islands	  Police	  Force	  (RSIPF)9	  responded	  aggressively.	  In	  December	  1998,	  a	  Guadalcanal	  youth	  was	  shot	  dead	  by	  police	  and	  after	  18	  months	  of	  conflict	  13	  IFM	  militants	  had	  died.	   The	   IFM	   uprising	   was	   initially	   treated	   by	   the	   government	   as	   a	   small-­‐scale	   insurgency;	  however,	  after	  ongoing	  clashes	  with	  the	  RSIP,	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  on	  Guadalcanal	  was	  declared	  in	  June	  1999.	  The	  government’s	  initially	  dismissive	  approach	  combined	  with	  IFM	  deaths	  at	  the	  hands	  of	   the	  police	  encouraged	  young	  men	   to	   join	   the	  movement	   (Dinnen	  2002;	  Kabutaulaka	  2001).	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  IFM	  attract	  new	  recruits	  they	  managed	  to	  guide	  public	  opinion	  among	  Guale	  communities	  towards	  their	  cause.	  While	  many	  areas	  were	  unaffected	  and	  saw	  very	  little	  of	  the	  conflict,	  Kabutaulaka	  (2001)	  writes	  that	  “the	  general	  feeling	  throughout	  the	  island	  is	  that	  of	  agreement	  with	  the	  IFM.”	  	  The	   inconsistent	   response	   from	   central	   government	   also	   provided	   the	   IFM	   with	   some	  momentum.	  Braithwaite	  describes	  how	  the	  government	  faltered	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  the	   evictions,	   wavering	   between	   calls	   for	   greater	   dialogue	   and	   calls	   for	   greater	   force.	   The	  differing	  stances	  were	  regarded	  either	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  weakness	  or	  of	  a	  repressive	  state	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  Malaitan	  interests	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	   The	   name	   change	   is	   significant	   in	   that	   it	   aims	   to	   fundamentally	   reframe	   the	   movement,	   altering	   its	  outlook	  from	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  revolutionary	  movem	  ent	  to	  a	  more	  primordial	  one,	  connected	  through	  ancestral	   linkages	  to	  Isatabu,	   the	  traditional	  name	  for	  Guadalcanal	   (Moore	   2004).	   Harold	   Keke	  was	   particularly	   insistent	   that	   his	   followers	   should	  wear	   that	  traditional	  kabiloto	  and	  strictly	  adhere	  to	  customary	  law	  (Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  Solomon	  Islands	  2012:	  172).	  	  9	  Solomon	  Islands	  has	  no	  military	  force.	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Late	   1999	   saw	   a	   number	   of	   peace	   efforts	   being	   made.	   The	   first,	   in	   line	   with	   kastom,	   was	   a	  reconciliation	   feast.	  While	   it	   aimed	   to	   address	   Guale	   grievances	   through	   traditional	  means,	   it	  was	  not	  attended	  by	  the	  IFM	  militants.	  A	  further	  effort	  was	  made	  in	  June	  1999	  when	  Fijian	  coup	  leader	   Sitiveni	   Rabuka	   and	   Nigerian	   Ade	   Adefuye	   were	   deployed	   as	   Commonwealth	   envoys.	  With	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  IFM,	  they	  brokered	  the	  Honiara	  Peace	  Accord	  which	  called	  on	  the	  militants	   to	   renounce	   violence,	   recognise	   the	   legitimate	   grievances	   of	   the	   Guadalcanal	  community	   and	   pay	   compensation	   to	   those	   who	   had	   been	   forcefully	   evicted.	   The	   IFM’s	  involvement,	   however,	   did	  not	   extend	   to	   signing	   the	   agreement	   and	   the	   eviction	  of	  Malaitans	  continued	   unchecked.	   A	   later	   effort,	   the	   Panatina	   Agreement	   in	   August	   1999,	   reaffirmed	   the	  Honiara	  Peace	  Accord	  and	  called	  on	  renewed	  efforts	  to	  end	  the	  violence	  but,	  like	  the	  Accord	  and	  other	   Australian-­‐	   and	   New	   Zealand-­‐brokered	   efforts,	   had	   little	   effect	   on	   levels	   of	   violence	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  The	   failure	   of	   the	   government	   and	   international	   actors	   to	   bring	   the	   violence	   to	   an	   end	   saw	  a	  small	  group	  of	  Malaitans	  take	  up	  arms	  in	  defence	  of	  their	  homes	  and	  businesses.	  The	  formation	  of	  the	  Malaitan	  Eagle	  Force	  (MEF)	  in	  early	  2000	  led	  to	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  tension.	  The	  MEF	  had	  close	  connections	  with	   the	  RSIPF	  and	  access	   to	  high-­‐powered	  weapons	  and	  military-­‐style	  equipment.	   As	   the	   fighting	   continued,	   the	   flight	   of	   non-­‐Malaitan	   officers	   from	   the	   RSIPF	  intensified	  and	   its	  agenda	  became	   increasingly	  aligned	  with	   the	  MEF	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Dinnen	  2002).	  	  IFM	   bases	   in	   Honiara	   became	   the	   focus	   of	   Malaitan	   aggression,	   along	   with	   any	   who	   had	  sympathised	   with	   the	   Guadalcanal	   movement.	   In	   June	   2000,	   the	   MEF,	   operating	   alongside	  elements	  of	  the	  paramilitary	  wing	  of	  the	  police	  force,	  seized	  a	  police	  armoury	  at	  Auki	  and	  placed	  the	  Prime	  Minister	   and	  Governor-­‐General	   under	  house	   arrest.	   Spokesman	  and	  key	  negotiator	  for	  the	  MEF,	  Andrew	  Nori,	  demanded	  a	  new	  national	  leader	  be	  elected	  by	  the	  parliament	  after	  Prime	  Minister,	  Bartholomew	  Ulufa’alu,	  resigned	  following	  the	  coup	  (cited	  in	  Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  six	  MPs	  who	  were	  allegedly	   threatened	  by	  MEF	  militants,	  Opposition	  leader,	  Manasseh	  Sogavare,	  was	  elected	  Prime	  Minister	  (Dinnen	  2002).	  	  	  Sogavare’s	  compensation-­‐before-­‐reconciliation	  approach	  aimed	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  resolution	   to	  the	   conflict.	   The	   plan,	   however,	   was	   seen	   as	   heavily	   geared	   towards	   Malaitan	   interests,	  providing	  large	  sums	  of	  money	  to	  those	  who	  had	  been	  evicted	  from	  their	   land	  on	  Guadalcanal	  (Moore	  2004).	  	  In	  the	  months	  that	  followed	  the	  coup,	  the	  MEF	  effectively	  acted	  as	  “the	  government’s	  alternative	  power	  base”	  (Moore	  2004:138),	  taking	  control	  of	  Honiara	  and	  making	  incursions	  into	  IFM-­‐held	  territory	   around	   the	   city.	   The	   government	   had	   little	   capacity	   to	   counter	   such	   a	   well-­‐armed	  movement,	  and	  intimidation,	  destruction	  and	  violence	  worsened	  significantly.	  In	  many	  respects,	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the	  RSIPF	   contributed	   further	   to	   the	  problem.	  High-­‐ranking	  officers	  were	  actively	   involved	   in	  the	  planning	  and	  carrying	  out	  of	   the	   raids	  on	  police	  armouries	  and	   this	  provided	   the	  militant	  groups	  with	  the	  bulk	  of	  their	  high-­‐powered	  weaponry.	  Other	  officers	  simply	  handed	  over	  their	  weapons.	   The	   force	   became	   increasingly	   factionalised	   and	   this	   made	   it	   difficult	   for	   frontline	  officers	   to	   carry	   out	   their	   work	   effectively.	   The	   findings	   of	   the	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	  (Solomon	   Islands	   Truth	   and	   Reconciliation	   Commission	   2012:80)	   highlight	   the	   collapse	   of	  authority	  and	  structure	  throughout	  the	  organisation:	  	  
Between	  1998	  and	  2000	  the	  RSIPF	  disintegrated.	  Ethnic	  allegiances	  ruined	  the	  professional	  
codes	  and	  the	   loyalty	   the	  police	  officers	   [felt]	   towards	  the	  Force.	  Discipline	  and	  respect	   for	  
rank	  faded	  away	  as	  executives	  were	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  hold	  the	  institution	  together....	  	  
As	  the	  fighting	  intensified	  and	  battle	  lines	  between	  the	  IFM	  and	  MEF	  became	  more	  entrenched,	  the	  conflict	  began	   to	  have	  more	  serious	   implications	   for	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  country.	  Australia	  and	  New	   Zealand	   had	   already	   declined	   to	   intervene	   prior	   to	   the	   coup	   and	   the	   deployment	   of	   an	  Australian	   naval	   vessel	   to	   evacuate	   foreign	   nationals	   did	   little	   to	   quell	   the	   country’s	   descent	  (Dinnen	  2002).	  Government	   incapacity	   led	   to	  economic	   collapse	  with	   large-­‐scale	   capital	   flight	  contributing	   further	   to	   the	   government’s	   already	   precarious	   financial	   position.	   In	   2000,	  government	  defaults	  on	  loans,	  a	  dramatic	  decline	  in	  exports	  and	  decreasing	  commodity	  prices	  led	   GDP	   per	   capita	   to	   drop	   by	   18	   per	   cent	   (Australian	   Government	   Department	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  Economic	  Analytical	  Unit	  2004).	  	  A	  Failed	  Peace	  and	  a	  ‘Failed	  State’	  As	   the	   situation	   endured	   through	   the	   early	   2000s,	   ethnic	   tension	   gradually	   gave	  way	   to	   civil	  unrest	  and	  lawlessness.	  Rioting	  and	  looting	  came	  to	  characterise	  areas	  of	  Honiara	  and	  high-­‐level	  corruption	   further	   inhibited	   an	   effective	   indigenous	   response.	   Some	   degree	   of	   reconciliation	  was	   achieved	   through	   the	   Townsville	   Peace	   Agreement	   signed	   in	  mid-­‐2000.	   It	   called	   for	   the	  parliament	   to	   pass	   an	   Amnesty	   Act	   following	   the	   surrender	   of	   weapons	   by	   both	   sides.	   The	  repatriation	   of	   militants	   and	   compensation	   for	   those	   who	   had	   lost	   property	   were	   further	  components	   of	   the	   agreement.	   RSIPF	   officers	   who	   had	   joined	   the	   MEF,	   deserted	   or	   misused	  their	   power	  were	   free	   to	   return	  without	   fear	   of	   sanction.	   An	   International	   Peace	  Monitoring	  Team	   made	   up	   from	   other	   Pacific	   nations	   and	   a	   Solomon	   Islands	   Peace	   Monitoring	   Council	  would	  oversee	  these	  processes.	  	  Like	   earlier	   attempts	   at	   peace,	  militant	   IFM	   leader,	   Harold	   Keke,	   did	   not	   attend.	   His	   absence	  made	  the	  MEF	  reluctant	   to	  genuinely	  embrace	  the	  process.	  A	   further	  absence	  was	  that	  of	  civil	  society	   groups.	   Church	   groups,	   NGOs,	   and	  women’s	   association	   had	   been	   active	   up	   until	   this	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time	   aiming	   to	   bring	   peace	   through	   local	   collective	   action	   (Leslie	   &	   Boso	   2003;	   McDougall	  2003).	   In	  Townsville,	   they	  were	   excluded	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   the	   focus	  on	   the	  militants	   and	   the	  violence.	  The	  Townsville	  Peace	  Agreement	  did	  contribute	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  fighting	  between	  the	  IFM	  and	  MEF.	   However,	   the	   more	   substantive	   issues	   relating	   to	   land,	   inequality	   and	   corruption	  continued	   to	   undermine	   law	   and	   order	   and	   hinder	   the	   reconciliation	   process.	   There	  were	   no	  provisions	  made	   for	   those	  outside	  Guadalcanal	  or	  Malaita.	   In	  addition,	   the	  MEF	  retained	   their	  strong	   links	  with	   the	  police	   force,	  notable	  militant	  Harold	  Keke	  was	   still	   at	   large	   and	  actively	  working	  against	  the	  peace	  process,	  and	  the	  population	  remained	  heavily	  militarised	  despite	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  International	  Peace	  Monitoring	  Team	  (Dinnen	  2002).	  Similar	  violence	  occurring	  in	  the	  Marau	  region	  also	  went	  unresolved.	  	  A	   significant	   problem	   was	   the	   inability	   of	   both	   sides	   to	   control	   rogue	   elements	   within	   their	  ranks,	   for	   example	  Harold	  Keke.	   Initially	   a	  member	  of	   the	   IFM	   from	   the	  Weather	  Coast,	  Keke	  provided	   some	   degree	   of	   consensus	   between	   the	   MEF	   and	   IFM	   who	   both	   made	   efforts	   to	  capture	  him.10	  Keke’s	  disaffection	  was	   representative	  of	  a	  deeper	   rift	  within	   the	   IFM	  between	  elements	  from	  the	  Weather	  Coast	  and	  those	  from	  the	  north	  of	  the	  Island	  (Kabutaulaka	  2001).11	  On	  the	  Malaitan	  side,	  there	  were	  clashes	  over	  claims	  to	  compensation,	  especially	  given	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  (Moore	  2004).	  A	  more	  difficult	   issue,	  especially	  for	  Malaita,	  was	  maintaining	  the	  image	  of	  a	  united	  front	  against	  Guale	  evictions.	  Kabutaulaka	  writes	  that	  “the	  existence	  of	  various	  groups	   within	   the	   Malaita	   Eagle	   Force	   (MEF)	   (throughout	   the	   crisis)	   was	   a	   manifestation	   of	  deep	  divisions	   between	  Malaitans	   and	   the	   difficulties	   of	   constructing	   a	   homogenous	  Malaitan	  identity”	   and	   that	   events	   such	   as	   the	   burning	   of	   Andrew	   Nori’s	   office	   were	   “further	  demonstration[s]	   of	   fragility	   of	   [sic]	   and	   temporariness	   of	   Malaitan	   ethnic	   mobilization.”	  (Kabutaulaka	  2001).	  	  The	  fracturing	  of	  both	  the	  MEF	  and	  IFM	  served	  to	  challenge	  dominant	  perceptions	  of	  the	  conflict	  as	  being	  ethnically-­‐based	  by	  highlighting	  the	  diverse	  interests	  and	  unique	  experiences	  of	  what	  were	  presented	  as	  united	  entities.	  A	  further	  element	  proving	  difficult	  to	  control	  was	  the	  Masta	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	   Harold	   Keke,	   an	   IFM	   leader	   from	   the	  Weather	   Coast,	   formed	   the	   Guadalcanal	   Liberation	   Front	  with	  other	  elements	  from	  Guadalcanal	  who	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  Townsville	  Peace	  Agreement.	  He	  was	  regarded	  as	  mentally	  unstable	  and	  responsible	  for	  up	  to	  24	  murders	  and	  an	  assassination	  attempt	  of	  Guadalcanal	  Premier,	   Ezekiel	   Alebua.	   He	   came	   to	   seen	   as	   one	   of	   the	   most	   prolific	   spoilers	   of	   the	   peace	   process,	  especially	   following	   the	   kidnapping	   and	   murder	   of	   7	   Melanesian	   Brothers	   who	   had	   travelled	   to	   the	  Weather	  Coast	  to	  make	  peace	  (Braithwaite	  2010).	  	  11	   Following	   the	   Townsville	   Peace	   Agreement,	   an	   effort	   was	   made	   by	   the	   government	   to	   arm	   former	  militants	  from	  both	  the	  IFM	  and	  MEF	  as	  part	  of	  a	  ‘Joint	  Operation’	  to	  capture	  Harold	  Keke.	  The	  effort	  went	  against	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Townsville	  Peace	  and	  only	  contributed	  to	  the	  problem	  on	  the	  Weather	  Coast	  	  (Solomon	  Islands	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  2012).	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Liu	   with	   many	   benefiting	   from	   the	   lawlessness,	   by	   using	   weapons	   to	   extort	   payments	   and	  compensation	  from	  others.	  As	  members	  of	  the	  various	  militant	  groups,	  the	  Masta	  Liu	  “cherished	  their	   new	   status	   and	   guns	   as	   symbolising	   a	   degree	   of	   social	   power	   that	   was	   otherwise	  unthinkable	   and	   impossible”	   (Fraenkel	   2004:119).	   The	   breakdown	   of	   law	   and	   order	  exacerbated	   their	   disillusionment	   and	   rewarded	   their	   aggression.	   The	   Tensions	   provided	   an	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  could	  give	  meaning	  to	  their	  culture	  of	  resistance.	  	  As	   law	   and	   order	   continued	   to	   break	   down,	   the	   Malaitan-­‐Guale	   divide	   became	   increasingly	  meaningless	   as	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   conflict.	   The	   conflict’s	   unravelling	   demonstrated	   the	  multiple	   layers	   of	   grievances	   that	   stretched	   both	   horizontally	   and	   vertically	   across	   Solomon	  Islands.	  Social	  and	  political	  relationships	  continued	  to	  be	  undermined	  by	  the	  failure	  to	  address	  the	   underlying	   causes	   of	   the	   Tensions.	   In	   many	   respects,	   the	   conditions	   that	   led	   to	   violent	  conflict	  were	  exacerbated.	  	  Throughout	   the	   conflict,	   no	   serious	   effort	   was	   put	   towards	   combating	   corruption;	   a	   central	  cause	  behind	  the	  erosion	  of	  trust	  between	  Solomon	  Island	  citizens	  and	  their	  government.	  While	  peace	   agreements	   aimed	   to	   include	   provisions	   for	   reconciliation	   through	   compensation	   (an	  approach	  in	   line	  with	  customary	  practices),	  many	  such	  provisions	  were	  exploited	  for	   financial	  gain.	  The	  Townsville	  Peace	  Agreement	  had	  aimed	  to	  accommodate	  former	  militants	  by	  paying	  allowances	  to	  them	  if	  they	  returned	  to	  Malaita,	  however,	  the	  scheme	  was	  prone	  to	  exploitation	  with	   many	   returning	   to	   Guadalcanal	   as	   a	   way	   of	   extorting	   money	   (Dinnen	   2002).	   Prime	  Minister,	  Manasseh	  Sogavare,	  admitted	  in	  2001	  that	  up	  to	  S$40m	  had	  been	  spent	  on	  fraudulent	  compensation	  payments	  (cited	   in	  Fraenkel	  2004:122).	  The	  payouts	  to	  militants	  placed	  further	  pressure	   on	   the	   country’s	   finances	   and	   only	   served	   to	   give	   the	   ‘spoils	   of	   peace’	   to	   those	  who	  posed	   the	   largest	   barrier	   to	   effective	   reconciliation.	   	   A	   further	   provision	   of	   the	   Agreement	  allowed	  for	  the	  appointment	  of	  former	  militants	  as	   ‘special	  constables’	  within	  the	  police	  force.	  Again,	  this	  was	  abused	  with	  over	  2000,	  mainly	  ex-­‐MEF	  fighters,	  being	  appointed	  to	  the	  positions	  in	  just	  over	  a	  year	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  The	  corruption	  perpetrated	  by	  militants	  was	  only	  a	  part	  of	  the	  problem.	  Corrupt	  practices	  in	  the	  logging	   and	   fishing	   industries	   distorted	   economic	   incentives	   and	   undermined	   fiscal	   stability.	  More	  importantly,	  however,	  stories	  of	  militants	  and	  politicians	  receiving	  financial	  gain	  from	  the	  conflict	  served	  to	  deflate	  the	  optimism	  of	  the	  post-­‐Townsville	  peace	  process.	  The	  government,	  due	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   its	   involvement	   in	   encouraging	   corrupt	   practices,	   became	   increasingly	  marginal	  to	  people’s	  visions	  of	  a	  peaceful	  future.	  As	  Fraenkel	  writes	  “Signs	  of	  hope	  existed,	  and	  the	   aspiration	   for	   change	   was	   far	   stronger	   than	   the	   ability	   to	   realise	   those	   hopes.	   But	   there	  existed	  no	  catalyst	  for	  top-­‐level	  change.	  No	  circuit-­‐breaker	  was	  available	  to	  decisively	  break	  the	  power	  of	  the	  militants.”	  (Fraenkel	  2004:158).	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Corruption	  also	  served	  to	  highlight	  the	  structural	  inequality	  that	  had	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  violent	  conflict.	  Part	  of	  this	  was	  the	  perceived	  favouring	  of	  Malaitan	  interests	  over	  Guale	  by	  the	  government.	   As	   highlighted	   above,	   several	   provisions	   of	   the	   Townsville	   Peace	   Agreement	  allowed	   for	   Malaitan	   militants	   to	   benefit	   financially	   from	   the	   Agreement	   and	   to	   retain	   their	  positions	   in	   the	  RSIP.	  Fraenkel	   (2004:122)	  cites	  some	  notable	  examples,	   including	   the	  case	  of	  MEF	  member	  Andrew	  Fioga	  being	  paid	  a	  S$100,000	  compensation	  payment	  for	  “panel	  beating.”	  	  The	   Agreement	   highlighted	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   political	   agenda	   had	   been	   corrupted	   by	  militants	   on	   both	   sides,	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   a	   number	   of	   competing	   interests.	   	   Compensation	  payments	   indebted	   the	   government	   to	  militant	   groups	  who	  were	   able	   to	   back	   up	   their	   ever-­‐escalating	  demands	  with	  threats	  of	  violence	  (Dinnen	  2002).	  The	  government’s	  fiscal	  position	  led	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  vital	  services	  on	  other	  islands	  not	  involved	  in	  the	  conflict.	  All	  health	  services	  on	  Makira-­‐Ulawa	  were	  suspended	   in	  2001	  and	   the	  education	  system	  on	   Isabel	  collapsed	  after	  teachers’	  wages	  went	   unpaid	   (Dinnen	  2002:294).	   It	  was	  becoming	   increasingly	   apparent	   that	  concerted	   efforts	   by	   the	   government	   and	   its	   international	   partners	   to	   bring	   an	   end	   to	   the	  violence	  would	  mean	   further	  marginalisation	   of	   those	   communities	  who	   had	   not	   resorted	   to	  violence.	   The	   Townsville	   process	   had	   seen	   the	   deliberate	   exclusion	   of	   civil	   society	   groups	  (Braithwaite	   et	   al.	   2010)	   which	   led	   it	   to	   be	   described	   as	   “a	   militants’	   charter”	   (Fraenkel	  2004:101).	  As	  both	  the	   IFM	  and	  MEF	  cemented	  their	   influence	   in	  Honiara,	   the	  work	  put	   in	  by	  churches,	  women’s	  groups	  and	  the	  Civil	  Society	  Network	  often	  went	  ignored	  or	  neglected	  with	  the	   result	   that	   avenues	   of	   access	   to	   central	   government	  were	   constricted	   for	  many.	   	   In	  many	  respects	   their	   exclusion	   reflects	   the	   larger	   issues	   hindering	   the	   peace	   process.	   Allowing	   civil	  society	  involvement	  would	  have	  effectively	  been	  a	  concession	  that	  this	  conflict	  was	  about	  more	  than	  Malaita	   and	   Guadalcanal	   and	   that	  more	   deep-­‐seated	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   political	   issues	  were	  at	  its	  core.	  Violence	  and	  disorder	  continued	  through	  the	  early	  2000s	  as	  efforts	  to	  capture	  Keke	  failed.	  The	  RSIPF	  continued	  to	  decline	  in	  both	  professionalism	  and	  capacity	  as	  gangs	  took	  root	  in	  Honiara.	  Prime	  Minister	  Sogavare’s	  government	  lasted	  until	  the	  2001	  elections,	  when	  he	  was	  ousted	  by	  Sir	   Allan	   Kemakeza.	   Kemakeza	   promised	   an	   improvement	   to	   the	   law-­‐and-­‐order	   situation	  although	  his	  efforts	  remained	  handicapped	  by	  the	  divided	  loyalties	  and	  fractured	  nature	  of	  the	  police	  force.	  Episodes	  of	  murder	  and	  torture	  demonstrated	  that	  neither	  the	  police	  nor	  the	  MEF	  had	  a	  firm	  grasp	  on	  the	  security	  situation.	  Compensation	  payments	  arising	  from	  the	  Townsville	  Agreement	  further	  bankrupted	  the	  state,	  with	  corruption	  and	  dishonesty	  resulting	  in	  millions	  of	  dollars	  being	  wasted.	  	  Increasingly,	   Solomon	   Islands	   came	   to	   be	   seen	   by	   the	   international	   community	   and	   other	  observers	   as	   a	   ‘failing’	   or	   ‘failed	   state’	   (Australian	  Government	  Department	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs	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and	   Trade	   Economic	   Analytical	   Unit	   2004;	   Australian	   Strategic	   Policy	   Institute	   2003;	   The	  Economist	  2003;	  Wainwright	  2003)12.	  In	  April	  2003,	  Sir	  Allan	  Kemakeza	  made	  another	  request	  for	  assistance	  from	  Australia.	  After	  having	  earlier	  dismissed	  as	  “folly	  in	  the	  extreme”	  the	  idea	  of	  Australian	   intervention	   in	   Solomon	   Islands,	   Foreign	   Minister	   Alexander	   Downer,	   and	   his	  counterpart	  in	  New	  Zealand	  Phil	  Goff,	  were	  this	  time	  more	  willing	  to	  consider	  such	  action	  and	  went	  about	  laying	  the	  groundwork	  for	  a	  broad-­‐based	  regional	  intervention.	  	  The	  Regional	  Assistance	  Mission	  to	  Solomon	  Islands	  Australia’s	   decision	   to	   intervene	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   represented	   a	   reversal	   of	   its	   earlier	  reluctance	  to	  become	  too	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  conflict	  there	  (Boege	  2008;	  Fry	  &	  Kabutaulaka	  2008;	   Hegarty	   2005).	   Events	   such	   as	   9/11	   and	   the	   Bali	   bombings	   had	   heightened	   concern	  regarding	  Australia’s	  leadership	  on	  issues	  of	  state	  instability	  in	  the	  region	  as	  well	  as	  fears	  over	  the	  possible	   infiltration	  of	  Pacific	  societies	  by	   terrorist	  groups	  (Fry	  2008;	  Greener-­‐Barcham	  &	  Barcham	   2006).	   These	   concerns	   catalysed	   broader	   shifts	   occurring	   in	   the	   international	  community	  and	  pushed	  regional	  actors	  towards	  a	  more	  pro-­‐intervention	  stance.	  While	  Australia	  and	  New	   Zealand	   had	   been	   part	   of	   this	   shift	   in	   other	   theatres,	   it	  was	   only	   in	   2003	   that	   such	  thinking	  was	  applied	  to	  a	  case	  in	  the	  Pacific	  (Boege	  2008;	  Dinnen	  2008;	  Hameiri	  2009b).	  	  A	   report	   produced	   around	   this	   time	   by	   the	   Australian	   Strategic	   Policy	   Institute	   (2003)	   was	  influential	  in	  shaping	  the	  thinking	  on	  the	  Solomon	  Islands’	  conflict	  and	  Australia’s	  response	  to	  it.	  The	   report,	   Our	   Failing	   Neighbour:	   Australia	   and	   the	   Future	   of	   Solomon	   Islands,	   began	   by	  outlining	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  threats	  posed	  to	  Australia	  by	  the	  Solomon	  Islands’	  failure	  and	  argued	  that	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  existing	  approach	  would	  fail	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  satisfactory	  solution	  for	  Australia’s	  economic,	  security	  and	  strategic	  interests.	  Due	  to	  these	  concerns,	  the	  report	  stressed	  urgency	  in	  devising	  a	  solution	  that	  would	  arrest	  Solomon	  Islands	  decline:	  	  
The	   point	   has	   now	   been	   reached	   that	   simply	   providing	   more	   aid	   to	   the	   Government	   in	  
Honiara	   is	  unlikely	   to	   fix	   the	  problems,	  and	  could	  well	   end	  up	  exacerbating	   them,	  because	  
the	  Solomon	   Islands	  Government	   is	  now	   incapable	  of	  using	   further	  aid	  effectively.	  So	   if	  we	  
are	   to	   do	   more,	   we	   will	   need	   to	   become	   more	   deeply	   engaged	   on	   the	   ground	   ourselves.	  
Continued	  reliance	  on	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  Government	  alone	  means	  accepting	  state	  failure	  
as	  the	  most	  likely	  outcome.	  (Australian	  Strategic	  Policy	  Institute	  2003:7).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Applying	  the	  ‘failed	  state’	  label	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  and	  in	  other	  areas	  across	  the	  Pacific,	  has	  been	  highly	  contentious	   with	   many	   questioning	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   such	   a	   rigid	   measure	   in	   a	   context	  characterised	   by	   adaptability	   and	   cultural	   exchange.	   Dinnen	   writes:	   “These	   are	   not	   robust	   analytical	  devices	  and	  provide	  us	  with	  little	  insight	  into	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  states	  they	  seek	  to	  describe.	  That	  would	   require	   a	  much	  deeper	  understanding	  of	   the	   social	   and	  political	   dynamics	   that	   have	   shaped	   the	  historical	  development	  of	  particular	  states.	  (Dinnen	  2008:340)”	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In	   its	   recommendations	   the	   report	   developed	   a	   plan	   for	   Australian	   engagement	   in	   Solomon	  Islands	   focused	   on	   resolving	   the	   issues	   that	   led	   to	   the	   crisis	  while	   retaining	   Solomon	   Islands	  sovereignty	   and	   independence.	   A	   two-­‐phase	   plan	   was	   outlined	   with	   the	   first	   aimed	   at	  addressing	   law	  and	  order	  and	  more	   immediate	  governance	  problems	  and	   the	  second	  taking	  a	  longer	  term	  approach	  in	  addressing	  the	  underlying	  grievances	  undermining	  effective	  statehood	  (Australian	   Strategic	   Policy	   Institute	   2003:39-­‐46).	  While	   the	   cost	   of	   such	   a	   commitment	  was	  high,	   the	   report	   identified	   a	   number	   of	   actors	   in	   the	   international	   community	   capable	   of	  providing	  support.	  	  To	   avoid	   being	   seen	   as	   a	   neo-­‐colonial	   power,	   preserving	   Solomon	   Islands	   sovereignty	   was	  considered	  central	  to	  any	  move	  by	  Australia	  to	  provide	  assistance.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  and	  mobilising	  the	  strengthened	  assistance	  package	  for	  Solomon	  Islands,	  gaining	  consent	  from	  the	  main	   actors	   both	   locally	   and	   regionally	   was	   central	   (Goff	   2012).	   A	  meeting	   in	   July	   2003	  between	   Australian,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Solomon	   Island	   officials	   led	   to	   the	   Solomon	   Islands	  
Government	   Policy	   Statement	   on	   the	   Offer	   by	   the	   Australian	   Government	   for	   Strengthening	  
Assistance	   to	   Solomon	   Islands,	   2003,	   which	   outlined	   the	   nature	   of	   such	   support	   and	   the	   legal	  framework	  under	  which	  it	  would	  go	  ahead.	  The	  paper	  placed	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	  gaining	  clear	  consent	  from	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  government	  for	  such	  assistance	  to	  be	  given	  and,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Biketawa	  Declaration,	  signed	  in	  October	  2000,	  called	  for	  the	  Pacific	  Islands	  Forum	  to	  play	  a	  lead	  role	  in	  the	  response	  (cited	  in	  Parliamentary	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee	  2009:19).	  	  The	   Pacific	   Islands	   Forum	   approved	   the	   Australian	   government’s	   plan	   but	   required	   a	   more	  formal	   request	   for	   assistance	   from	   Solomon	   Islands.	   Legislative	   changes	   from	   the	   National	  Parliament	   of	   Solomon	   Islands	  were	   also	   required	   in	   order	   to	   give	   full	   legal	   authority	   to	   the	  intervention.	   This	   came	   on	   17	   July	   2003	   with	   the	   unanimous	   passing	   of	   the	   Facilitation	   of	  International	  Assistance	  Act	  2003	  in	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  Parliament.	  Final	  approval	  was	  given	  on	  24	  July	  2003	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  what	  became	  the	  ‘RAMSI	  Treaty’	  that	  set	  out	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  mission,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  duration	  and	  other	  legal	  requirements	  relating	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  assistance	  forces	   (cited	   in	   Parliamentary	   Foreign	   Relations	   Committee	   2009:32).	   That	   same	   day,	   RAMSI	  personnel	  began	  arriving	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  	  In	   many	   respects,	   RAMSI	   can	   be	   described	   as	   an	   archetypal	   state-­‐building	  mission	   in	   that	   it	  places	   state	   capacity	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   its	   programme	   to	   build	   a	   sustainable	   peace.	   While	   the	  initial	  phase	  of	  the	  mission	  focused	  on	  restoring	  law	  and	  order	  to	  the	  capital	  and	  other	  unstable	  areas,	  latter	  stages	  have	  seen	  significant	  effort	  being	  put	  into	  more	  substantial	  restructuring	  of	  the	   Solomon	   Islands’	   political	   and	   economic	   institutions.	   The	   Framework	   for	   Strengthened	  
Assistance	   to	   Solomon	   Islands:	   Proposed	   Scope	   and	   Requirements	   sets	   out	   both	   the	   short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  objectives	  of	  the	  mission.	  The	  report	  states:	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Under	   civil	   order,	   the	   main	   task	   will	   be	   to	   re-­‐establish	   security	   in	   Honiara,	   enabling	  
government,	   business	   and	   the	   community	   to	   operate	   free	   of	   intimidation...It	   will	   be	  
important	  to	  pursue	  economic	  reform	  policies	  to	  regain	  credibility	  within	  the	  international	  
donor	  community,	  and	  to	  rebuild	  the	  essential	  machinery	  of	  government	  to	  support	  stability	  
and	  delivery	  of	  services.	  (Australian	  Government	  2008:1).	  
With	   time,	   noticeable	   changes	   in	   the	   mission’s	   work	   became	   apparent	   as	   this	   shift	   in	   focus	  towards	   the	   longer-­‐term	   governance	   issues	   took	   place.	   In	   2009,	   the	   RAMSI	   Partnership	  Framework	  stated	  that	  the	  overall	  goal	  of	  the	  mission	  was:	  	  
A	  peaceful	  Solomon	  Islands	  where	  key	  national	  institutions	  and	  functions	  of	  law	  and	  justice,	  
public	   administration	   and	   economic	   management	   are	   effective,	   affordable	   and	   have	   the	  
capacity	   to	   be	   sustained	   without	   RAMSI’s	   further	   assistance.	   (RAMSI	   &	   Solomon	   Islands	  
Government	  2009:6).	  
To	   implement	   such	   a	   broad	   mandate,	   RAMSI’s	   work	   is	   divided	   into	   three	   pillars:	   ‘Law	   and	  Justice’,	   ‘Economic	   Governance	   and	   Growth’,	   and	   ‘Machinery	   of	   Government’.	   Within	   these	  fields,	   tasks	  have	  been	  split	   into	  short-­‐term	  priorities	  aimed	  at	  stabilisation	  and	  medium-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	   strategies	   aimed	   at	   building	   local	   capacity	   and	   re-­‐structuring	   the	   core	   features	   of	  Solomon	  Islands’	  governance.	  	  Under	   the	   law	   and	   justice	   pillar,	   the	   immediate	   focus	   was	   placed	   on	   restoring	   security	   in	  Honiara	  and	  other	  unstable	  areas	  before	  shifting	  to	  the	  more	  long-­‐term	  effort	  of	  rebuilding	  the	  RSIPF	  and	  strengthening	   its	  capacity.	  The	  goal	  of	   the	   ‘Law	  and	   Justice’	  pillar	  was	  described	   in	  the	  RAMSI	  Partnership	  Framework	  as	  being	   the	  creation	  of	   “[a]	  secure,	   safe,	  ordered	  and	   just	  Solomon	   Islands	   society	   where	   laws	   are	   administered	   fairly	   regardless	   of	   position	   or	   status,	  giving	   due	   recognition	   to	   traditional	   values	   and	   customs”	   (RAMSI	   &	   Solomon	   Islands	  Government	  2009:6).	  	  Under	  ‘Economic	  Governance	  and	  Growth’,	  efforts	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  were	  directed	  at	  stabilising	  government	  finance	  while	  longer-­‐term	  goals	  involved	  restoring	  confidence	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  encouraging	   economic	   growth.	   This	   required	   “A	   Solomon	   Islands	   achieving	   broad-­‐based	  economic	   growth	   and	   a	   more	   prosperous	   society	   (including	   for	   those	   living	   in	   rural	   areas)	  supported	   by	   a	   fiscally	   responsible	   government	   which	   promotes	   sound	   economic	   policies.”	  (RAMSI	  &	  Solomon	  Islands	  Government	  2009:6).	  	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  improving	  the	  ‘Machinery	  of	  Government’	  meant	  first	  increasing	  transparency	  then	  working	  to	  enhance	  the	  capacity	  of	  administrative	  and	  electoral	  institutions.	  The	  work	  has	  been	   framed	   as	   a	   technical	   exercise	   aimed	   at	   developing	   a	   public	   sector	   that	   is	   “strategic,	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professional,	   transparent	  and	  accountable	   in	   the	  delivery	  of	  services	  and	  priority	  programs	  of	  the	  government	  of	  the	  day.”	  (RAMSI	  &	  Solomon	  Islands	  Government	  2009:6).	  This	   ‘Whole	   of	   Government’	   programme	   for	   reforming	   the	   Solomon	   Islands	   state	   reflected	  regional	  concern	  over	  the	  potential	  for	  state	  collapse	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  It	  aimed	  to	  create	  the	  foundations	  for	  a	  stable	  peace	  by	  focusing	  its	  attention	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  pillars	  of	  governance	  (Braithwaite	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Re-­‐establishing	  a	  strong	  central	  state	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  best	  defence	  against	  a	  resurgence	  of	  conflict	  and	  the	  further	  erosion	  of	  governance	  and	  development	   in	   Melanesia	   (Boege	   2008).	   In	   its	   work,	   RAMSI	   aimed	   to	   maintain	   a	   difficult	  balance	  between	  carrying	  out	  fundamental	  reform	  of	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  governance	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  and	  remaining	  a	  neutral	  presence	  in	  the	  political-­‐economic	  space.	  By	  adopting	  such	  an	  ambitious	  mandate,	  RAMSI	  conceded	  that	  it	  was	  going	  beyond	  the	  manifestations	  of	  conflict	  to	  address	  what	  many	  saw	  as	  a	  fundamental	  crisis	  of	  governance	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  With	  no	  exit	  timetable,	   the	   strengthened	   assistance	   package	   aimed,	   in	   the	   words	   of	   Australian	   Prime	  Minister	   John	  Howard	   (qtd.	   in	   Braithwaite	   et	   al.	   2010:51),	   to	   “re-­‐engineer”	   the	  machinery	   of	  government	   and	   development	   so	   as	   to	   establish	   peace	   through	   an	   effective	   and	   legitimate	  nation-­‐state.	  	  
RAMSI	  and	  the	  Participating	  Police	  Force	  Where	   RAMSI	   differs	   from	  many	   other	   state-­‐building	  missions	   of	   its	   kind	   is	   in	   its	   personnel.	  Rather	  than	  being	  led	  by	  a	  military	  contingent,	  RAMSI	  has	  from	  the	  beginning	  been	  a	  police-­‐led	  operation,	  led	  by	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police	  with	  input	  from	  regional	  partners.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  police	  forces	  have	  come	  to	  play	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  peacekeeping	  missions	  internationally	  and	   the	   deployment	   of	   a	   Participating	   Police	   Force	   to	   Solomon	   Islands	   represents	   a	   further	  development	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   this	   peace-­‐building	   practice.	   While	   a	   sizeable	   military	  contingent	  played	  an	  important	  role	  stabilising	  the	  security	  situation	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  deployment,	  they	  played	  only	  a	  supporting	  role	  in	  the	  more	  substantive	  work	  of	  peace-­‐building	  as	  the	  mission	  progressed.	  	  The	  approach	  of	  the	  PPF	  mirrored	  RAMSI’s	  three-­‐phased	  plan	  with	  the	  initial	  stabilisation	  effort	  followed	   by	   the	  more	   substantive	  work	   of	   re-­‐building	   communities	   and	   reforming	   the	   Royal	  Solomon	   Islands	   Police	   Force	   (RSIPF).	   The	   first	   phase	   saw	   a	   300-­‐strong	   Participating	   Police	  Force,	  supported	  by	  a	  military	  contingent	  of	  1,700,	  move	  to	  re-­‐establish	  security	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Honiara	  and	  protect	  key	  government	  officials,	   including	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  In	  a	  shock-­‐and-­‐awe	  style	  approach,	  the	  PPF	  and	  military	  contingent	  presented	  “a	  united	  ‘show	  of	  force’	  where	  they	  made	   it	   known	   	   to	   the	   gangs	   that	   they	  would	   no	   longer	   be	   allowed	   to	   go	   rampant	   and	  unchallenged”	   (Australian	   Federal	   Police	   2005).	   This	   “crucial	   environment	   of	   compliance”	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allowed	   for	   other	   short-­‐term	   peacekeeping	   work	   including	   weapons	   collection,	   arresting	  militant	   leader	   Harold	   Keke	   and	   securing	   the	   Weather	   Coast,	   and	   re-­‐establishing	   internal	  discipline	  within	  the	  RSIPF	  (Australian	  Federal	  Police	  2005).	  While	  these	  early	  efforts	  achieved	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  success,	   there	  was	  a	  recognition	  among	  policy-­‐makers	   that	  embedding	  peace	  and	  re-­‐establishing	  good	  governance	  would	  be	  a	  longer-­‐term	  project.	  RAMSI’s	  open-­‐ended	  commitment	  to	  Solomon	  Islands	  was	  made	  clear	  by	  a	  number	  of	  actors	  at	  the	   time	   of	   its	   deployment.	   Australian	   Prime	   Minister	   John	   Howard	   stated	   during	   a	   visit	   to	  Honiara	   in	   2003	   that	   “RAMSI	  will	   remain	   until	   the	   job	   is	   done”	   (New	   Zealand	  Herald	   2003).	  Likewise,	  his	  New	  Zealand	  counterpart,	  Prime	  Minister	  Helen	  Clark,	  stressed	  that	  “It	  is	  going	  to	  take	   time	   to	   build	   a	   police	   force	   that	   can	   really	   deal	   with	   the	   bad	   elements	   of	   the	   Solomon	  [Islands]”	   (cited	   in	   New	   Zealand	   Herald	   2003).	   Such	   a	   commitment	   meant	   that	   the	   work	   of	  RAMSI	   and	   the	   PPF	   went	   beyond	   short-­‐term	   security	   goals	   to	   engage	   the	   more	   substantive	  issues	  driving	  conflict	  and	  undermining	  good	  governance	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  	  The	   approach	   was	   summarised	   by	   the	   Commissioner	   of	   the	   Australian	   Federal	   Police,	   who	  stated	  in	  2004:	  
If	  we	  are	   to	   restore	   law	  and	  order	   over	   the	   longer	   term,	   it	   is	   no	  good	   just	   removing	  guns	  
from	  the	  streets.	  You	  have	  to	  create	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  social,	  political	  and	  justice	  
systems	  can	  function	  properly,	  with	  the	  right	  powers,	  restraints	  and	  checks	  and	  balances	  to	  
enable	  the	  community	  to	  have	  confidence	  and	  business	  to	  thrive.	  (Australian	  Federal	  Police	  
2005).	  
RAMSI’s	  shift	  in	  approach	  saw	  PPF	  members	  serve	  as	  both	  mentors	  and	  ‘in-­‐line’	  police	  officers	  working	  on	  Solomon	   Islands’	   streets	   to	   inculcate	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  police	  professionalism	   in	   the	  RSIPF	  and	  build	  trust	  within	  communities.	  The	  extent	  of	  corruption	  and	  criminality	  within	  the	  RSIPF	  meant	  that	  PPF	  officers	  conducted	  much	  of	  the	  everyday	  policing	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  intervention.	  An	  agreement	  between	  RAMSI	  and	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  Government	  provided	  for	  these	   ‘in-­‐line’	   PPF	   officers	   and	   meant	   that	   “RAMSI	   police	   were	   not	   just	   advisers,	   but	   could	  conduct	  investigations	  and	  make	  arrests.	  (Warner	  2004)”.	  	  Inserting	   PPF	   officers	   into	   these	   ‘in-­‐line’	   positions	   was	   necessary,	  Warner	   (2004)	   argued,	   to	  ensure	  a	  stable	  law	  and	  order	  situation	  and	  allow	  for	  capacity	  to	  be	  built	  within	  the	  RSIPF	  over	  time.	   The	   arrangement	   gave	   greater	   responsibility	   to	   PPF	   officers	   and	   added	   a	   considerable	  degree	   of	   significance	   to	   their	   role.	   While	   RAMSI	   comprised	   a	   range	   of	   police,	   military	   and	  civilian	   actors,	   it	  was	   the	  PPF	   that	   became	   the	   face	   of	   the	  peace-­‐building	  mission	   in	   Solomon	  Islands’	  communities.	  As	  the	  2010	  Annual	  Performance	  Report	  stated:	  “Of	  all	  RAMSI	  programs	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the	  PPF/RSIPF	  partnership	  is	  the	  most	  visible	  and	  is	  what	  most	  Solomon	  Islanders	  understand	  by	  ‘RAMSI’”.	  	  The	  RAMSI	  website	  (RAMSI	  2012)	  outlines	  the	  five	  core	  goals	  for	  PPF	  officers	  during	  this	  phase	  and	  describes	  those	  goals	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  1. Law	  and	  order:	  Assisting	  the	  RSIPF	  to	  maintain	  a	  safe	  and	  peaceful	  Solomon	  Islands.	  2. Build	   community	   confidence:	   Improve	   public	   demand	   for	   better	   rule	   of	   law	  outcomes	   across	   Solomon	   Islands,	   and	   support	   the	   Royal	   Solomon	   Islands	   Police	  Force	  to	  provide	  a	  secure	  Solomon	  Islands	  where	  crime	  and	  violence	  are	  managed	  by	  police	  and	  the	  justice	  system	  in	  an	  accountable	  way.	  	  3. Improve	  the	  RSIPF	  organisation:	  Build	  the	  foundations	  of	  an	  effective,	  accountable	  and	  appropriate	  police	  service	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Solomon	  Islands.	  4. Safeguard	   borders	   and	   natural	   resources:	   Assist	   the	   RSIPF	   and	   other	   relevant	  authorities	   to	   develop	   capacity	   to	   safeguard	   the	   borders	   and	   natural	   resources	   of	  Solomon	  Islands.	  	  5. Support	   traditional	   justice:	   Establish	   and	   provide	   support	   for	   traditional	   justice	  processes	  which	  maintain	  order	  and	  accountability	   in	   inaccessible	  areas	  of	  Solomon	  Islands.	  Before	  being	  deployed	   there	   in	  2003,	  New	  Zealand	  Police	   Inspector	  Brent	  Holmes	  provided	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  the	  PPF’s	  role	  as	  being:	  “getting	  the	  police	  back	  up	  and	  running	  again,	  getting	  the	   population	   on	   side,	   community	   policing	   and	   general	   crime."	   (qtd.	   in	  New	   Zealand	  Herald	  2003).	  	  Inspector	  Holmes’	  summary,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  goals	  listed	  above,	  highlight	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  PPF’s	  mandate,	  namely	  the	  centrality	  of	  community	  confidence	  to	  the	  task	  of	  re-­‐establishing	  security	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  and	  re-­‐building	  the	  Royal	  Solomon	  Islands	  Police	  Force.	  	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  the	  PPF	  had	  to	  act	  as	  a	  police	  force,	  ensuring	  safety	  and	  security	  for	  Solomon	  Islanders,	  by	  working	  alongside	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  in	  place	  of	  local	  police	  officers.	  Beyond	  this,	  its	  work	  extended	  to	  the	  organisational	  reform	  of	  the	  RSIPF	  and	  wider	  justice	  system	  where	  the	  longer-­‐term	  project	  of	  mentoring	  and	  training	  former	  officers	  and	  new	  recruits	  took	  place.	  Alongside	  both	   of	   these,	   however,	  was	   the	   community	   element,	   or	  what	   Inspector	   Holmes	   describes	   as	  “getting	  the	  population	  on	  side”,	  involving	  work	  to	  re-­‐build	  trust	  and	  bridge	  the	  divide	  between	  the	   Solomon	   Islands	   people	   and	   their	   Police.	   This	   community	   element	   is	   significant	   and	  indicates	  that	  “community-­‐oriented”	  policing	  style	  was	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  philosophy	  underlying	  the	  work	  of	  the	  PPF.	  A	  clear	  effort	  was	  made	  to	  avoid	  the	  use	  of	  more	  coercive	  policing	  methods	  and	   adopt	   a	   more	   open	   and	   responsive	   relationship	   with	   the	   local	   community.	   The	  Commissioner	  of	   the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police’s	  statement	   in	  2005	   illustrates	   this	  philosophy:	  “We	  made	   the	   decision	   to	   go	   unarmed	   so	  we	   could	   demonstrate	   to	   the	   local	   people	   that	   our	  officers	  were	  there	  to	  reassert	  the	  moral	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  with	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  use	  of	  violence.”	  (Australian	  Federal	  Police	  2005).	  This	  community-­‐oriented	   approach	   also	   meant	   establishing	   a	   police	   presence	   in	   remote	   communities	   and	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building	  trust	  through	  regular	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  contact	  and	  high	  levels	  of	   interaction	  with	  the	  local	  population	  (Greener	  2009:60).	  	  In	   recent	   years,	   the	   focus	   has	   been	   on	   instilling	   a	   similar	   ‘community-­‐oriented’	   approach	   to	  policing	  within	  the	  Royal	  Solomon	  Islands	  Police	  Force.	  The	  2009	  Partnership	  Framework	  lists	  “Building	   greater	   community	   confidence	   in	   the	  RSIPF”	   and	   “Building	   broad	   community	   crime	  prevention	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  capability”	  as	   two	  of	   its	  primary	  strategies	   for	   improving	   the	  capacity	  and	  professionalism	  of	  the	  RSIPF	  (RAMSI	  &	  Solomon	  Islands	  Government	  2009:15).	  	  The	  use	  of	  a	  community-­‐oriented	  policing	  model	  under	  RAMSI	  reflects	  the	  experience	  that	  the	  mission’s	  primary	  architects,	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  have	  had	  with	  the	  community	  policing	  model	   in	  their	  domestic	  settings.	  As	  a	  model	   for	  crime	  control	   in	  urbanised	  Western	  societies,	  the	  model	  has	  attained	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  popularity	  since	  first	  being	  implemented	  in	  the	  1970s	   and	   1980s.	   Interesting	   and	   important	   questions	   emerge,	   however,	  when	   it	   is	   included	  within	  a	  context	  such	  as	  post-­‐conflict	  Solomon	  Islands	  and	  employed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  building	  peace.	  Such	  a	  mandate	  gives	  considerable	  responsibility	  and	  scope	  to	   the	  work	  carried	  out	  by	  officers	   of	   the	   Participating	   Police	   Force.	   As	   will	   be	   described	   in	   the	   following	   chapter,	  community-­‐oriented	   policing	   styles	   broaden	   the	   police	   role;	   shifting	   the	   focus	   away	   from	  coercion	  and	  towards	  consultation	  and,	  through	  this,	  allowing	  for	  a	  more	  close	  relationship	  to	  develop	  between	  officer	  and	  citizen.	   In	  most	  cases,	   the	  model	   favours	  a	  decentralised	  policing	  structure	   that	   enables	   officers	   to	   establish	   local	   connections	   and	   better	   respond	   to	   public	  concerns.	  While	   this	   can	  have	  a	   significant	   effect	   locally,	   its	  use	  here	   in	   the	   context	  of	   a	  post-­‐conflict	  peace-­‐building	  mission	  means	   that	   it	  will	  also	  have	  significant	   implications	  nationally,	  regionally	  and	   internationally.	  This	  research	  aims	   to	  reveal	  more	  about	   the	   interface	  between	  PPF	   officers	   and	   members	   of	   the	   local	   community,	   with	   a	   particular	   focus	   on	   how	   that	  relationship	   affects,	   and	   is	   affected	   by,	   the	   wider	   socio-­‐political	   context	   outlined	   above.	   This	  involves	  examining	  the	  dynamics	  of	  police-­‐led	  community	  engagement	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  setting	  and	  how	  this	  setting	  affects	  the	  work	  of	  the	  officers	  who	  carry	  it	  out.	  Conclusion	  While	   the	  violent	  conflict	   that	  defined	   the	  Tensions	  was	  reasonably	   localised,	   it	  drew	  from	  an	  array	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  conditions	  that	  were	  much	  more	  expansive.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  the	  conflict	  is	  placed	  into	  historical	  context,	  taking	  into	  account	  these	  wider	  social	  and	  political	  processes	  at	  play,	   that	   its	   complexity	  and	   its	  diversity	  can	  be	   fully	  understood.	  Here	   it	   can	  be	  seen	   that	   the	   Tensions,	   a	   conflict	   ostensibly	   between	   rival	   ethnic	   groups,	   had	   its	   roots	   in	   a	  myriad	  of	  grievances	   involving	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actors	  and	  influences.	  For	  police	  peacekeepers	  attempting	  to	  encourage	  effective	  reconciliation	  and	  a	  sustainable	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict,	  the	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discussion	   has	   raised	   several	   important	   points	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   conflict	   and	   its	  relationship	   to	   the	  wider	  political	   culture	   in	  Solomon	   Islands.	  Taking	   these	   into	  consideration	  allows	  peace-­‐building	  efforts	  to	  be	  placed	  into	  context	  and,	  through	  this,	  be	  better	  adapted	  and	  more	  responsive	  to	  local	  political	  and	  economic	  realities.	  	  Firstly,	   Solomon	   Islands	   political	   culture,	   in	   which	   the	   conflict	   is	   deeply	   embedded,	   is	  characterised	   by	   a	   dynamic	   interaction	   between	   a	   variety	   of	   competing	   and	   complementary	  processes.	   In	   evaluating	   such	   societies,	   it	   is	   tempting	   to	   allow	   rigid	   conceptions	  of	   traditional	  and	  introduced	  practices	  to	  shape	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  discussion.	  A	  better	  understanding	  can	  be	  gained	  without	  such	  simplistic	  categorisations.	  This	  involves	  paying	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  political	  sphere	  over	  time	  and	  giving	  consideration	  to	  its	  fluidity	  as	  well	  as	  its	  capacity	   for	   interaction	  and	  exchange.	  Solomon	  Islands	  experience	  since	   independence	  has	  seen	  the	  infusion	  of	  national	  politics	  with	  local	  customary	  practices,	  such	  as	  the	  wantok	  system	  of	   communal	   relations.	  While	   in	   some	   respects	   the	  Westminster	   Parliament	   set	   up	   by	  British	  colonial	   administrators	   was	   a	   foreign	   governing	   system,	   it	   could	   not	   be	   insulated	   from	   the	  norms	   of	   political	   behaviour	   that	   pervaded	   Solomon	   Islands	   society.	   Tenets	   of	   the	   wantok	  system	   and	   big-­‐man	   politics	   have	   adapted	   to	   new	   centres	   of	   power	   and	   come	   to	   shape	  conceptions	   of	   representation	   and	   leadership	   at	   the	   national	   level.	   Other	   civil	   society	   actors	  have	  also	  played	  a	  part	  in	  this	  interaction.	  Churches,	  for	  example,	  have	  helped	  to	  facilitate	  this	  process,	   not	   only	   by	   strengthening	   relationships	   between	   communities,	   but	   also	   by	   acting	   as	  intermediaries	   between	   national	   and	   international	   processes	   and	   local	   context.	   The	  intertwining	   of	   customary	   practices	   with	   modern	   ones	   demonstrates,	   Hameiri	   (2007:419)	  writes,	  that	  custom	  “is	  not	  a	  fixed	  entity,	  somehow	  external	  to	  social	  interaction...it	  is	  contested	  and	  regularly	  invoked	  to	  legitimize	  a	  range	  of	  often	  conflicting	  political	  ends”.	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  exchange	   means	   that	   governing	   coalitions	   are	   fluid	   and	   locations	   of	   power	   are	   constantly	  shifting.	   However,	   this	   process	   has	   allowed	   for	   Solomon	   Islanders	   to	   exercise	   a	   degree	   of	  ownership	  over	  introduced	  systems	  by	  bringing	  them	  into	  line	  with	  the	  character	  of	  local	  power	  arrangements.	  	  Developing	   effective	   conflict	   resolution	   mechanisms	   to	   achieve	   a	   durable	   resolution	   to	   the	  Tensions	  requires	  that	   the	  events	  of	  1998-­‐2003	  be	  regarded,	  not	  as	  separate	   from,	  but	   tightly	  bound	  up	  in	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  unique	  political	  culture.	  This	  means	  looking	  beyond	   simplistic,	   short-­‐term	   explanations	   of	   the	   conflict	   to	   find	   the	   deeper	   socio-­‐economic	  trends	   that	   have	   shaped	   political	   behaviour	   and	   political	   outcomes	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   the	  Tensions.	   The	   violence	  was	   at	   its	  most	   severe	   between	   the	  militant	   factions	   of	  Malaitan	   and	  Guale	  populations.	  However,	  the	  Malaitan-­‐Guale	  divide	  was	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	   division	   itself	   disguises	   the	   diverse	   interests	   that	   made	   up	   both	   groups	   and	   the	   unique	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circumstances	  that	  brought	  them	  together.	  The	  conflict’s	  ethnic	  dimension	  represented	  an	  effort	  by	  certain	   individuals	   to	  unite	  various	  strands	  of	  grievances	  under	  a	  banner	   that	  would	  carry	  political	  significance.	  The	  centrality	  of	  this	  frame	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  media	  and	  by	  the	  state	  who	  were	  unable,	  or	  unwilling,	  to	  look	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  its	  history.	  The	  continuation	  of	  violent	  conflict,	  even	  as	  both	  militant	  groups	  fragmented,	  illustrates	  the	   unhelpfulness	   of	   such	   distinctions	   in	   highly	   contested	   political	   spaces.	   More	   nuanced	  accounts	   of	   the	   conflict	   have	   identified	   historical	   processes	   of	   uneven	   development	   and	  unresolved	   land	   issues	   as	   well	   as	   narrowing	   avenues	   to	   central	   government	   and	   the	  marginalisation	  of	  youth	  as	  among	  the	  many	  factors	  that	  limited	  the	  ability	  of	  well-­‐established	  mechanisms	  for	  containing	  violence	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities.	  Acknowledging	   the	   myriad	   of	   factors	   that	   contribute	   to	   ethnic	   fractionalisation	   and	   the	  outbreak	  of	  conflict	  is	  an	  important	  step	  for	  peace-­‐builders	  and	  police	  peacekeepers	  seeking	  to	  devise	   durable	   solutions.	   Like	   the	   conflict	   itself,	   the	   peace	   process	   will	   need	   to	   be	   a	   deeply	  political	   exercise	   that	   stretches	   both	   horizontally	   and	   vertically	   across	   the	   Solomon	   Islands	  political	   sphere.	   A	   high	   level	   of	   community	   involvement	   is	   required	   in	   this	   process.	   The	  challenge	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   is	   to	   move	   beyond	   the	   ethnic	   divide	   and	   instead	   address	   the	  diversity	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  interests	  at	  play.	  Unlike	  earlier	  efforts,	  the	  Townsville	  Peace	  Agreement	  focused	  the	  peace	  process	  on	  the	  militants,	  instead	  of	  encompassing	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  who	  had	  helped	  to	  mediate	  the	  conflict	  and	  whose	  involvement	  would	  be	  crucial	   for	   future	   development.	  With	   their	   emphasis	   on	   addressing	   the	   grievances	   of	   the	   IFM	  and	  MEF	  these	  efforts	  continued	  to	  inflate	  misconceptions	  about	  the	  conflict’s	  ethnic	  basis	  and	  its	   centrality	   to	   Solomon	   Islands	   as	   a	   whole.	   Allowing	   diverse	   input	   into	   the	   peace	   process	  requires	  a	  solution	  that	  can	  accommodate	  fluidity	  without	  falling	  victim	  to	  manipulation.	  This	  is	  important	   for	  preventing	   the	   conflating	  of	   separate	   and	  unique	  grievances	  under	  overarching	  narratives	   that	   emphasise	   division	   and	   suspicion.	   Peace-­‐building	   must	   work	   to	   address	   the	  various	  strands	  of	  grievances	  that	  created	  the	  Tensions	  as	  well	  as	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  social	  and	  political	   actors,	   and	   the	   multiple	   layers	   of	   people’s	   loyalties.	   These	   hallmarks	   of	   the	   conflict	  were	  demonstrated	  in	  its	  unravelling	  and	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  if	  a	  sustainable	  resolution	  is	  to	  be	  found.	  	  The	  intention	  here	  has	  been	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  intricacy	  and	  fluidity	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  space	  in	  which	  PPF	  officers	   are	   required	   to	  operate.	  The	  discussion	  provides	  an	   introduction	   to	   the	  complexity	   of	   the	   task	   faced	   by	   the	   PPF	   and	   RAMSI	   in	   establishing	   peace	   and	   building	  community	   capacity	   in	   Solomon	   Islands.	   The	   important	   question	   now	   concerns	   the	  compatibility	  between	  the	  community	  described	  here	  and	  the	  approach	  being	  adopted	  by	  those	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  peace-­‐building	  effort.	  	  Understanding	  how	  the	  PPF	  and	  their	  community-­‐
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oriented	   approach	  may	   help	   or	   hinder	   the	   search	   for	   peace	   in	   this	   environment	   is	   central	   to	  answering	  this.	  It	  is	  this	  relationship	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  police	  officers	  from	  another	  state,	  nation,	  culture	  and	  social	  setting	  to	  adjust	  and	  adapt	  to	  this	  reality	  that	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  research.	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Community	  Policing	  in	  the	  ‘Foreign	  Policy	  Space’	  
The	   previous	   chapter	   aimed	   to	   go	   some	  way	   towards	   outlining	   the	   diversity	   and	   intricacy	   of	  local	  communities	  and	  cultures,	  the	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  in	  1998	  and	  the	  wide-­‐ranging	   international	   assistance	   package	   aimed	   at	   restoring	   peace	   and	   re-­‐establishing	  statehood	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  More	  importantly,	  however,	  it	  aimed	  to	  identify	  the	  rather	  unique	  context	  that	  police	  officers	  of	  RAMSI’s	  Participating	  Police	  Force	  find	  themselves	  in	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  myriad	  of	  local,	  national	  and	  international	  actors	  and	  influences.	  	  With	  this	   in	  mind,	  the	  focus	  now	  shifts	  towards	   learning	  more	  about	  how	  they	  operate	  within	  that	  context	  and	  understanding	  some	  of	  the	  potential	  implications	  of	  their	  work	  within	  it.	  To	  do	  this	   requires	   an	   analytical	   framework	   that	   helps	   to	   isolate	   that	   interface	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   this	  research;	  that	  is,	  the	  one	  between	  international	  police	  officers	  and	  members	  of	  the	  host	  society.	  Rather	   than	   continue	   the	   literature’s	   current	   focus	   on	   the	   global	   implications	   and	   normative	  dimensions	  of	  international	  post-­‐conflict	  policing,	  this	  research	  aims	  to	  focus	  more	  exclusively	  on	   the	   local	   level	   dynamics	   and,	   through	   this,	   learn	  more	   about	   the	   experience	   of	   individual	  police	   officers	   deployed	   in	   such	   a	   role.	   While	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   international	   post-­‐conflict	  policing	  provides	  some	  useful	  insights,	  the	  intention	  here	  is	  to	  borrow	  from	  a	  different	  literature	   that	   focuses	   more	   intently	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   a	   police	   force	   and	   the	  community	   in	   which	   it	   operates;	   that	   is,	   the	   community	   policing	   literature.	   The	   community	  policing	  literature	  is	  valuable	  firstly	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  much	  of	  the	  PPF’s	  work	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  community	   policing	   model,	   as	   practiced	   in	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand.	   More	   importantly,	  however,	   it	   provides	   a	   useful	   analytical	   lens	   for	   understanding	   some	   of	   the	   complexities	   and	  challenges	  for	  police	  officers	  as	  they	  attempt	  to	  engage	  citizens	  and	  build	  communities.	  It	  is	  this	  insight	  that	  makes	  the	  literature	  particularly	  valuable	  for	  an	  examination	  of	  RAMSI’s	  PPF	  as	  they	  enter	  into	  fragile	  and	  remote	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities	  with	  the	  task	  of	  restoring	  peace	  and	  re-­‐building	  a	  nation-­‐state.	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   two	   sets	   of	   literature	   relevant	   to	   the	   study	   of	   international	   policing	   are	  reviewed.	  The	  first	  surrounds	  the	  development	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  community	  policing	  model	  and	  draws	  upon	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  studies	  conducted	  around	  the	  world	  regarding	  its	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  as	  a	  model	  for	  crime	  control.	  This	  literature	  describes	  the	  socio-­‐political	  context	  that	   shaped	   its	   development,	   outlines	   its	   core	   characteristics	   and	   overarching	   goals,	   and	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  analysing	  and	  understanding	  its	  effectiveness	  as	  a	  model	  for	  engaging	  the	   community	  on	   issues	  of	   social	   order.	  The	   second	   set	   of	   literature	   forms	  a	  part	   of	   a	  wider	  literature	   on	   international	   policing	   and	   peacekeeping	   but	   focuses	   more	   directly	   on	   issues	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associated	   with	   engaging	   the	   local	   community.	   Considered	   together,	   these	   literatures	   raise	  questions	  about	  the	  transition	  process	  that	  occurs	  when	  police	  officers,	  experienced	  in	  engaging	  their	  local	  community	  using	  a	  well	  developed	  model,	  are	  deployed	  to	  maintain	  order	  and	  build	  peace	  in	  a	  very	  different	  community.	  Policing	  Models	  and	  Professionalism	  Modern	  policing	  strategies,	  at	   least	  those	  in	  the	  West,	  can	  be	  grouped	  into	  three	  quite	  distinct	  eras:	  the	  political	  era,	  the	  reform	  era	  and	  the	  community-­‐oriented	  era	  (Kelling	  &	  Moore	  2005).	  The	  first	  developed	  policing	  model,	  the	  political	  era,	  emerged	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  modern	  police	   forces	   into	  urban	  centres	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1800s	   (Kelling	  &	  Moore	  2005).	   It	   is	  known	  as	   the	  political	  era	  of	  policing	  because	  it	  was	  defined	  by	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  officers	  and	  local	  political	   leaders.	  Political	   leaders	  could	  keep	  officers	  employed	  and	  prevent	  significant	  change	  within	   the	   department.	   In	   return,	   officers	   provided	   political	   support	   by	   encouraging	   their	  respective	   communities	   to	   vote	   certain	  ways	   and,	   in	   some	   cases,	   rigging	   elections	   (Kelling	   &	  Moore	   2005).	   Departments	   adhered	   to	   a	   quasi-­‐military,	   centralised	   command	   structure,	  although,	   with	   the	   division	   of	   cities	   into	   precincts,	   were	   reasonably	   decentralised	   in	   their	  everyday	   functioning.	   The	   primary	   tactic	   for	   dealing	   with	   crime	   was	   foot	   patrol	   and	   it	   was	  through	   this	   that	   ties	   to	   the	   local	   neighbourhood	  were	   developed	   and	   strengthened.	   Face-­‐to-­‐face	   contact	   meant	   police	   could	   be	   provided	   with	   information	   and	   insights	   directly	   by	   the	  community.	   Recruitment	   from	   the	   local	   area	   further	   contributed	   to	   this	   tight	   relationship.	  Despite	  this	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  community,	  priorities	  and	  problems	  continued	  to	  be	  defined	  by	   the	  political	  elite.	  Thus,	   it	  was	   this	   relationship	  between	  politicians	  and	  police,	   rather	   than	  police	  and	  the	  community,	  that	  defined	  this	  era	  of	  policing.	  	  Over	  time,	  significant	  weaknesses	  began	  to	  emerge	  in	  this	  political	  model.	  The	  close	  relationship	  between	  police	  and	  politicians	  inevitably	  led	  to	  police	  corruption.	  Decentralised	  organisational	  structures	  aided	  the	  spread	  of	  corruption	  by	  failing	  to	  provide	  administrators	  with	  the	  oversight	  needed	  to	  combat	  such	  activity.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  close	  relationships	  with	  the	  community	  often	  meant	  close	  identification	  with	  a	  particular	  section	  of	  that	  community,	  with	  white,	  upper	  class	  neighbourhoods	   being	   the	   primary	   benefactors.	   For	  minority	   or	   lower	   class	   neighbourhoods,	  this	  meant	  discrimination	  and	   inadequate	  protection	   from	   their	   local	  police	   (Kelling	  &	  Moore	  2005).	  	  	  Out	  of	  these	  failures	  emerged	  a	  new	  model,	  in	  the	  early	  1940s,	  which	  was	  known	  as	  the	  reform	  or	   professional	   model	   (Goldstein	   1990;	   Kelling	   &	   Moore	   2005).	   Skolnick	   and	   Bayley	   (1988)	  describe	  the	  period	  from	  the	  1920s	  through	  to	  the	  1960s	  as	  the	  Tranquil	  Period	  of	  policing	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  By	  this	  they	  mean	  that	  police	  affairs	  attracted	  relatively	  few	  headlines	  and	  did	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not	  feature	  as	  major	  public	  policy	  issues.	  The	  reform	  model	  that	  characterised	  policing	  during	  this	  time	  was	  defined	  by	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  In	  reaction	  to	  the	   corruption	   that	   plagued	   the	   political	   model,	   the	   reform	   model	   stressed	   the	   need	   for	   an	  apolitical,	  unbiased	  force	  and	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  this	  through	  strong	  centralised	  decision-­‐making,	  tight	   organisational	   structures,	   and	   a	   heightened	   sense	   of	   individual	   responsibility	   among	  officers.	  	  In	   operational	   terms,	   various	   attempts	  were	  made	   to	   isolate	   officers	   from	  political	   influences	  and	  prevent	  too	  close	  a	  relationship	  developing	  with	  the	  population	  they	  controlled	  (Kelling	  &	  Moore	  2005).	  Greater	  integration	  of	  new	  technology	  and	  higher	  standards	  for	  recruitment	  and	  training	   further	  contributed	  to	   the	  development	  of	  a	  standardised	  and	  highly	  professionalised	  policing	   style.	   Police	   professionalism	   under	   the	   reform	   model	   was	   exhibited	   through	   the	  distance	  between	  the	  police	  and	  the	  community	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  the	  image	  of	  a	  police	  officer	  as	  a	  specialist	   in	  the	  field	  of	   law	  enforcement.	  The	  civilian	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  passive	  recipient	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  preserve	  social	  order.	  	  Within	  police	  departments,	  the	  reform	  model	  saw	  a	  hierarchical	  management	  structure	  develop	  so	   as	   to	   ensure	   policing	   activity	   could	   be	   controlled	   by	   a	   central	   authority.	   Architects	   of	   the	  model,	  including	  Berkeley	  Police	  Chief	  August	  Vollmer	  and	  Director	  of	  the	  FBI	  J.	  Edgar	  Hoover,	  sought	  to	  create	  officers	  with	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  equal	  protection	  under	  the	  law.	  	  This	  detached	  form	  of	  policing	  narrowed	  the	  mandate	  of	  police	  departments	  by	  keeping	  officers	  in	  cars	  and	  placing	  a	  high	  priority	  on	  responding	  to	  incidents	  quickly	  and	  efficiently.	  As	  Kelling	  and	  Coles	  (1996:163)	  write,	  the	  approach	  became	  one	  that	  revolved	  around	  dealing	  with	  issues	  as	   and	  when	   they	   arose:	   “A	   chronic	   neighbourhood	   quarrel	   erupts:	   police	   respond.	   It	   erupts	  again:	   police	   again	   respond.	  And	   so	   on.	   In	  practical	   terms	   for	   police,	   incidents	   have	  neither	   a	  history	  nor	  a	  future”.	  The	   1950s	   saw	   the	   growth	   of	   academic	   research	   into	   policing	   practice.	   In	   many	   ways,	   this	  research	  served	   to	  challenge	   idealised	  perceptions	  of	  policing	  within	  both	  police	  departments	  and	   the	   broader	   public.	   Goldstein	   (1990)	   identifies	   a	   number	   of	  weaknesses	  with	   the	   reform	  model	  that	  began	  to	  emerge	  with	  the	  social	  upheaval	  of	  the	  1960s.	  His	  primary	  concern	  was	  that	  the	  reform	  model	  aimed	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  criminal	  behaviour,	  and	  other	  activity	  the	  police	  have	  to	  deal	  with,	  with	  a	  very	  generic	  approach.	  As	  described	  earlier,	  the	  focus	  of	  policing	  during	  this	  time	  was	  on	  remaining	  professional	  and	  detached.	  Goldstein	  also	  highlighted	  how	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  means	   over	   ends	   often	  meant	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   service	   delivered	   to	   the	  public	  deteriorated.	   It	  also	  meant	  that	  policing	  was	  predominantly	  reactive	  in	  that	  responding	  to	  emergency	  calls	  dictated	  the	  allocation	  of	  police	  resources.	  The	  narrow	  focus	  on	  responding	  to	   calls	  meant	   that	   both	   the	   community	   and	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	   officers	  were	   bypassed	   in	   terms	   of	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their	  input	  into	  policy	  decisions	  and	  priorities.	  The	  community	  were	  thus	  the	  subject	  of	  police	  policy,	  rather	  than	  a	  contributor	  towards	  it.	  As	  Goldstein	  (1990:22,	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  writes:	  “What	  the	  police	  did	  was	  done	  to	  a	  community	  rather	  than	  for	  it.”	  Likewise,	  street	  level	  officers	  had	  little	  say	  in	  how	  they	  carried	  out	  their	  job.	  They	  were	  expected	  to	  act	  as	  “automatons”	  but,	  according	   to	   Goldstein	   (1990:27),	   “constantly	   complain[ed]	   that	   they	   [were]	   treated	   like	  children;	  they	  want[ed]	  desperately	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  mature	  adults”.	  A	  further	  component	  of	  this	  was	   that	   promotion	  was	   often	   based	   on	   conformity	   to	   department	   policy,	   as	   opposed	   to	  innovation	  or	   initiative.	  Goldstein’s	   final	   criticism	  grows	  out	   of	   this	   exclusion	  of	   rank-­‐and-­‐file	  officers	  and	  concerns	  the	  limits	  of	  piecemeal	  reform.	  Because	  many	  of	  the	  changes	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  an	  incremental	  fashion,	  they	  often	  failed	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  officers	  who	  had	  to	  implement	  the	  change.	  The	  failure	  to	  recognise	  the	  complexity	  and	  intricacy	  of	  the	  police	  subculture	  meant	  that	  the	  model	  struggled	  from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  	  The	  problems	  that	  began	  to	  emerge	  served	  to	  highlight	  some	  of	   the	  potential	  shortcomings	  of	  the	   reform	  model.	   However,	   it	   was	   only	   with	   the	   ending	   of	   the	   so	   called	   Tranquil	   Period	   of	  policing	  that	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  reform	  model	  gained	  the	  attention	  of	  policy	  makers.	  	  Reform	   policing	   was	   undermined	   throughout	   the	   1960s	   by	   the	   dual	   processes	   of	   declining	  police	   performance	   and	   rising	   levels	   of	   fear	   among	   the	   community	   (Kelling	   &	   Moore	   2005).	  During	  the	  1960s,	  crime	  rates	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  Western	  nations	  began	  to	  rise	  with	  new	  levels	  of	  social	  disruption	  plaguing	  urban	  communities.	  The	  narrow	  focus	  of	  the	  police	  on	  responding	  to	  calls	  and	  dealing	  with	   them	  in	  an	   isolated	   fashion	  made	  policing	   inefficient	  and	  costly.	  Significant	  increases	  in	  budgets	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  technology	  and	  equipment	  had	  little	  effect	  (Kelling	  &	  Moore	  2005).	  Rioting	  in	  Los	  Angeles,	  Chicago	  and	  New	  York,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  major	  US	  cities,	  throughout	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  served	  to	  highlight	  the	  police’s	   inability	  to	  effectively	  control	  crime	  and	  disorder.	   	  They	  also	  contributed	  to	  rising	   fear.	  While	  crime	  rates	  and	  fear	  did	  not	  always	  correspond,	  Kelling	  and	  Moore	  (2005)	  describe	  how	  a	  heightened	  sense	  of	  fear	  meant	  citizens	  abandoned	  public	  spaces	  because	  of	  the	  growing	  disorder.	  	  It	  was	  during	  this	  time	  that	  the	  issue	  gained	  the	  attention	  of	  policy-­‐makers	  at	  the	  highest	  level.	  
The	   President’s	   Commission	   on	   Law	   Enforcement	   and	   Administration	   of	   Justice	   (The	   Crime	  Commission	  Report)	  and	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  National	  Advisory	  Commission	  on	  Civil	  Disorders	  (The	  Kerner	  Commission)	  reflected	   the	  scale	  of	  concern	  about	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  police	   in	   the	  United	   States.	   Race	   and	   inequality	   were	   identified	   as	   key	   issues	   of	   concern.	   The	   Crime	  Commission	  Report	  (cited	  in	  Skolnick	  &	  Bayley	  1988)	  highlighted	  hostility	  towards	  the	  police,	  particularly	  among	  black	  communities,	  as	  a	  key	  contributor	  to	  their	  growing	  sense	  of	  weakness.	  This	   point	   	   is	   also	   highlighted	   by	   Kelling	   and	   Moore	   (2005),	   who	   argue	   that	   the	   increased	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momentum	  of	  civil	  rights	  protests	  at	  this	  time	  served	  to	  challenge	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  police,	  especially	  among	  minorities	  and	  young	  people,	  	  but	  also	  among	  the	  general	  public.	  	  The	  Kerner	  Commission	  (cited	  in	  Skolnick	  &	  Bayley	  1988)	  went	  further	  to	   identify	  the	  deeper	  structural	   problems	   that	   plagued	   American	   society	   and	   how	   these	   were	   expressed	   in	   the	  criminal	   justice	   system.	  The	   conclusion	  of	   the	   report	  was	  unequivocal:	   “Our	  nation	   is	  moving	  towards	   two	   societies,	   one	   black,	   one	   white	   –	   separate	   and	   unequal”	   (National	   Advisory	  Commission	   on	   Civil	   Disorders	   1968:1).	   Disparities	   in	   incomes	   and	   sentences,	   out-­‐of-­‐date	  prison	   facilities	   and	   ‘assembly-­‐line	   justice’	   in	   lower	   courts	  were	   all	   identified	   as	   contributing	  factors	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  social	  decay	  that	  arose	  during	  this	  time.	  Policing	  tactics	  were	  identified	  as	  a	  factor	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  riots,	  however,	  they	  were	  also	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  problem	  of	  racial	  hostility.	  The	  report	  described	  how	  perceptions	  of	  the	  police	  within	  urban	  African-­‐American	  communities	  were	  intensely	  negative,	  with	  many	  regarding	  the	  police	  as	   an	   instrument	   of	   white	   supremacy	   based	   on	   double	   standards	   and	   excessive	   brutality.	   In	  response,	   the	   Commission	   recommended	   a	   raft	   of	   measures	   aimed	   at	   establishing	   a	   closer	  relationship	  between	   the	   organs	   of	   local	   government	   and	   the	  people	   it	   served.	  Regarding	   the	  police,	   the	   report	   suggested	   reviewing	   and	   improving	   policing	   in	   the	   ghetto	   and	   establishing	  mechanisms	  for	  responding	  to	  the	  community	  and	  addressing	  grievances.	  These	  changes	  had	  to	  be	   embedded	  within	   a	  whole-­‐of-­‐society	   response	   aimed	   at	   remediating	   the	   underlying	   social	  and	  political	  cleavages	  that	  fuelled	  the	  disorder.	  	  	  A	  similar	  reflective	  process	  occurred	  in	  Britain,	  although	  slightly	  later.	  The	  1981	  Brixton	  Riots	  served	   as	   a	   catalyst	   driving	   police	   reform	   there.	   As	   in	   a	   large	   number	   of	   suburbs	   and	   cities	  across	  the	  world	  at	  this	  time,	  Brixton	  suffered	  from	  a	  range	  of	  problems,	  including	  deep	  social	  cleavages	  along	  racial	   lines	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  (Lord	  Scarman	  1982).	  Lord	  Scarman	  (1982)	  was	   tasked	  with	   investigating	   the	   riots	  and	   identifying	   their	  underlying	  causes.	   His	   report	   found	   racial	   cleavages	   to	   be	   the	   central	   cause	   of	   the	   rioting.	   However,	   the	  style	   of	   policing	   in	   Brixton	   was	   also	   highlighted	   as	   a	   key	   contributing	   factor.	   Lord	   Scarman	  identifies	  six	  common	  criticisms	  voiced	  by	  the	  public	  regarding	  policing	   in	  the	  area	  of	  Brixton	  most	   affected	  by	   the	   riots:	   racial	   prejudice;	   harassment	   and	   abrasive	   treatment	   of	   the	  public;	  unimaginative	   and	   inflexible	   policing	   styles;	   over-­‐reaction	   to	   the	   disorder;	   a	   lack	   of	   urgency;	  and	  a	   failure	   to	  deal	  with	   looting.	   In	   a	   similar	  way	   to	   inquiries	   in	   the	  US,	   the	  Scarman	   report	  found	  racial	   tension	  and	  police	  ambivalence	   to	  be	  a	  primary	  driver	  of	   the	  violence	   in	  London.	  	  The	  use	  of	   “hard	  policing”	  methods	  was	   identified	  as	  a	  key	  weakness	  of	  policing	   strategies	   in	  Brixton	  and	  elsewhere,	   and	  seen	  as	  evidence	   that	  declining	   confidence	   in	   the	  police	   stemmed	  more	  from	  the	  overall	  policing	  approach	  than	  individual	  cases	  of	  misconduct.	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The	   police’s	   inability	   to	   address	   racial	   inequalities	   in	   Britain	   was	   both	   a	   cause,	   and	   a	  consequence,	   of	   declining	   local	   confidence	   in	   the	   police.	   These	   failures	   left	   Lord	   Scarman	  (1982:79)	  with	   “no	  doubt	   that	  a	   significant	  cause	  of	   the	  hostility	  of	  young	  blacks	   towards	   the	  police	  was	  loss	  of	  confidence	  by	  significant	  sections,	  though	  it	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  by	  all,	  of	  the	  Lambeth	  public	  in	  the	  police.”	  The	  Report’s	  conclusion	  stressed	  that	  the	  police	  are	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  racial	  disadvantage	  but	  must	  be	  forever	  conscious	  of	  their	  role	  in	  potentially	  perpetuating	  it.	  Such	  recognition	  was	  not	  catered	  for	  within	  the	  current	  policing	  model.	  	  In	  calling	  for	  a	  new	  approach,	  the	  Report	  argued	  that	  “[i]f	  they	  [the	  police]	  neglect	  consultation	  and	  cooperation	  with	  the	  local	  community,	  unrest	  is	  certain	  and	  riot	  becomes	  probable”	  (Lord	  Scarman	   1982:210).	   The	   Scarman	   Report	   came	   to	   be	   a	   key	   driver	   of	   change	   in	   Britain’s	  approach	   to	  modern	   policing	   (Bennett	   1994).	   From	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	   through	   the	   early	   1990s,	  Britain,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  many	  others	  began	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  model	  that	  aimed	  to	  bridge	  the	  distance	  between	  police	  and	  urban	  minorities	  whilst	  maintaining	  police	  professionalism	  and	  integrity.	  	  Community	  Policing	  Community	   policing	   represents	   the	   combination	   of	   a	   number	   of	   ideas	   aimed	   at	   improving	  police-­‐society	  relations	  and	  addressing	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  crime	  in	  urban	  communities.13	  As	  has	  been	  described,	  reform	  policing	  focused	  on	  the	  application	  of	  criminal	  law	  through	  such	  measures	  as	  deterrence,	  incapacitation	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  distance	  between	  police	  and	  community	  (Eck	   &	   Rosenbaum	   1994).	   Community	   policing	   stresses	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   flexibility,	  responsiveness	   and,	   above	   all,	  more	   involvement	   of	   the	   community	   in	   crime	   control	   and	   the	  maintenance	  of	  social	  order.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Community	  policing	  is	  used	  here	  as	  an	  umbrella	  term	  to	  encompass	  a	  number	  of	  trends	  that	  were	  all	  moving	  in	  the	  same	  general	  direction,	  that	  is,	  towards	  a	  more	  inclusive	  policing	  strategy.	  One	  important	  distinction	  should	  be	  made,	  however,	  between	  community	  policing	  and	  another	  emerging	  model	  gaining	  popularity	   at	   this	   time:	   problem-­‐oriented	   policing.	   Problem-­‐oriented	   policing	   has	   very	   similar	   goals	   to	  community	   policing	   and	   employs	   many	   of	   the	   same	   policing	   strategies.	   The	   model	   was	   developed	   by	  Herman	   Goldstein	   and,	   like	   community	   policing,	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   learn	   from	   the	   failures	   of	   previous	  models.	   Its	   key	   point	   of	   difference,	   however,	   is	   that	   rather	   than	   identifying	   a	   lack	   of	   community	  involvement	   as	   policing’s	   primary	  weakness,	   problem-­‐oriented	  policing	   highlights	   the	   incident-­‐focused	  approach	  of	  reform	  policing	  as	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  its	  failures.	  Goldstein’s	  model	  aims	  to	  address	  the	  problems	   that	   underlie	   incidents,	   rather	   than	   just	   the	   surface	   expression	   of	   them.	   This	   involves	  identifying	   the	  main	  drivers	  of	  crime	   in	  a	  community	  and	  shifting	   the	   focus	  of	  policing	   towards	  solving	  them,	   rather	   than	   responding	   to	   them.	  Problems	   are	  defined	   as	   a	   cluster	   of	   similar	   incidents,	   a	   unit	   of	  police	  business,	  or	  a	  substantive	  community	  concern.	  Thus,	  problem-­‐oriented	  policing	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  community	  policing	  but	  some	  problems	  may	  not	  necessarily	  require	  community	  involvement	  in	  order	  to	  solve.	  While	  they	  can,	  and	  often	  do,	  embody	  aspects	  of	  one	  another,	  the	  key	  point	  is	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to.	  Problem-­‐oriented	  policing	  may	  involve	  input	  from	  the	  community,	  but	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  it	  as	  its	  primary	  reference	  point,	  as	  with	  community	  policing.	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For	  many	  neighbourhoods,	  community	  policing	  began	  as	  an	  experiment:	  small	  teams	  of	  officers	  were	  given	  the	  task	  of	  engaging	  the	  community	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  crime	  and	  social	  disorder	  in	  the	   local	   area.	   For	   this	   reason,	   however,	   no	   specific	   doctrine	   of	   community	   policing	  has	   been	  developed,	   making	   the	   concept	   difficult	   to	   identify	   and	   define.	   Kelling	   and	   Coles	   (1996:158)	  write	   that	   “community	   policing	   has	   come	   to	   mean	   all	   things	   to	   all	   people.”	   Different	  departments	  use	  different	  strategies	  to	  improve	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  community	  and	  they	  have	  different	  motivations	  for	  doing	  so.	  While	  this	  reflects	  a	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  in	  the	  model,	  it	  also	  means	  that	  no	  one	  programme	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	   ‘pure’	  community	  policing	  programme.	  However,	  several	  broad	  traits	  can	  be	  identified	  across	  many	  programmes	  that	  help	  demonstrate	  what	  the	  concept	  means	  at	  the	  policy-­‐,	  management-­‐,	  and	  street-­‐level.	  	  In	   attempting	   to	   identify	   and	   separate	   out	   the	   different	   elements	   to	   an	   effective	   community	  policing	  model,	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  has	  come	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  framework	  developed	  by	  Cordner	  (1996,2005).	  Cordner	  identifies	  four	  core	  dimensions	  of	  community	  policing;	  the	  philosophical,	  strategic,	  tactical,	  and	  organisational	  dimensions.	  These	  dimensions	  help	  to	  outline	  the	  nature	  of	  a	   community	   policing	   approach	   even	   though	   specific	   programmes	   or	   models	   may	   vary	   in	  practice.	   They	   also	   demonstrate	   that	   community	   policing	   is	   a	  whole-­‐of-­‐department	   approach	  that	  requires	  some	  degree	  of	  implementation	  across	  the	  entire	  police	  organisation.	  	  The	  philosophical	  dimension	  describes	  the	  underlying	  principles	  driving	  a	  police	  department’s	  operation	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  allow	  for	  and	  encourage	  community	  engagement.	  The	  philosophical	   dimension	   is	   an	   important	   one	   as	   it	   indicates	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   community	  policing	   is	   driven	   by	   a	   genuine	   desire	   to	   involve	   the	   community.	   Re-­‐orienting	   department	  philosophy	   requires	   a	   fundamental	   change	   in	   the	   way	   police	   think	   about	   and	   perform	   their	  work	  in	  the	  community	  “toward	  a	  more	  open	  and	  democratic	  orientation,	  and	  a	  redefinition	  and	  broadening	  of	  the	  police	  role”	  (Roberg	  1994:250).	  Where	   previous	   models	   of	   policing	   considered	   law	   enforcement	   to	   be	   a	   police	   matter,	  community	  policing	  considers	  the	  issue	  in	  a	  much	  wider	  context,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  range	  of	   actors	   associated	  with	   and	   affected	  by	   the	   problem.	   In	   effect,	   community	   policing	   requires	  that	  policing	  becomes	  ‘de-­‐professionalised’	  and	  ‘de-­‐specialised’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  community	  are	  encouraged	  to	  take	  on	  some	  of	  the	  tasks	  associated	  with	  maintaining	  law	  and	  order.	   In	  an	  ideal	   sense,	   community	   policing	   aims	   to	   develop	   “self-­‐regulating,	   self-­‐sufficient	   communities	  where	   levels	   of	   crime	   and	   disorder	   are	   contained	   by	   the	   efforts	   of	   local	   residents	   and	   local	  institutions”	   (Eck	   &	   Rosenbaum	   1994:8).	   This	   involves	   encouraging	   communities	   to	   be	  organised	   and	   informed	   about	   their	   neighbourhoods	   and	   be	   active	   in	   attempts	   to	   resolve	  disturbances	  or	  problems	  and	  requires	  that	  the	  community	  take	  on	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  identifying	  problems	  and	  developing	  solutions	  (Friedman	  1994).	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Observers	   stress	   that	   community	   policing	   is	   not	   a	   panacea	   and	   so	   expectations	   should	   be	  adapted	  to	  local	  context.	  	  Glaser	  and	  Denhardt	  (2010:310)	  describe	  community	  policing	  as	  “the	  co-­‐production	   of	   public	   safety”.	   Likewise,	   Tilley	   (2003:315,	   emphasis	   in	   original)	   argues	   that	  “Community	  policing	  stresses	  policing	  with	  and	   for	   the	  community	   rather	   than	  policing	  of	   the	  community.”	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   ways	   this	   philosophical	   shift	   can	   be	   exhibited,	   however,	   Cordner	  highlights	  three	  that	  are	  critically	  important:	  citizen	  input,	  broad	  function	  and	  personal	  service.	  Citizen	   input	   refers	   to	   the	   soliciting	   community	   involvement	   in	  police	  operations	  and	   is	  often	  achieved	   through	   community	   surveys,	   advisory	   boards,	   or	   town	   meetings.	   Broad	   function	  facilitates	  this	  by	  encouraging	  officers	  to	  look	  beyond	  their	  traditionally-­‐defined	  role	  in	  order	  to	  engage	   with	   concerns	   raised	   by	   citizens.	   Personal	   service	   also	   plays	   a	   role	   by	   establishing	   a	  rapport	   between	   community	   members	   and	   officers	   and	   allowing	   flexible	   responses	   to	  community	  concerns	  rather	  than	  bureaucratic	  ones.	  These	  practices	  help	  to	  convey	  the	  image	  of	  an	  open	  and	  responsive	  police	  department	   to	   the	   local	   community.	   If	   implemented	  effectively	  they	  should	  embody	  a	  new	  policing	  philosophy	  that	  allows	  for	  a	  more	   interactive	  relationship	  between	  officers	  and	  citizens.	  	  The	  strategic	  dimension	  of	  community	  policing	  is	  described	  by	  Cordner	  as	  the	  components	  of	  a	  programme	  that	  translate	  department	  philosophy	  into	  action.	  Important	  strategic	  elements	  of	  a	  community	   policing	   approach	   are	   re-­‐oriented	  patrols,	   prevention	   emphasis,	   and	   geographical	  focus.	   Re-­‐oriented	   patrols	   and	   a	   geographical	   focus	   should	   aim	   to	   foster	   a	   more	   personal	  relationship	   between	   officers	   and	   the	   areas	   they	  work	   in.	   	  Many	   departments	   internationally	  have	  reinstated	  foot	  patrols	  as	  a	  way	  of	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  contacts	  officers	  have	   with	   those	   in	   the	   community.	   Foot	   patrols	   formed	   the	   basis	   of	   police	   strategy	   in	   both	  Singapore	   and	   Japan	   (Skolnick	   &	   Bayley	   1988).	   Neighbourhood	  meetings	   and	   the	   opening	   of	  new	  mini-­‐stations	  have	  also	  been	  used	  as	  ways	  of	  bringing	  the	  police	  closer	  to	  the	  community,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Mini-­‐stations	  or	  outposts	  have	  been	  popular	  in	  Detroit	  (USA),	  Australia,	  Norway,	  Singapore	  and	  Japan	  where	  they	  are	  used	  to	  “extend,	  deepen	  and	  personalize	  interaction”	  with	  the	  local	  community	  (Skolnick	  &	  Bayley	  1988:11).	  It	   is	  believed	  that	  a	  policing	  approach	  can	  become	  more	  responsive	  if	  efforts	  are	  concentrated	  on	   developing	   local	   solutions	   to	   local	   problems.	   Toch	   and	   Grant	   (2005:288)	   highlight	   the	  importance	  of	  local	  input	  into	  policing	  programmes:	  “Community	  policing	  is	  by	  definition	  local	  because	  that	   is	  what	  communities	  are.”	  Locally-­‐sourced	  ideas	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  more	  durable	  and	   more	   effective	   than	   those	   developed	   centrally	   by	   the	   police	   administration.	   Patrols	   that	  engage	   citizens	   at	   the	   street-­‐level	   are	   believed	   to	   make	   policing	   more	   efficient	   and	   effective	  (Cordner	  2005).	   There	   are	   a	   number	  of	   practical	   benefits	   that	   flow	   from	  a	   close	   relationship.	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The	   community	   can	   become	   ‘the	   eyes	   and	   ears’	   for	   the	   police	   and	   the	   police	   can	   encourage	  greater	  vigilance	  by	  providing	   information	  on	  wider	   criminal	   trends	   (Schneider	  1998).	  Glaser	  and	  Denhardt	  (2010:310)	  explain	   that,	   through	  such	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  contacts	  with	  citizens,	   “police	  officers	  have	   the	  potential	   to	   create	   an	   environment	   that	  not	   only	   improves	  public	   safety	  but	  also	  enhances	  citizen	  engagement	  and	  involvement	  and	  builds	  a	  sense	  of	  community.”	  It	  can	  be	  seen	   here	   how	   community	   policing	   aims	   not	   only	   to	   increase	   the	   flow	   of	   intelligence	   to	   the	  police	  but	  also,	  through	  interactive	  engagement	  with	  the	  community,	  to	  strengthen	  the	  ties	  that	  bind	  citizens	  together	  as	  well	  as	  those	  that	  bind	  them	  to	  the	  police.	  Critical	  to	  this	  is	  achieving	  a	  sense	  of	  common	  interests,	  values	  and	  norms	  between	  police	  and	  community.	  Re-­‐oriented	  patrols	  and	  a	  geographical	  focus	  can	  help	  to	  achieve	  this	  by	  opening	  up	  more	  points	  for	  the	  general	  public	  to	  access	  the	  police.	   Increased	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  contact	  with	  the	  community	   allows	   police	   to	   adjust	   to	   local	   norms	   and	   standards	   of	   ordered	   behaviour.	   As	  Skolnick	  and	  Bayley	  (1988:71)	  write,	  working	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  community	  allows	  them	  “to	  explain	  themselves,	  associate	  themselves	  with	  community	  initiatives,	  and	  become	  highly	  visible	  as	   concerned	   defenders	   of	   public	   safety.”	   In	   this	   way,	   Eck	   and	   Rosenbaum	   (1994)	   believe,	  community	  policing	  also	  provides	  some	  means	  of	  redressing	  discrimination	  by	  including	  those	  communities,	   particularly	   minorities,	   who	   have	   traditionally	   been	   treated	   unfairly	   by	   police	  practice.	  By	  involving	  previously	  excluded	  groups,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  some	  of	  the	  distance	  between	  police	  and	  minority	  communities,	  such	  as	  that	  identified	  in	  the	  Scarman	  Report,	  will	  be	  closed.	  This	  can	  be	  difficult,	  however,	   in	  urban	  environments	  where	  communities	  are	  fragmented	  and	  show	   few	   signs	   of	   social	   cohesion,	   let	   alone	   an	   identifiable	   set	   of	   norms	   or	   standards	   of	  behaviour	  (Buerger	  1994).	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   strategic	   dimension,	   Cordner	   also	   identifies	   the	   tactical	   dimension	   which	  describes	  how	  strategies	  can	  be	  pursued	  so	   that	   they	  contribute	   to	   the	  overarching	  goals	  of	  a	  community	   policing	   programme.	   Positive	   interaction,	   partnerships,	   and	   problem-­‐solving	   are	  considered	   central	   to	   giving	   substance	   to	   the	   promises	   of	   community	   policing.	   Positive	  interaction	   requires	   that	   constructive	   and	   peaceful	   interactions	  with	   citizens	   are	   encouraged	  and	   reinforced	   as	   a	   way	   of	   counteracting	   the	   inevitable	   negative	   interactions.	   In	   addition	   to	  reaffirming	   solidarity	   between	   officers	   and	   the	   community,	   a	   focus	   on	   establishing	   positive	  interactions	   makes	   policing	   more	   enjoyable	   and	   rewarding	   for	   both	   sides	   (Cordner	   2005).	  Problem-­‐solving	   contributes	   to	   this	   by	  making	   street-­‐level	   policing	   less	   incident-­‐focused	   and	  therefore	   more	   proactive.	   Where	   reform-­‐era	   policing	   focused	   its	   attention	   on	   responding	   to	  calls	  for	  assistance,	  community	  policing	  encourages	  officers	  to	  analyse	  underlying	  social	  issues	  or	  trends	  that	  may	  be	  driving	  crime	  within	  a	  community.	  In	  this	  way,	  officers	  can	  have	  a	  more	  meaningful	  effect	  on	  crime	  and	  fear	  of	  crime	  in	  the	  area	  they	  patrol.	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Partnership,	   sometimes	   described	   as	   interagency	   cooperation,	   is	   a	   common	   component	   of	  community	   policing	   emphasised	   by	   the	   literature.	   Dealing	   with	   crime	   in	   its	   broader	   social	  context	   requires	   that	   police	  work	  with	   other	   agencies	   also	   involved	   in	   improving	   the	   overall	  well-­‐being	  of	   the	  community.	   It	   is	  based	  on	   the	  recognition	   that	  crime	   is	  a	  reflection	  of	   larger	  problems	  within	   society,	   dealing	  with	  which	  would	   be	   beyond	   any	   department’s	   capabilities.	  Sadd	   and	   Grinc	   (1994:41)	   write	   that	   “no	   police	   department	   can	   do	   effective	   and	   efficient	  problem	  solving	  without	  the	  active	  involvement	  of	  other	  city	  agencies.”	  In	  an	  example	  from	  New	  York,	   Kelling	   and	   Coles	   (1996:159-­‐160)	   describe	   how	   solving	   the	   problem	   of	   disorder	   in	   the	  subway	   system	   required	   a	   number	   of	   different	   actors	   –	   from	  public	   relations	  departments	   to	  station	  managers	  –	  to	  contribute	  to	  solving	  an	  issue	  that	  transcended	  the	  traditionally	  defined	  boundaries	  of	  each	  of	  those	  actors.	  By	  working	  together,	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  strategy	  could	  be	  adopted.	  	  Interagency	   cooperation	   thus	   requires	   police	   departments	   to	   consider	   themselves	   within	   a	  much	  larger	  operating	  environment.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  police	  are	  able	  to	  integrate	  themselves	  into	   this	   effort	   and	   work	   collaboratively	   with	   organisations	   that	   may	   have	   a	   very	   different	  working	  agenda.	  In	  some	  cases,	  this	  will	  require	  police	  to	  take	  a	  proactive	  role	  in	  encouraging	  such	   cooperation.	   Schneider	   (1998:352)	   writes	   that	   “the	   efficacy	   of	   a	   police	   department	   in	  advancing	  crime	  prevention	  is	  dependent	  upon	  their	  ability	  to	  promote	  collective	  action.”	  While	  this	  may	  be	  outside	  their	  primary	  role	  and	  may	  consume	  extra	  police	  resources,	  the	  community	  model	  outlines	  how	  such	  effort	  can	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  more	  effective	  broad-­‐based	  social	  control	  over	  the	  long-­‐term.	  	  Interagency	   cooperation	   can	   also	   involve	   groups	   already	   working	   at	   the	   community	   level.	   A	  common	   example	   is	   Neighbourhood	   Watch.	   Neighbourhood	   Watch	   schemes	   aim	   to	   foster	   a	  sense	   of	   community	   by	   asking	   neighbourhood	   residents	   to	   take	   greater	   responsibility	   for	  preventing	   disorder	   in	   their	   local	   area	   (Skolnick	   &	   Bayley	   1988).	   They	   can	   involve	   basic	  measures	  such	  as	  an	  effort	  by	  neighbours	  to	  provide	  informal	  surveillance	  of	  the	  street	  to	  more	  advanced	   programmes	   of	   patrolling	   and	   reporting.	   For	   police,	   Neighbourhood	   Watch	   is	  designed	  to	  lighten	  the	  burden	  of	  patrolling	  and	  monitoring	  areas;	  however,	  like	  other	  aspects	  of	  community	  policing,	  wider	  benefits	  come	  from	  the	  strengthening	  of	  neighbourhood	  ties	  and	  the	  more	  productive	  police-­‐community	  relationship	  that	  flow	  indirectly	  from	  such	  programmes	  (Fleming	  2005).	  	  The	  organisational	  dimension	  of	  community	  policing	  describes	  those	  aspects	  of	  a	  department’s	  functioning	  that	  allow	  officers	  to	  conduct	  their	  work	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  goals	  of	  community	   policing.	   Here,	   structure,	   management	   and	   information	   are	   considered	   vital	   to	  establishing	  an	  organisational	  culture	  conducive	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	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between	  police	  and	  the	  community.	  To	  suit	  the	  emphasis	  on	  a	  uniform	  police	  response,	  reform-­‐era	   policing	   saw	   the	   development	   of	   bureaucratic	   department	   structures	   with	   clearly	  identifiable	  chains	  of	  command	  being	  a	  hallmark.	  Community	  policing	  aims	  to	  both	  decentralise	  and	  flatten	  the	  police	  hierarchical	  structure.	  Decentralisation	  is	  often	  utilised	  to	  shorten	  lines	  of	  communication	   across	   the	   agency	   and	   give	   officers	   the	   required	   autonomy	   to	   effectively	  respond	   to	   the	   community.	  The	   shift	   reflects	  wider	   changes	  occurring	   in	   the	   corporate	  world	  and	   a	   desire	   by	   police	   to	   emulate	   private	   sector	  models	   for	   improving	   efficiency	   and	   service	  delivery	  (Skogan	  &	  Hartnett	  2005).	  	  In	   policing	   terms,	   decentralisation	   means	   that	   responses	   to	   incidents	   are	   dictated	   less	   by	   a	  centralised	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  more	  by	   the	   instincts	  and	   intuitions	  of	   the	  officer	  on	  the	  street.	  The	  aim	  is	  that	  smaller	  units	  with	  smaller	  areas	  of	  operation	  will	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  higher	  levels	  of	  contact	  with	  their	  local	  community	  and	  thus	  deliver	  a	  higher	  quality	  service	  to	  that	  community	  (Bennett	  1994:229).	  As	  Kelling	  and	  Coles	  (1996:160)	  write:	  “Because	  problems	  are	  most	  often	  local	  –	  requiring	  identification	  and	  crafting	  of	  responses	  at	  this	  level	  –	  authority	  must	  be	  devolved	  to	  lower	  levels	  of	  the	  police	  organization	  if	  a	  department	  is	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  neighbourhood	  needs.”	  Decentralisation	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  issues	  relating	  to	  racial	  inequality	  and	  inequitable	  policing	  in	  urban	  neighbourhoods.	  In	  these	  cases	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  giving	  officers	  greater	  flexibility	  will	  enable	  departments	  to	  respond	  more	  effectively	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  minorities,	  whose	  voice	  may	  otherwise	  be	  lost	  in	  dense	  urban	  neighbourhoods.	  Alongside	   decentralisation,	   more	   significant	   changes	   have	   been	   made	   at	   the	   strategy	   and	  planning	   levels	   to	   bring	   policing	   into	   line	  with	   a	   corporate	   style	   of	   department	  management	  (Kelling	   &	   Coles	   1996).	   Under	   community	   policing,	   street-­‐level	   officers	   are	   given	   greater	  responsibility	   for	   decision-­‐making	   in	   their	   area	   in	   the	   hope	   that	   they	  will	   become	  more	   self-­‐directing.	  Meanwhile,	  senior	  officers	  are	  expected	  to	  encourage	  initiative	  and	  develop	  strategies	  that	   enhance	   the	   role	   of	   their	   subordinates	   (Skolnick	   &	   Bayley	   1988).	   Enabling	   street-­‐level	  officers	   to	   contribute	   to	   department	   planning	   aims	   to	  make	   use	   of	   the	  wealth	   of	   information	  possessed	  by	  those	  who	  are	  closest	  to	  the	  problem	  (Wycoff	  &	  Skogan	  1994).	  By	  integrating	  this	  information	  into	  department	  strategies,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  an	  improved	  service	  can	  be	  delivered	  to	  the	   public.	   This	   contribution	  will	   complement	   that	   provided	   by	   the	   community,	   and	   through	  this,	  ensure	  that	  police	  policy	  reflects	  the	  concerns	  of	  those	  who	  experience	  and	  deal	  with	  the	  problem.	  A	   flatter	   hierarchical	   structure	   also	   aims	   to	   improve	   the	   job	   satisfaction,	   morale	   and	  performance	   of	   police	   officers	   (Lurigio	   &	   Rosenbaum	   1994).	   Wycoff	   and	   Skogan	   (1994:89)	  explain:	   “Employees	  who	   are	   treated	   as	   internal	   customers,	   the	   logic	   goes,	   are	   better	   able	   to	  understand	  what	  it	  means	  to	  treat	  citizens	  as	  external	  customers.”	  Community	  policing	  affects	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an	  officer’s	  skills,	  motivations	  and	  opportunities	  by	  asking	  them	  to	  form	  new	  partnerships	  with	  those	  they	  police	  and	  those	  they	  work	  with	  (Wilkinson	  &	  Rosenbaum	  1994).	  This	  creates	  more	  opportunities	  for	  career	  development	  and	  up-­‐skilling.	  In	  many	  cases,	  avenues	  for	  promotion	  are	  altered	  so	  as	  to	  encourage	  greater	  innovation	  and	  initiative	  among	  individual	  officers	  (Weisel	  &	  Eck	   1994;	   Wycoff	   &	   Skogan	   1994).	   Kelling	   and	   Coles	   (1996)	   describe	   how	   the	   role	   of	   the	  sergeant	   is	   transformed	   from	  being	  an	  overseer	   to	  being	   that	  of	  a	  mentor	  or	  coach	  (Kelling	  &	  Coles	  1996).	  	  A	   flatter	   command	   structure	   can	   also	   help	   towards	   gaining	   internal	   acceptance	   of	   the	   new	  policing	   model	   (Greene	   et	   al.	   1994:106).	   Gaining	   officer	   input	   into	   such	   programmes	   is	  important	   but	   can	   be	   difficult.	   Guyot	   (1979)	   describes	   how	   police	   rank	   structures	   can	   be	  resistant	  to	  change,	  highlighting	  factors	  such	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  flexibility	  and	  insularity	  as	  significant	  barriers	   to	   organisational	   reform.	   Community	   policing	   intends	   to	   gain	   the	   support	   of	   officers	  across	  different	  ranks	  to	  make	  the	  transition	  more	  effective.	  It	  aims	  to	  improve	  job	  satisfaction	  by	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  unemotional,	  non-­‐emergency	  contacts	  officers	  have	  with	  the	  public,	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  lessening	  the	  likelihood	  of	  combative	  or	  hostile	  attitudes	  developing	  (Skolnick	  &	  Bayley	  1988).	  A	  more	  receptive	  attitude	  amongst	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  officers	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  key	  factor	  contributing	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  model	  because	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  have	  to	  turn	  departmental	  policy	  into	  a	  reality	  on	  the	  street	  (Sadd	  &	  Grinc	  1994).	  Together	  these	  dimensions	  constitute	  a	  broad	  outline	  of	  the	  community	  policing	  model.	  While	  individual	  programmes	  may	  vary,	  in	  general	  these	  philosophies,	  structures,	  and	  strategies	  have	  come	   to	   define	   the	   implementation	   of	   community	   policing	   around	   the	   world.	   Following	   its	  emergence	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain,	  the	  community	  policing	  turn	  can	  now	  be	  seen	  across	  Asia	   (Skolnick	   &	   Bayley	   1988),	   Latin	   America	   (Frühling	   2012;	   Neild	   2000),	   Central	   Europe	  (International	   Helsinki	   Federation	   for	   Human	   Rights	   2002),	   the	   Pacific	   (Butterworth	   2005;	  Chan	  1997)	  and,	  most	  recently,	  in	  cases	  of	  international	  policing	  (Emmott	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Greener	  2009a).	  It	  is	  this	  most	  recent	  development	  that	  is	  of	  primary	  concern	  here.	  However,	  to	  better	  understand	   the	   implications	   of	   this	   development	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   look	   back	   at	   the	   lessons	  learned	   in	   domestic	   contexts	   and,	   through	   this,	   develop	   a	   greater	   awareness	   of	   the	   potential	  issues	  associated	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  community	  policing	  model	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  	  setting.	  	  Engaging	  Communities	  in	  the	  “Foreign	  Policy	  Space”	  With	   the	   expansion	   of	   community	   policing	   came	   a	   number	   of	   careful	   examinations	   and	  critiques.	  The	  following	  review	  brings	  together	  discussions	  surrounding	  the	  implementation	  of	  community	  policing	   in	   the	  United	  States,	  Britain,	   Latin	  America,	   and	  Canada.	  The	   studies	   that	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have	   been	   reviewed	   raise	   a	   number	   of	   questions	   surrounding	   the	   appropriateness	   and	  effectiveness	  of	   community	  policing	   in	  dealing	  with	   issues	  of	   crime	  control.	  They	   identify	  and	  explore	  some	  of	   the	  social,	   cultural	  and	  political	  challenges	   that	   face	  police	  officers	  under	   this	  new	  model	  and,	  because	  of	  this,	  provide	  a	  useful	  insight	  for	  understanding	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	   international	   police	   officers	   as	   they	   seek	   to	   engage	   communities	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   societies.	  These	  issues	  are	  discussed,	  firstly,	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  they	  have	  arisen	  in	  domestic	  settings	  and,	  secondly,	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  they	  might	  manifest	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  environment.	  The	  questions	  that	   arise	   out	   of	   this	   review	   aim	   to	   explore	   some	   of	   the	   philosophical,	   strategic,	   tactical	   and	  organisational	  dimensions	  of	  the	  policing	  effort	  and	  understand	  more	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  for	  building	  a	  sustainable	  peace	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  	  
‘Communities’	  in	  Conflict	  A	   primary	   concern	   emerging	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   community	   policing	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   detail	  concerning	  what	  is	  actually	  meant	  by	  the	  term	  ‘community’.	  Use	  of	  the	  term	  to	  promote	  a	  range	  of	   public	   and	   private	   initiatives	   has	   grown	   in	   popularity	   in	   recent	   times	   as	   the	   expansion	   of	  urban	   societies	   erodes	   traditional	   patterns	   of	   interaction	   and	   mobility	   (Bryson	   &	   Mowbray	  1981).	  Reclaiming	  a	  lost	  sense	  of	  communal	  solidarity	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  answer	  to	  a	  range	  of	  social	  problems	   not	   necessarily	   limited	   to	   crime	   and	   disorder.	   As	   Skogan	   and	   Hartnett	   (1997:433)	  write,	  “[a]t	  a	  mythic	  level,	  community	  policing	  reminds	  us	  of	  a	  world	  we	  think	  we	  once	  had,	  but	  have	  now	  lost”.	  Such	  rhetoric	  provides	  an	  idealised	  image	  of	  the	  vision	  underlying	  the	  model	  but	  reveals	  little	  about	  the	  particular	  kinds	  of	  community	  that	  it	  aims	  to	  encourage.	  Many	  observers	  now	  question	  whether	  such	  imagery	  provides	  a	  sufficient	  base	  for	  grass-­‐roots	  collective	  action	  or	   whether	   it	   merely	   acts	   as	   	   a	   ‘spray-­‐on	   solution’,	   lending	   legitimacy	   to	   deteriorating	  institutions	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  “vague	  formulations	  and	  selective	  perceptions”	  (Bryson	  &	  Mowbray	  1981:256).	  Buerger	  (1994:270,	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  writes:	  	  
Little	  attention	  has	  been	  given	  to	  definition	  of	  the	  community	  commensurate	  with	  the	  vast	  
promise	   embedded	   in	   the	   community	   policing	   rhetoric.	   Even	   less	   has	   been	   spared	   for	  
defining	  the	  role	  that	  can	  be	  reasonably	  expected	  of	  “the	  community,”	  howsoever	  it	  should	  be	  
defined.	  
While	  nostalgic	   images	  of	   ‘community’	  may	  provide	  a	  vision	   for	  citizens	   to	  aspire	   to,	   they	  can	  have	  a	  powerful	  political	  effect	  by	  asserting	  an	  overly	  simplistic	  image	  of	  diverse,	  multi-­‐faceted	  social	   groupings.	   Such	   assertions	   tend	   to	   underplay	   the	   significance	   of	   social	   conflict	   and	  disagreement,	   instead	  aiming	   to	  superimpose	  an	   image	  of	  unity	  and	  structure	  over	  often	  very	  fluid	  communal	  arrangements.	  As	  Cunneen	  (1992:161)	  writes:	  “Under	  the	  rubric	  of	  community,	  contradictory	   social	   relations	   such	   as	   those	   of	   class,	   race	   and	   gender	   disappear.	   Relations	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between	   groups	   of	   people	   which	   may	   involve	   the	   exercise	   of	   power	   and	   exploitation	   are	  deemed	  non-­‐existent	  if	  the	  definition	  imposed	  posits	  a	  single	  community”.	  The	  practice	  can	  also	  act	  as	  a	  way	  of	  undermining	  dissent	  and	  ensuring	  minority	  groups	  conform	  to	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  community’s	   majority	   (Cunneen	   1992).	   By	   presenting	   an	   a-­‐political	   construction	   of	   social	  relations,	  emphasising	  essentialised	  conceptions	  of	  unity,	  and	  promoting	  a	  static	  vision	  of	  highly	  mobile	  societies,	  the	  term	  can	  promote	  programme	  goals	  that	  are	  both	  unrealisable	  and	  unfair.	  	  ‘Communities’	   exist	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   forms,	   and	   it	   is	   this	   variety	   that	   can	   make	   communities	  particularly	   difficult	   to	   conceptualise	   and	   engage.	   	  Whether	   community	   policing	   programmes	  refer	  to	  geographically-­‐defined	  communities,	  as	   in	  neighbourhoods	  or	  streets,	  or	  ones	  centred	  around	   a	   particular	   “imagined”	   link	   of	   ethnicity,	   culture,	   or	   nationality,	   their	  multiplicity	   and	  diversity	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   given	   sufficient	   consideration	   by	   the	   model.	   The	   issue	   is	   not	  merely	   definitional.	   When	   complex	   social	   processes	   of	   community	   formation	   are	   obscured,	  multi-­‐dimensional	   identity-­‐formation	   processes	   can	   be	   overlooked	   and	   the	   potential	   for	  harmful	  expressions	  of	  communal	  solidarity	  ignored.	  	  Observers	   both	   inside	   and	   outside	   the	   community	   policing	   literature	   argue	   that	   strong	  communities	  are	  not	  always	  inclusive,	  egalitarian	  or	  stable	  and	  can	  often	  become	  overprotective	  or	   violent	   towards	   outsiders	   (Skolnick	   &	   Bayley	   1988).	   Community	   policing,	   like	   other	  ‘community-­‐oriented’	   programmes,	   tends	   to	   assume	   that	   communities	   are	   defined	   by	  homogeneity,	   good-­‐natured	   neighbourhood	   relations	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   tension	   or	   conflict	  (Ellison	   2007).	   Several	   examples	   highlighted	   by	   the	   literature	   on	   community	   policing	  demonstrate	   the	   potential	   for	   unintended	   consequences	   to	   result	   from	   the	   narrow	   focus	   on	  communal	   solidarity	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   crime	   control.	   Correia	   (2000)	   describes	   how	  communities	  defined	  along	  geographical	  boundaries	  can	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  become	  exclusive,	  as	   witnessed	   by	   the	   growth	   in	   gated	   communities	   across	   many	   US	   cities.	   Such	   communities	  often	  have	   invasive	  surveillance	  systems	  and	  conditions	  of	  membership	   that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  considered	  illegal	  if	  imposed	  by	  a	  government.	  Communities	  such	  as	  these	  can	  also	  exhibit	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  stability	  and	  overall	  health	  of	  the	  community	  outside	  of	  their	  own	  (Correia	  2000).	  This	  concern	  that	  communities	  can	  become	  insular	  and	  develop	  solidarity	  at	  the	  expense	  of	   those	   around	   them	   is	   a	   common	   thread	   across	   studies	   of	   community	   and	   community-­‐building.	  	  Theorists	  of	   social	   capital,	  Nat	  Colletta	  and	  Michelle	  Cullen	   (2000:6),	  write	   that	   “social	   capital	  can	  be	  constructive	  and	  support	  societal	  cohesion	  and	  the	  mitigation	  of	  conflict,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  perverted	  to	  hasten	  social	   fragmentation	  and	  the	  onslaught	  of	  violent	  conflict”.	  They	  stress	  that	  violence	  is	  not	  necessarily	  driven	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  community	  strength,	  but	  is	  often	  the	  result	  of	   harmful	   social	   arrangements	   that	   see	   tight-­‐knit	   communities	  mobilise	   against	   one	   another	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(Goodhand	  et	  al.	  2000;	  John	  2011;	  Nan	  2008;	  Vervisch	  2011).	  For	  example,	  Colletta	  and	  Cullen	  write	  that	  during	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide,	  various	  forms	  of	  social	  capital	  were	  evident.	  In	  some	  cases,	  social	  networks	  became	  strong	  and	  exclusionary	  as	  ethnic	  boundaries	  solidified,	  whereas	  in	  others,	  they	  became	  more	  dense	  and	  more	  tightly	  bound	  within	  families	  and	  groups	  targeted	  by	  the	  Interhamwe	  and	  other	  militias	  (Colletta	  &	  Cullen	  2000:18).	  Often	  peaceful	  communities	  are	   based	   upon	   a	   range	   of	   social	   links,	   the	   varying	   strength	   and	   density	   of	   which	   helps	   to	  mitigate	   or	   mediate	   conflict.	   In	   describing	   the	   value	   of	   weak	   social	   ties,	   Granovetter	   (1973)	  writes	  that	  it	  is	  often	  the	  ties	  between	  communities,	  rather	  than	  within	  them,	  that	  are	  the	  most	  important	  for	  building	  a	  more	  cohesive	  social	  network.	  	  The	  observations	  here	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	   ‘community’	   lead	  to	  questions	  over	  whether	  an	  emphasis	   on	   community-­‐building	   in	   a	   post-­‐conflict	   society	   may	   lead	   to	   the	   same	   kinds	   of	  exclusive,	   insular	   or	   even	   violent	   communities	   described	   by	   theorists	   of	   social	   capital	   and	  community-­‐building.	  The	  lesson	  provided	  by	  both	  of	  these	  literatures	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  not	  all	  community-­‐level	  processes	  contribute	  to	  more	  peaceful	  communities.	  Community	  policing	  must	  therefore	   involve	   more	   than	   simply	   strengthening	   communities	   and	   go	   further	   towards	  considering	   what	   kinds	   of	   social	   formulations	   produce	   peaceful	   results	   for	   local	  neighbourhoods.	  As	  Glaser	  and	  Denhardt	  (2010:311)	  write:	  “If	  community	  policing	  is	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  both	  public	  safety	  and	  community	  building,	  then	  officers	  must	  be	  vigilant	  and	  resourceful	  in	  tying	  the	  agendas	  of	  neighbourhood	  to	  the	  overarching	  agenda	  of	  community”.	  Preventing	  the	  harmful	   by-­‐products	   of	   community-­‐building	   requires	   that	   not	   only	   are	   links	   within	  neighbourhoods	   strengthened	   but	   that	   they	   are	   connected	   to	   an	   overarching	   sense	   of	  “community”.	  In	  post-­‐conflict	  settings,	  the	  need	  for	  such	  considerations	  is	  heightened	  given	  the	  extent	  of	  social	  fragmentation	  and	  the	  multidimensional	  path	  to	  reconciliation.	  	  Murphy	   (2007)	  argues	   that	   the	   idealised	  assumptions	  about	   the	  value	  of	   community	   strength	  contained	   within	   the	   community	   policing	   model	   are	   often	   ill-­‐fitted	   to	   post-­‐conflict	   societies	  characterised	   by	   deep	   socio-­‐economic,	   ideological,	   ethnic,	   tribal	   or	   class	   cleavages.	   In	   such	  settings,	   strong	   communities	   can	   turn	   against	   one	   another	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   hinder	   the	  development	  of	  an	  overarching	  social	  network	  capable	  of	  negating	  conflict.	  	  A	  particular	  concern	  is	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  or	  re-­‐entrenching	  of	  such	  constructions	  if	  community-­‐building	   simply	   reinforces	   local	   attachments	   and	   existing	   societal	   boundaries.	   While	   local	  identities	  can	  be	  diverse,	  multi-­‐faceted	  and	  inclusive,	  there	  remains	  the	  possibility	  for	  narrowly-­‐defined	  communities	  to	  become	  exclusive	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  harmful	  to	  broader	  efforts	  aimed	  at	   bringing	   about	   reconciliation	   and	   unity.	   The	   potential	   for	   communities,	   either	   physical	   or	  imagined,	  to	  be	  mobilised	  for	  violent	  purposes	  is	  also	  a	  very	  real	  concern.	  On	  this	  basis,	  Murphy	  (2007:250)	   argues	   that	   implementing	   a	   policing	   model	   that	   encourages	   and	   rewards	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‘community’	   involvement	  may	   be	   “perhaps	   premature	   and	   potentially	   dangerous”.	   How	   such	  concerns	   factor	   into	   the	  considerations	  of	   international	  police	  officers	  at	   the	  street	   level	   is	  an	  important	  question.	  The	   above	   discussion	   has	   illustrated	   the	   lack	   of	   clarity	   concerning	   what	   constitutes	   a	  community	  and	  has	  highlighted	  how	  this	  lack	  of	  clarity	  can	  hinder	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  police	  force	   that	   aims	   to	   be	   community-­‐driven.	   Knowing	   more	   about	   this	   is	   particularly	   important	  given	  the	  community-­‐ethos	  underlying	  much	  of	  RAMSI	  and	  the	  PPF’s	  work.	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	   model	   for	   community	   engagement,	   the	   perspectives	   of	   individual	   officers	   will	   have	   a	  defining	   impact	   upon	   how	   the	  model	   operates	   at	   the	   street	   level.	   It	   is	   necessary	   therefore	   to	  examine	   in	   greater	   detail	   the	   kinds	   of	   community	   activities	   and	   behaviour	   that	   are	   being	  encouraged	   or	   discouraged	   by	   police	   officers	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   societies	   and	   to	   what	   extent	  concerns	  around	  different	  community-­‐level	  processes	  are	  factored	  into	  the	  community-­‐oriented	  approach.	   Part	   of	   this	   involves	   understanding	   how	   international	   police	   officers	   conceive	   of	  “local	  communities”,	  including	  what	  social,	  cultural	  or	  political	  hallmarks	  define	  a	  “community”	  in	  the	  host	  society	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  communities	  those	  hallmarks	  create.	  Also	  of	  importance	  to	  a	   study	   of	   community	   policing	   is	   how	   the	   different	   aspects	   or	   traits	   of	   that	   landscape	   were	  utilised	  by	  international	  police	  officers	  to	  engage	  local	  communities.	  Because	  of	  the	  positioning	  of	  international	  police	  officers	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  mission’s	  outreach	  efforts,	  their	  perception	  of	   the	   local	   “community”	   landscape	  will	   have	  a	  defining	   impact	  on	  how	   “community”	  policing	  operates	  in	  that	  context.	  Likewise,	  their	  understanding	  of	  how	  those	  communities	  were	  affected	  by	   conflict	   will	   also	   be	   of	   critical	   importance	   to	   the	   scope	   and	   direction	   of	   the	  wider	   peace-­‐building	  effort.	  	  The	  first	  research	  question	  aims	  to	  explore	  these	  issues	  and	  asks:	  	  
How	  do	  international	  police	  officers	  adapt	  to	  the	  local	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  context	  
and	   how	   does	   their	   understanding	   of	   that	   context	   shape	   the	   approach	   they	   take	   towards	  
engaging	  local	  communities?	  
Outreach	  and	  Inequality	  Alongside	  the	  definitional	  issues	  surrounding	  how	  communities	  are	  conceived	  and	  constructed,	  are	  issues	  associated	  with	  how	  programmes	  are	  carried	  out	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  certain	  groups	  to	   be	  marginalised.	   Like	   ‘community’,	   the	   term	   ‘community	   outreach’	   can	   be	  misleading.	   The	  term	  is	  often	  used	  alongside	  others,	  such	  as	  ‘collaboration’,	  ‘co-­‐production’	  and	  ‘partnership’,	  to	  describe	   the	   kinds	   of	   relationships	   that	   police	   organisations	   hope	   to	   build	   with	   their	   local	  community.	  While	   such	   terms	  may	   be	   helpful	   in	  many	   cases,	   they	   can	   often	   be	   too	   vague	   to	  provide	  any	  indication	  as	  to	  what	  a	  programme	  actually	  entails	  or	  how	  it	  operates	  for	  residents	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at	  the	  street	  level	  (Goris	  &	  Walters	  1999).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  ‘outreach’,	  this	  lack	  of	  detail	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  social	  effect	  as	  it	  carries	  the	  potential	  to	  obscure	  unequal	  or	  inequitable	  results	  and	  further	  isolate	  those	  parts	  of	  the	  community	  that	  are	  most	  in	  need	  of	  police	  help.	  	  Fielding	   argues	   that	   community-­‐based	   policing	   systems	   tend	   to	   only	   work	   effectively	   in	  communities	  with	  an	  established	  level	  of	  social	  capital	  and	  community	  cohesion.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  neighbourhood	  watch,	  Fielding	   (2005:462)	  writes	   that	   “[m]embership	  correlates	  with	   income	  more	  than	  risk”.	  Likewise,	  in	  their	  study,	  Sadd	  and	  Grinc	  found	  that	  knowledge	  of	  a	  programme	  and	  how	  it	  functioned	  often	  depended	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  one’s	  position	  in	  the	  community	  with	  those	   considered	   leaders	   knowing	   a	   significant	   amount	   more	   than	   ‘ordinary’	   community	  members	   (Sadd	   &	   Grinc	   1994).	   It	   appears	   to	   be	   often	   the	   case	   that	   “those	   who	   talk	   of	   ‘the	  community’	  are	  those	  who	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  social	  and	  economic	  power	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  enforce	   particular	   notions	   of	   moral	   and	   social	   behaviour.	   It	   is	   in	   their	   interest	   to	   define	  themselves	  as	  ‘community’	  or	  its	  representatives”	  (Cunneen	  1992:162).	  It	   is	   important	   to	   recognise	   therefore	   that	  efforts	   aimed	  at	  gaining	  community	   input	  have	   the	  potential	   to	   only	   engage	   certain	   elements	   of	   that	   community	   and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   perpetuate	  inequality	   and	  undermine	  a	  programme’s	   effectiveness	   (Frühling	  2012;	   Schneider	  1998).	   In	   a	  review	  of	  community	  policing	  in	  Vancouver,	  Schneider	  (1998)	  expresses	  doubt	  over	  the	  ability	  of	   community	   policing	   to	   engage	   and	   empower	   socially-­‐disadvantaged	   neighbourhoods.	   A	  scientific	  approach	  to	  crime	  control	  has,	  in	  Schneider’s	  (1998:359)	  view,	  hindered	  the	  ability	  of	  Vancouver’s	   police	   department	   to	   genuinely	   engage	   with	   the	   city’s	   poorer	   neighbourhoods,	  instead	   preferring	   to	   rely	   on	   “technical	   solutions	   to	   social	   problems”.	   Skolnick	   and	   Bayley	  (1988)	  describe	  cases,	  such	  as	  in	  remote	  areas	  of	  Australia,	  where	  policing	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  reliance	  on	  certain	   individuals	  or	  elements	  of	   the	   local	  community	   to	  assist	   the	  police	   in	   their	  role.	  Such	  a	  relationship	  may	  be	  effective	  but	  says	  little	  about	  how	  minorities	  or	  outsiders	  might	  be	   treated	   by	   the	   police	   if	   they	   come	   into	   conflict	   with	   those	   favoured	   actors	   in	   the	   local	  community.	   These	   examples	   demonstrate	   that	   a	   citizen’s	   community	   policing	   experience	   is	  often	   affected	   by	   their	   wealth	   or	   social	   status.	   The	   potential	   for	   these	   kinds	   of	   community	  outreach	   to	   result	   in	  exclusion,	   inequality	  or	  unfair	   treatment	  by	   the	  police	   is	   therefore	  a	  key	  area	  of	  concern.	  In	   post-­‐conflict	   societies	   there	  may	   be	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons	  why	   citizens	   are	   either	   unable	   or	  unwilling	  to	  engage	  the	  police	  on	  matters	  affecting	  their	  community.	  It	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  potential	  for	  inequality	  is	  exacerbated	  in	  such	  a	  context	  where	  achieving	  a	  genuine	  partnership	  across	   different	   communities	   is	   complicated	   by	   both	   practical	   and	   political	   obstacles.	   Often	  unequal	  treatment	  by	  police	  can	  result	  from	  poor	  communication	  or	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  approach	  regarding	  the	  actual	  process	  of	  community	  engagement.	  Mobekk’s	  (2002)	  study	  of	  community	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policing	   following	   conflict	   in	   East	   Timor	   identified	   how	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   clear	   approach	   to	  community	   engagement	   weakened	   the	   prospects	   for	   substantive	   community	   input	   into	   the	  policing	  programme.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  Mobekk	  (2002:66)	  writes	  that	  “No	  UN	  document	  that	  referred	  to	  the	  use	  of	  community	  policing	  in	  East	  Timor	  defined	  the	  concept	  or	  explained	  it	  in	  depth.”	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  never	  clear	  what	  the	  pilot	  community	  policing	  programme	  in	  East	  Timor	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  or	  how	  its	  functioning	  might	  affect	  its	  wider	  implementation	  (Emmott	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  For	   residents	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   societies,	   a	   lack	   of	   clarity	   from	   the	   police	   about	   the	   new	  programme	   can	   make	   involvement	   more	   difficult	   or	   more	   costly.	   It	   can	   also	   allow	   policing	  agencies	   to	   perpetuate	   their	   dominance	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	   fail	   to	   follow	   through	   on	   the	  more	   substantive	   changes	   required	   for	   effective	   community	   input	   (Frühling	   2012;	   Goris	   &	  Walters	  1999;	  Schneider	  1998).	  	  To	   answer	   these	   questions	   requires	   some	   understanding	   of	   what	   efforts	   were	   made	   by	  international	  police	  officers	  to	  communicate	  and	  genuinely	  engage	  with	  the	  local	  population	  so	  that	   an	   equitable	   police	   service	   was	   provided	   to	   all.	   	   The	   literature	   has	   demonstrated	   that	  effective	   community	   engagement	   requires	   both	   clarity	   and	   commitment	   from	   police	   officers;	  clarity	   that	   informs	   the	   community	   about	   the	   role	   they	   can	   play	   and	   commitment	   that	   goes	  beyond	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  policing	  and	  toward	  a	  more	  genuine	  working	  partnership	  with	  citizens.	   Asking	   these	   questions	   will	   reveal	   more	   about	   the	   how	   the	   issues	   identified	   by	  Schneider	  and	  Fielding,	  regarding	  unequal	  access	  to	  police,	  are	  being	  managed	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  Solomon	   Islands	   where	   neighbourhoods	   may	   be	   fragmented	   or	   isolated.	   Given	   the	   country’s	  history,	  examining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  local	  communities	  are	  able	  to	  access	  the	  police	  on	  equal	  and	   equitable	   terms	   is	   important	   when	   assessing	   the	   value	   of	   international	   police	   forces	   in	  bringing	  about	  a	  durable	  and	  sustainable	  peace.	  	  The	  second	  research	  question	  aims	  to	  explore	  these	  issues	  by	  asking:	  
What	   strategies	   do	   international	   police	   employ	   to	   interact	   and	   engage	   with	   the	   local	  
population	   and	   how	   do	   these	   strategies	   aim	   to	   contribute	   to	   an	   effective	   and	   equitable	  
partnership	  between	  officers	  and	  citizens?	  
Trust	  A	  related	  issue	  is	  trust	  and	  how	  to	  establish	  or	  re-­‐establish	  trust	  between	  police	  officers	  and	  the	  local	   community.	   It	   is	   an	   issue	   common	   to	   the	   implementation	  of	   community	  policing	  around	  the	  world	  and,	  as	  contributors	  to	  the	  community	  policing	  literature	  highlight,	  is	  one	  that	  many	  police	  organisations	  struggle	  with.	  Overcoming	  the	  distrust	  sown	  by	  previous	  policing	  practices	  or	  behaviour	  can	  be	  a	  significant	  challenge	  in	  gaining	  community	  input	  and	  achieving	  effective	  
58	  	  
community	   consultation.	   Schneider	   (1998)	   has	   described	   the	   difficulties	   that	   police	   in	  Vancouver	   faced	   in	   overcoming	   the	   negative	   perception	   that	   mental	   health	   patients	   had	   of	  police	  due	  to	  their	  association	  with	  highly	  stressful	  situations.	  In	  describing	  the	  findings	  of	  his	  research,	  Schneider	  (1998:357)	  writes:	  
Because	  of	   their	   repeated	   exposure	   to	  police	   responses	   to	   crisis	   situations,	   the	  mentally	   ill	  
associate	   police	   primarily	   with	   these	   highly	   stressful	   and	   adversarial	   encounters.	   These	  
situations	   reinforce	   a	   negative	   image	   of	   police	   by	   the	  mentally	   ill	   and	  many	   focus	   group	  
members	  expressed	  an	  intimidation	  of	  an	  uniformed	  officer.	  As	  one	  focus	  group	  participant	  
succinctly	  stated,	  “sick	  people	  get	  very	  disturbed	  when	  they	  see	  a	  uniform.”	  
Such	  observations	  highlight	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  deficit	  in	  trust	  that	  some	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  face	  and	  illustrate	  how	  images,	  symbols	  or	  icons	  associated	  with	  police	  forces	  can	  evoke	  a	  very	  real	  sense	  of	  fear	  within	  parts	  of	  the	  community.	  In	  their	  analysis	  of	  eight	  community	  policing	  projects	  implemented	  across	  the	  United	  States,	  Sadd	  and	  Grinc	  (1994)	  found	  that	  departments	  tended	  to	   ignore	  or	  understate	  the	  depth	  of	  mistrust	  and	  hostility	   that	  characterised	  relations	  between	  the	  police	  and	  both	  poor	  and	  minority	  communities.	  	  The	   issue	   of	   trust	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   that	   of	   power.	   Fielding	   (2005)	   describes	   how	   a	   police	  force	  must	   constantly	   balance	   its	   role	   as	   a	   coercive	   force	   imposing	   social	   order	   with	   that	   of	  service	   provider	   to	   the	   public.	   Community	   policing	   aims	   to	   limit	   a	   police	   force’s	   reliance	   on	  coercion;	  however,	  it	  is	  argued	  that,	  in	  doing	  so,	  it	  may	  merely	  obscure	  the	  influence	  the	  police	  have	   in	  exercising	  social	   control	   (Skolnick	  &	  Bayley	  1988).	   Some	  observers	  highlight	  how	   the	  emphasis	  on	  proximity	  and	  close	  contact	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  legitimate	  the	  intrusion	  of	  the	  state	  into	   local	   communities	   and,	   through	   this,	   become	   a	   mechanism	   for	   tighter	   government	  surveillance	   (Skolnick	   &	   Bayley	   1988).	   Neild	   (2000)	   argues	   that,	   rather	   than	   promoting	  responsiveness,	   closer	  proximity	  can	  often	  mean	   tighter	  control	  and	   lend	  greater	  authority	   to	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  police.	  	  Community	  policing	  may	  also	  contribute	  to	  an	  erosion	  of	  trust	  by	  undermining	  the	  depoliticised	  and	  impartial	  nature	  of	  policing.	  When	  the	  police	  form	  stronger	  bonds	  with	  the	  community,	  they	  are	  drawn	  more	  strongly	  into	  taking	  sides	  and	  favouring	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  social	  order	  (Fielding	  2005).	  Cunneen	  argues	  that	  collaboration	  across	  different	  agencies	  can	  often	  result	  in	  informal	  alliances	  between	  law	  enforcement	  and	  local	  politicians,	  in	  a	  way	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  occurred	  during	  the	  political	  era	  of	  policing.	  “Such	  informal	  mechanisms	  of	  control...”	  Cunneen	  (1992:164)	  argues,	  “may	  operate	  with	  open	  disregard	  to	  the	  formal	  separation	  of	  powers”.	  Trust	  and	  the	  appropriate	  exercise	  of	  police	  power	  are	  important	  issues	  for	  international	  police	  officers	   to	   consider	   when	   interacting	   with	   communities	   emerging	   from	   conflict.	   Several	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observers	   of	   international	   policing	   express	   concern	   that	   community	   policing	  may	   not	   be	   the	  most	   appropriate	   approach	   given	   its	   reliance	   on	   high	   levels	   of	   trust	   between	   police	   and	   the	  community.	  As	  Murphy	  (2007:249)	  writes:	  	  
While	  mistrust	  of	  police	  power	  is	  understandable,	  given	  the	  record	  of	  most	  pre-­‐reform	  police	  
forces,	   Western	   reform	   experience	   suggests	   there	   are	   good	   reasons	   to	   question	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  pursuing	  a	  reform	  strategy	   that	  emphasises	  aggressive,	  externally	   imposed	  
mechanisms	  of	  public	  sanctioning	  and	  police	  governance.	  	  
Experience	   with	   the	   community	   policing	   model	   in	   jurisdictions	   with	   a	   history	   of	   coercive	  policing	   has	   delivered	   mixed	   results	   regarding	   trust.	   Neild	   (2000)	   identifies	   a	   number	   of	  obstacles	   that	   have	   made	   the	   implementation	   of	   community	   policing	   in	   Latin	   America	  particularly	  difficult.	  High	  levels	  of	  distrust	  of	  the	  police,	  significant	  power	  imbalances	  between	  different	   communities	   and	   weak	   control	   mechanisms	   undermined	   the	   ability	   of	   police	  departments	  to	  develop	  a	  productive	  relationship	  with	  their	  community.	  Frühling	  (2012)	  agrees	  that	  the	  history	  of	  police	  repression	  in	  Latin	  America	  made	  the	   implementation	  of	  community	  policing	   considerably	   more	   difficult.	   Similar	   issues	   have	   emerged	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   settings.	  Mobekk	   (2002),	   in	   evaluating	   the	   implementation	   of	   community	   policing	   in	   East	   Timor,	  describes	  how	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  security	  forces	  and	  the	  public	  could	  in	  fact	  serve	  as	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  brutal	  forms	  of	  policing	  experienced	  under	  Indonesian	  rule.	  Many	  believe	  the	  issue	   of	   trust	   is	   accentuated	   for	   international	   police	   who	   are	   typically	   deployed	   for	   short	  periods	  of	  time	  and	  have	  a	  limited	  understanding	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  host	  society.	  	  A	   number	   of	   observers	   of	   international	   policing	   have	   expressed	   concern	   that	   a	   mandate	   for	  decentralisation	   and	   the	   devolution	   of	   authority	   in	   fragile	   and	   unstable	   societies	   may	  undermine	   the	  ability	  of	  officials	   to	  monitor	   the	  exercise	  of	  police	  power.	  Murphy	  (2007:252)	  argues	   that	   allowing	   for	   a	   reduced	   role	   for	   centralised	   management	   and	   greater	   police	  discretion	   would	   first	   require	   “a	   relatively	   benign	   political	   and	   community	   environment	   but	  also	  police	  officers	   that	   are	   inclined	  and	  able	   to	   resist	   the	  powerful	   corrupting	   forces	   in	   their	  working	   environment”.	   Post-­‐conflict	   societies	   are	   rarely	   defined	   by	   such	   high	   standards	   of	  official	   conduct.	   Issues	   associated	  with	   accountability	   are	  not	   limited	   to	   local	  police	   forces.	   In	  cases	   where	   foreign	   police	   forces	   are	   given	   executive	   authority	   to	   police	   a	   local	   society,	  imposing	  a	  model	  of	  policing	  not	  designed	  locally	  and	  working	  alongside	  military	  actors,	  lines	  of	  authority	   become	   blurred	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   legitimacy	   becomes	   more	   complex	   and	   confused	  (Sheptycki	  2007).	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For	   these	  reasons,	   some	  observers	  have	  expressed	  scepticism	  over	   the	  ability	  of	   international	  police	   officers	   to	   overcome	   entrenched	   distrust,	   and	   concern	   that	   efforts	   to	   improve	   police-­‐community	  relations	  may	  in	  fact	  antagonise	  the	  local	  population	  (Mobekk	  2002).	  	  Others,	  however,	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  due	  to	  their	  separation	  from	  the	   local	  political	  sphere,	  international	   officers	   may	   be	   better	   placed	   to	   act	   as	   neutral	   agents	   than	   local	   police.	   In	  describing	  the	  role	  played	  by	  colonial-­‐era	  kiaps	   in	  Papua	  New	  Guinea,	  Dinnen	  and	  Braithwaite	  (2009:169)	  write:	  	  
Kiaps,	  magistrates	   and	   other	   expatriate	   officials	   exercised	   considerable	   autonomy	   in	   their	  
dealings	  with	   local	   leaders	   precisely	   because	   they	  were	   foreigners.	   Their	   apparent	   lack	   of	  
interest	   in	  competing	  with	  Melanesians	  by	  engaging	  in	  local	  politics	  and	  their	   immunity	  to	  
the	  pressures	  of	  wantokism	  contributed	  to	  an	  aura	  of	  independence	  and	  impartiality.	  
Knowing	  more	  about	  how	  issues	  of	  trust	  affect	  the	  operation	  of	  international	  police	  forces	  helps	  to	  build	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  effective	  partnerships	  can	  be	  built	  out	  of	  cultural	  difference	  and	   entrenched	   negative	   perceptions	   of	   police.	   Levels	   of	   trust	   in	   police	   are	   likely	   to	   vary	  between	  different	  communities	  and	  further	  between	  individuals.	  The	  aim	  here	  is	  not	  to	  measure	  overall	   levels	   of	   trust	   in	   the	   same	  way	   to	   that	   done	   by	  RAMSI’s	   People’s	   Survey.	   Instead,	   the	  research	  question	  asks:	  
What	  efforts	  were	  made	  by	  the	  international	  police	  to	  overcome,	  alter	  or	  reinforce	  existing	  
perceptions	   of	   the	   police	   and	   how	   were	   these	   efforts	   adapted	   to,	   and	   affected	   by,	   local	  
context?	  
Organisational	  Change	  A	   further	   concern	   raised	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   community	   policing	   is	   the	   ability	   of	   police	  organisations	  to	  undergo	  the	  required	  changes	  in	  procedures	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  priorities	  that	   would	   make	   community	   policing	   a	   viable	   model.	   Involving	   the	   community	   in	   the	  traditionally	   tough	   business	   of	   maintaining	   social	   order	   is	   a	   difficult	   step	   for	   police	  organisations	   accustomed	   to	   centralised	   decision-­‐making	   and	   authority.	   As	   described	   above,	  successful	  community	  policing	  requires	  that	  police	  organisations	  undergo	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  change	  in	  structure	  and	  operation	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  effectively	  with	  the	  general	  public.	  While	  the	  model	  highlights	  how	  decentralised	  organisational	  systems	  and	  less	  hierarchical	  command	  structures	   can	   allow	   this	   to	   happen,	   a	   number	   of	   studies	   have	   illustrated	   the	   difficulties	   in	  bringing	  about	  such	  changes.	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In	   their	   study	  of	   six	   policing	   agencies	   in	   the	  United	   States,	  Weisel	   and	  Eck	   (1994)	   found	   that	  departments	  were	  reluctant	  to	  put	  into	  effect	  the	  required	  changes,	  and	  in	  cases	  where	  they	  did	  attempt	   to	   improve	   mechanisms	   for	   community	   engagement,	   were	   selective	   in	   their	  implementation.	   Sadd	   and	   Grinc	   (1994)	   found	   that	   in	   many	   of	   the	   agencies	   they	   examined,	  community	  policing	  had	  been	   imposed	   in	  a	   top-­‐down	   fashion.	  A	   lack	  of	   communication	  about	  the	   goals	   of	   the	   projects	   was	   also	   a	   problem	   with	   the	   result	   that	   many	   street-­‐level	   officers	  resisted	  the	  changes	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  as	  to	  their	  benefit.	  	  Entrenched	  department	   cultures	   can	   also	   pose	   a	   barrier.	   Skogan	   (1994)	   describes	   how	  many	  programmes	  have	  struggled	  due	  to	  a	  reliance	  on	  traditional	  crime-­‐fighting	  methods.	  Mid-­‐level	  managers	  have	  felt	  reluctant	  to	  push	  through	  the	  changes	  because	  such	  programmes	  can	  divert	  resources	  away	  from	  responding	  to	  emergency	  calls.	  As	  a	  result,	  community	  policing	  was	  slow	  to	   the	   develop	   the	   broad-­‐based	   support	   required	   in	   many	   of	   the	   police	   departments	   that	  implemented	  it	  (Skogan	  1994).	  These	   observations	   serve	   to	   direct	   attention	   towards	   the	   organisational	   dynamics	   within	  international	   policing	   contingents	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   developing	   a	   consistent	   policing	  response	   across	   all	   contributing	   agencies.	   While	   the	   community	   policing	   model	   discusses	  philosophical,	   strategic,	   tactical	  and	  organisational	  change,	   the	  situation	   is	  slightly	  different	   in	  post-­‐conflict	   settings.	   Most	   often,	   the	   role	   of	   international	   police	   officers	   after	   stabilising	   the	  security	  situation	  is	  to	  implement	  and	  then	  establish	  a	  community	  policing	  model	  they	  will	  most	  likely	   have	   some	   familiarity	   with.	   The	   task	   is	   complicated,	   however,	   when	   different	   national	  policing	   contingents	   come	   together	   with	   different	   approaches	   and	   understandings	   of	   the	  community-­‐oriented	  approach.	  	  As	  was	   highlighted	   earlier,	   there	   exists	   no	   single,	   well-­‐defined	  model	   of	   community	   policing.	  Instead,	  programmes	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  fashion	  across	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  cases.	  Formulating	   and	   implementing	   a	   coherent	   community-­‐oriented	   approach	   across	   police	  organisations	   with	   different	   attitudes	   and	   operational	   strategies	   can	   therefore	   be	   difficult.	  	  Organisational	  change,	  in	  this	  context,	  then	  refers,	  not	  only	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  international	  police	  forces	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  with	  the	  local	  community,	  but	  to	  overcome	  those	  logistical	  and	  cultural	  barriers	   that	   may	   hinder	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   policing	   mission	   as	   a	   whole	   to	   deliver	   a	  responsive	  and	  equitable	  service	  to	  the	  host	  society.	  	  Increasing	   demand	   for	   international	   police	   and	   growing	   complexity	   of	   recent	   intra-­‐state	  conflicts	   has	  meant	   that	  missions	   of	   this	   kind	   have	   often	   had	   to	   draw	  upon	   a	  wider	   range	   of	  policing	   organisations,	   thus	   accentuating	   the	   level	   of	   difficulty	   (Goldsmith	   &	   Harris	   2009).	  Problems	  of	   ‘horizontal	   interoperability’	  (Rubinstein	  et	  al.	  2008)	  plague	  many	  missions	  of	  this	  kind,	   and	   various	   studies	   highlight	   the	   difficulties	   of	   generating	   a	   consistent	   response	   across	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police,	   military,	   and	   civilian	   components	   (Goldsmith	   &	   Harris	   2009;	   Greener	   2009a;	   McLeod	  2009;	   Rubinstein	   et	   al.	   2008).	   For	   international	   police	   forces,	   disparities	   between	   different	  national	  policing	  agendas	  can	  make	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  coherent	  peace-­‐building	  strategy	  difficult.	  Goldsmith	  and	  Harris	  (2009)	  analyse	  the	  challenge	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UNPOL	  mission	  to	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  Their	   study	  stressed	   the	   importance	  of	   coherence,	   competency	  and	  co-­‐operation	  across	   the	   various	   contributing	   police	   agencies	   but	   found	   that	   communication	   barriers,	  differences	   in	  operating	  style	  and	  poor	  coordination	  hindered	  effective	  collaboration	  between	  them.	   These	   conclusions	   illustrate	   the	   difficulties	   associated	   with	   developing	   a	   consistent	  approach	  to	  both	  policing	  and	  peace-­‐building	  and	  lead	  to	  questions	  about	  how	  these	  difficulties	  might	  affect	  the	  work	  of	  individual	  officers	  at	  the	  village-­‐	  or	  street-­‐level.	  	  Further	  issues	  can	  arise	  when	  the	  relationship	  with	  local	  police	  is	  considered.	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  mandate	   of	   international	   police	   forces	   is	   to	   build	   and	   establish	   this	   model	   within	   the	   local	  community	   and	   within	   the	   local	   police	   force.	   These	   capacity	   development	   roles	   are,	   in	  themselves,	   becoming	   increasingly	   complex,	   especially	  when	   the	   task	   involves	   re-­‐building	   an	  effective	  democratic	  police	  force	  within	  an	  unstable	  and	  uncertain	  peace	  process	  (Bayley	  2001;	  den	  Heyer	  2010;	  Goldsmith	  &	  Dinnen	  2007;	  Hughes	  &	  Hunt	  2010;	  McLeod	  2009;	  Peake	  2010).	  Here	   again,	   disparities	   between	   the	   operational	   styles	   and	   organisational	   cultures	   of	  international	  and	  local	  police	  forces	  can	  create	  issues	  not	  only	  for	  implementing	  a	  community-­‐oriented	   policing	   approach,	   but	   also	   for	   establishing	   and	   embedding	   it	   over	   time.	   Both	   the	  capability	  and	  professionalism	  of	   the	   local	  police	   force	   can	   create	   challenges	   for	   international	  police	  asked	  to	  work	  alongside	  them.	  Poor	  human	  rights	  records,	  low	  morale,	  lack	  of	  resources	  and	  inadequate	  training	  are	  common	  problems	  plaguing	  police	  forces	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  societies,	  yet	  the	  difficulties	  these	  issues	  pose	  must	  be	  negotiated	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  by	  international	  police	  officers	   for	  mandates	   to	   be	   fulfilled.	   The	   difficulties	   require	   individual	   officers	   to	   not	   only	   be	  effective	   mentors	   and	   trainers	   but	   also	   to	   be	   capable	   of	   exercising	   patience	   and	   sensitivity	  towards	   the	   officers	   they	   operate	   alongside.	   Bayley	   (2001:28),	   in	   his	   guide	   to	   building	  democratic	  policing,	  writes:	  “	  
Reformers	  both	   inside	  and	  outside	  police	  organizations	   should	  be	   careful	  not	   to	  denigrate	  
the	  motivation,	  knowledge,	  or	  skill	  of	  the	  people	  whose	  behavior	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  change.	  
Denigration	  can	  occur	  unintentionally	  if	  proponents	  of	  change	  imply	  that	  the	  people	  whose	  
behavior	  they	  want	  to	  change	  are	  personally	  at	  fault....	  Sensitivity	  in	  advocacy	  is	  the	  solution	  
to	  this	  problem....	  
While	   the	   extensive	   literatures	   on	   police	   capacity-­‐development	   and	   security	   sector	   reform	  provide	  a	  number	  of	  insights	  into	  how	  to	  approach	  these	  organisational	  or	  bureaucratic	  aspects	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to	   these	   challenges,	   the	   community	   policing	   literature	   reviewed	   here	   serves	   to	   highlight	   the	  philosophical	  dimension	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  coherent	  approach	  to	  community	  engagement	  across	   both	   local	   and	   international	   actors.	   Organisational	   structures	   and	   strategies	   will	  contribute	   to	   this	  at	   the	  planning	   level.	  However,	  establishing	   the	  coherence,	   competency	  and	  co-­‐operation	   that	   Goldsmith	   and	   Harris	   discuss	   will	   ultimately	   depend	   on	   the	   attitudes	   and	  approaches	   of	   individual	   police	   officers	   so	   as	   to	   establish,	   manage	   and	   sustain	   a	   positive	  working	  environment	  for	  all	  actors.	  To	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  challenges	  that	  integrated	  missions	  pose	  at	  the	  departmental	  level,	  the	  fourth	  research	  question	  will	  ask:	  
How	   do	   international	   police	   officers	   manage	   their	   relationships	   with	   other	   contributing	  
agencies	  (including	  other	  national	  policing	  contingents,	  local	  police	  and	  military	  support)	  so	  
as	   to	   ensure	   a	   consistent	   and	   co-­‐ordinated	   policing	   service	   is	   provided	   to	   the	   host	  
community?	  	  Conclusion	  The	  intention	  here	  has	  been	  to	  review	  the	  literature	  on	  modern	  policing	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  series	   of	   questions	   for	   examining	   recent	   moves	   to	   incorporate	   policing	   elements	   into	   post-­‐conflict	  peace-­‐building	  missions.	  A	  brief	  history	  of	  policing	  was	  used	   to	  draw	  attention	   to	   the	  dominant	   themes	   that	   have	   arisen	   in	   the	  profession	  over	   recent	   decades	   and	   to	   highlight	   the	  core	  philosophical	  and	  operational	  components	  of	  the	  community-­‐oriented	  approach.	  The	  turn	  towards	  greater	  community	   input	   into	  policing	  emerged	  out	  of	  a	  crisis	  of	   legitimacy	   for	  many	  police	   departments	   around	   the	   world.	   Police	   ambivalence	   to	   the	   rising	   racial	   tension	   and	  inequality	   in	   many	   urban	   neighbourhoods	   contributed	   to	   this	   crisis	   and	   created	   a	   need	   for	  police	  to	  devise	  a	  strategy	  that	  could	  overcome	  entrenched	  distrust	  of	  their	  organisation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  vast	  cultural	  gap	  between	  them	  and	  the	  community	  they	  policed.	  In	  police	  departments	  around	   the	   world,	   various	   efforts	   were	   made	   to	   open	   up	   policing	   to	   the	   public	   and	   thereby	  create	   a	   more	   responsive	   and	   democratic	   policing	   approach.	   It	   has	   been	   described	   how	  community	   policing	   emerged	   as	   a	   model	   aimed	   at	   overcoming	   cultural	   difference	   and	   racial	  inequality	  in	  urban	  neighbourhoods	  and	  how	  its	  emergence	  raised	  new	  questions	  surrounding	  its	  appropriateness	  and	  effectiveness	  as	  a	  model	  for	  policing	  these	  communities.	  The	  review	  of	  the	   community	   policing	   literature	   identified	   points	   of	   cooperation,	   collaboration,	   tension	   and	  strain	  that	  can	  arise	  at	  the	  interface	  between	  police	  forces	  and	  local	  communities	  and,	   for	  this	  reason,	  provides	  a	  useful	  lens	  for	  learning	  more	  about	  the	  local-­‐level	  dynamics	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  international	  policing.	  The	   review	   has	   produced	   four	   core	   research	   questions	   for	   the	   application	   of	   community	  policing	   to	   a	  post-­‐conflict	   peace-­‐building	  mission.	  The	   first	   asks	  how	   the	   term	   ‘community’	   is	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defined	   and	   applied	   by	   international	   police	   forces.	   The	   question	   is	   based	   on	   an	  acknowledgement	  that	  not	  all	  communities	  are	  peaceful	  and	  that	  violent	  conflict	  can	  often	  arise	  out	  of	  community-­‐level	  processes	  that	  promote	  exclusion	  or	  separation	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  a	  more	  cohesive	   social	   structure.	   Asking	   questions	   as	   to	   what	   kinds	   of	   community	   behaviour	   are	  encouraged	  or	  discouraged	  by	   international	  police	  will	   reveal	  more	  about	  how	  such	  concerns	  are	  being	  addressed.	  	  The	   second	   question	   addresses	   issues	   around	   how	   the	   police	   go	   about	   engaging	   with	   the	  community	  and	  how	  that	  engagement	  might	  impact	  unequally	  across	  different	  communities.	  	  It	  asks	   what	   efforts	   are	   made	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   international	   policing	   mission	   communicates	  effectively	  with	  local	  populations.	  Effective	  communication	  is	  central	  to	  ensuring	  equal	  access	  to	  policing	  across	  neighbourhoods	  and	  encouraging	  genuine	  and	  democratic	   input	   from	  the	   local	  community	  on	  issues	  concerning	  social	  order.	  	  The	   third	   question	   asks	   in	   what	   ways	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   trust	   was	   established	   between	  international	   police	   and	   local	   neighbourhoods.	   Entrenched	  distrust	   is	   an	   issue	   faced	  by	  many	  police	  departments	  and	  one	  that	  international	  police	  officers	  will	  most	  likely	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  societies.	  	  	  The	   final	   question	   considers	   issues	   of	   organisational	   culture	   within	   the	   international	   police	  force	  and	  asks	  bureaucratic	  obstacles	  may	  impede	  the	  ability	  of	  international	  police	  officers	  to	  engage	  the	  local	  community.	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Research	  Scope	  and	  Methodology	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  established	  four	  core	  research	  questions	  that	  aim	  to	  provide	  some	  insight	  into	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  members	  of	  the	  RAMSI	  Participating	  Police	  Force	  and	   local	   Solomon	   Islands	   communities.	   The	   questions	   raise	   a	   number	   of	   concerns	   that	  may	  arise	  given	  the	  unique	  social,	  cultural	  and	  political	  context	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  Solomon	  Islands	  and	  seek	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  concerns	  were	  mitigated	  or	  addressed	  by	  members	  of	  the	  international	  police	  contingent.	  Before	  attempting	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  briefly	  outline	  the	  research	  methods	  used	  and	  their	  limitations	  so	  that	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  the	  study	  is	  recognised.	  	  As	   the	   research	   questions	   set	   out,	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   research	   is	   on	   certain	   aspects	   of	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  PPF	  and	  local	  communities.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  not	  an	  attempt	  to	  review	  or	  evaluate	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  policing	  mission	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	   intention	  here	   is	   to	  explore	  some	  of	  unique	  ethical,	  political	  and	  practical	  issues	  faced	  by	  officers	  of	  the	  PPF	  and	  understand,	  from	  their	  perspective,	  how	  they	  aimed	  to	  address	  or	  deal	  with	  them	  as	  they	  arose.	  	  There	   are	   numerous	   ways	   of	   conducting	   research	   so	   as	   to	   gain	   an	   insight	   into	   participants’	  perspectives.	   The	   relatively	   small	   size	   of	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   contingent	   meant	   that	   a	  quantitative	   study,	   traditionally	   based	   on	   large	   data-­‐sets,	   would	   be	   difficult	   to	   carry	   out	   and	  limited	   in	   utility.	   Instead,	   a	   qualitative	   approach,	   based	   heavily	   around	   semi-­‐structured	  interviews	   with	   PPF	   officers,	   has	   been	   selected	   as	   a	   way	   of	   gaining	   an	   insight	   into	   their	  experiences	  during	  their	  deployment	  to	  Solomon	  Islands.	  	  Interviews	  of	  this	  kind	  provide	  a	  window	  into	  the	  work	  of	  officers	  at	  the	  street-­‐level	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  discuss	  and	  evaluate	  their	  own	  experience	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  detail	  regarding	  the	  wider	  context	   in	   which	   they	   operated.	   Goldsmith	   and	   Harris	   (Goldsmith	   2009;	   Goldsmith	   &	   Harris	  2009)	   have	   conducted	   similar	   studies	   of	   post-­‐conflict	   policing	   missions	   and	   have	   used	   the	  interview	  method	  for	  gaining	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  work	  of	  individual	  officers	  deployed	  under	  such	  missions.	  They	  write:	  
The	   interview	  method	  was	   adopted	   in	   recognition	   of	   the	  wealth	   of	   knowledge	   held	   in	   the	  
minds	   of	   individual	   officers	   but	   not	   necessarily	   collected	   or	   utilised	   in	   a	   formal,	   coherent	  
manner.	  (Goldsmith	  &	  Harris	  2009:191).	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It	   is	   this	  knowledge	   that	   this	   research	  aims	   to	  gain	  access	   to	   so	   that	  more	  can	  be	  understood	  about	  the	  process	  of	  interaction	  and	  cooperation	  that	  occur	  between	  PPF	  officers	  and	  the	  local	  community.	  	  The	   semi-­‐structured	   interview	  method	  has	   two	  particular	  benefits	   that	   are	  of	   relevance	  here:	  firstly,	   it	  gives	  participants	  a	  greater	  opportunity	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  relaying	  of	  their	  stories	  and	  secondly,	  it	  affords	  some	  flexibility	  to	  the	  interviewer	  in	  responding	  to	  those	  stories.	  Unlike	  survey	  methods,	  where	  participants	  are	  provided	  with	  set	  range	  of	  responses,	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  allow	  the	  participant	  to	  explain	  in	  their	  own	  words	  their	  experience	  as	  well	  as	  other	  details	  they	  feel	  relevant	  to	  fully	  understanding	  that	  experience.	  This	   is	  hugely	  beneficial	   for	  a	  study	   that	  aims	   to	  go	  beyond	  simplistic	  portrayals	  of	  very	  complex	  situations	  and	  explore	   the	  unique	   experiences	   that	   arise	   out	   of	   the	   participant’s	   position.	   A	   further	   benefit	   of	   this	  particular	   method	   is	   the	   ability	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	   participant’s	   responses	   and	   adapt	   the	  interview’s	  focus	  accordingly.	  As	  Robson	  writes:	  “Face-­‐to-­‐face	  interviews	  offer	  the	  possibility	  of	  modifying	  one’s	  line	  of	  enquiry,	  following	  up	  interesting	  responses	  and	  investigating	  underlying	  motives	   in	   a	   way	   that	   postal	   and	   other	   self-­‐administered	   questionnaires	   cannot”	   (Robson	  2011:280).	  This	  flexibility	  will	  allow	  for	  questions	  to	  be	  tailored	  to	  address	  the	  particular	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  each	  participant	  and,	  in	  this	  way,	  avoid	  problems	  posed	  by	  irrelevant	  or	  ill-­‐suited	   questions.	   By	   permitting	   the	   interviewer	   to	   follow	   up	   on	   interesting	   or	   important	  issues,	  the	  method	  also	  encourages	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  depth	  as	  it	  allows	  the	  emphasis	  to	  shift	  with	   the	   participant’s	   response	   (Bryman	   2012:470).	   Flexibility	   can	   also	   allow	   the	   interview’s	  focus	   to	   be	   shaped	   more	   by	   the	   empirical	   data	   rather	   than	   any	   preconceived	   biases	   or	   ill-­‐founded	  assumptions.	  Because	  the	  research	  questions	  focus	  on	  the	  community-­‐level	  dynamics	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  policing,	  an	   emphasis	   has	   been	   placed	   on	   interviews	  with	   PPF	   officers	   who	   served	   at	   the	   street-­‐level	  during	   their	  deployment	  or	  deployments	   in	  Solomon	   Islands.	   It	   is	   the	   stories	  of	   these	  officers	  that	   provide	   the	   most	   direct	   insight	   into	   the	   intricacies	   of	   everyday	   interactions	   between	  international	   police	   officers	   and	   local	   community	   members.	   A	   total	   of	   15	   interviews	   were	  conducted	  with	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	   from	  across	   the	  contingent.	  Of	   the	  14,	   three	  were	  female	  and	  one	  was	  a	  non-­‐sworn	  member	  of	  Police	  staff.	  The	  14	  served	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  mission	  and	  in	  different	  locations	  across	  Solomon	  Islands.	  While	  they	  were	  deployed	  in	  a	  range	  of	  roles,	  most	  had	  a	  frontline	  component	  that	  saw	  them	  interacting	  with	  local	  communities	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  interviews	  were	  also	  conducted	  with	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  Commissioner	  and	  former	  Solomon	  Islands	  Police	  Commissioner,	  Peter	  Marshall,	  and	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  at	  the	  time	  of	  RAMSI’s	  deployment,	  Hon.	  Mr.	  Phil	  Goff.	  These	  interviews	  are	  less	  about	  gaining	  an	  
67	  	  
insight	   into	   personal	   experience	   and	   more	   about	   understanding	   the	   overarching	   context	   in	  which	   the	   work	   of	   the	   PPF	   took	   place.	   Their	   observations	   helped	   to	   illustrate	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   concerns	   raised	  were	  acknowledged	  and	  discussed	  at	   the	  planning	   level.	  They	  also	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  links	  between	  the	  local	  community	  and	  international	  actors.	  	  Social	   science	   research	   of	   this	   kind	   inevitably	   raises	   ethical	   concerns,	   particularly	   when	   it	  involves	   persons,	   such	   as	   police	   officers,	   who	  may	   have	   participated	   in,	   or	   been	   present	   for,	  highly	   emotional,	   stressful,	   or	   ethically	   complex	   situations.	   Interviewing	   individual	   officers	  raises	   further	  concerns	  by	  placing	   them	  in	  a	  difficult	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	  superiors	  and	  co-­‐workers.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  certain	  provisions	  were	  put	   in	  place	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  interviews	  were	  carried	  out	  with	  the	  appropriate	  degree	  of	  sensitivity	  and	  so	  that	  officers	  felt	  enabled	  to	  speak	   freely	   and	   openly	   about	   their	   experiences.	   Schostak	   (2006:53-­‐54)	   outlines	   six	   ethical	  protocols	   that	   should	   be	   followed	   when	   conducting	   interviews.	   These	   are:	   anonymisation,	  confidentiality,	   negotiation	   of	   access,	   right	   to	   say	   no,	   independence,	   and	   representation.	  Anonymisation	   and	   confidentiality	   deal	   with	   issues	   surrounding	   the	   identification	   of	  participants	  and	  how	  to	  appropriately	  handle	  information	  that	  may	  compromise	  the	  privacy	  or	  security	   of	   the	   participant.	   Here,	   participants	   have	   been	   given	   a	   number	   of	   options,	   ranging	  from	  open	  identification	  to	  complete	  anonymity,	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  select	  a	  level	  of	  confidentiality	  they	   believe	   is	   appropriate	   for	   their	   situation.14	   This	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   participants	   are	  comfortable	   with	   discussing	   their	   experiences	   and	   that	   they	   have	   an	   assurance	   that	   the	  information	  provided	  will	  not	  be	  misused.	  They	  are	  also	  given	  the	  right	  to	  cancel	  the	  interview	  or	  retract	  any	  or	  all	  information	  they	  provide.	  Information	  sheets	  and	  consent	  forms	  ensure	  that	  participants	  are	  fully	  informed	  and	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  raise	  any	  concerns	  prior	  to	  the	  interview	  taking	  place.	  Representation	  and	  negotiation	  of	  access	  are	  more	  easily	  managed	  as	   interviews	  will	  be	  arranged	  in	  close	  consultation	  with	  a	  liaison	  officer	  within	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  Force.	  The	   final	   criterion,	   independence,	   is	  more	   difficult	   to	   achieve	   as	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   New	  Zealand	   Police	   requires	   that	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   Research	   and	   Evaluation	   Steering	  Committee	   review	   and	   approve	   a	   draft	   of	   the	   research	   prior	   to	   publication.	   This	  means	   that	  complete	   independence	   is	   not	   achieved.	   Whether	   this	   affects	   the	   academic	   integrity	   of	   the	  research	  is	  an	  open	  question.	  15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  All	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  gave	  consent	  to	  be	  identified	  in	  this	  thesis.	  However,	  a	  decision	  was	  later	  made	  by	  the	  author	  to	  not	  identify	  any	  of	  the	  participants	  by	  name.	  It	  was	  felt	  that	  identifying	  an	  elevated	  level	  of	  risk,	  even	  with	  their	  consent,	  and	  added	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  value	  to	  the	  thesis.	  Locations	  and	  other	  relevant	  detail	  are	  provided	  as	  and	  when	  appropriate.	  15	  To	  ensure	  that	  the	  ethical	  concerns	  raised	  will	  be	  appropriately	  addressed,	  this	  research,	  including	  the	  information	   sheets	   and	   consent	   forms,	   has	   been	   reviewed	   and	   approved	   by	   both	   the	   University	   of	  Canterbury	  Human	  Ethics	  Committee	  as	  well	  as	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  Research	  and	  Evaluation	  Steering	  Committee.	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While	   the	   majority	   of	   research	   material	   will	   come	   from	   these	   interviews,	   official	   documents	  produced	   by	   the	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australian	   governments,	   RAMSI,	   the	   Australian	   Federal	  Police	  and	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  will	  also	  be	  utilised	  where	  necessary.	  This	  would	  likely	  be	  in	  cases	  where	   issues	  discussed	   in	   interviews	   relate	   to	  or	  have	   some	  bearing	  on	  government	  or	  official	  policies	  and	  practices.	  Newspaper	  articles	  will	  be	  utilised	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  This	  is	  to	  add	  some	  depth	  to	  cases	  where	  an	  individual	  officer	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  recount	  or	  never	  knew	  the	  wider	   details	   relating	   to	   the	   event	   or	   process	   they	   describe.	   Useful	   information	   can	   also	   be	  gained	   from	   those	   stories	   that	   have	   relied	   upon	   interviews,	   similar	   to	   those	   that	   have	   been	  conducted	  here.	  This	  part	  of	  the	  research	  will	   include	  both	   local	  newspapers,	   for	  example,	   the	  Solomon	  Times	  and	  the	  Solomon	  Star	  News,	  as	  well	  as	   international	  sources,	  such	  as	  the	  New	  Zealand	   Herald,	   the	   Fiji	   Times,	   and	   the	   Sydney	   Morning	   Herald.	   Because	   of	   the	   difficulty	   in	  accounting	   for	   the	  editorial	  biases	  and	  other	  discrepancies	  across	   these	  sources,	   the	   intention	  here	  is	  to	  limit	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  are	  relied	  upon.	  Instead	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  use	  these	  media	  sources	  primarily	   for	  background	   information	  so	  as	   to	  provide	  supporting	  detail	   to	   individual	  experiences	  where	  those	  details	  would	  otherwise	  be	  missed.	  Using	  these	  sources	  in	  such	  a	  way	  will	   allow	   for	   a	   degree	   of	   caution	   to	   be	   exercised	   as	   ensuring	   that	   they	   are	   appropriately	  contextualised.	  	  The	  research	  questions	  and	  methodology	  outlined	  above	  have	  some	  significant	  limitations	  and	  it	  is	  important	  that	  these	  are	  recognised	  in	  order	  to	  make	  clear	  both	  the	  focus	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  research.	  The	  primary	  limitation	  of	  the	  research	  is	  that	  it	  focuses	  solely	  on	  the	  PPF	  meaning	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  local	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  PPF’s	  efforts	  will	  not	  be	   captured.	   There	   are	   both	   practical	   and	   academic	   reasons	   for	   this.	   In	   practical	   terms,	  conducting	  the	  kind	  of	  primary	  research	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  villages	  necessary	  to	  gain	  an	  insight	  into	   their	   relationship	   with	   the	   PPF	   would	   have	   required	   a	   high	   financial	   commitment	   and	  incurred	  a	  significant	  personal	  cost	  for	  what	  could	  have	  been	  very	  little	  benefit.	  A	  lack	  of	  first-­‐hand	  knowledge	  about	  Solomon	  Islands,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fragile	  security	  situation	  there,	  increased	  the	  costs	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  research	  further.	  In	  academic	  terms,	  however,	  the	  omission	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  primary	  material	  was	   justified	  by	   the	  direction	  of	   the	   research	  questions.	   In	   the	  process	  of	  reviewing	   the	   literature	   and	   evaluating	   the	   various	   foci	   of	   the	   existing	   studies	   in	   this	   field,	   it	  became	   apparent	   that	   the	   experience	   of	   individual	   international	   police	   officers	   operating	   in	  remote	  communities	  had	  been	  left,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  unexamined.	  While	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  very	  helpful	  analyses	  of	  international	  policing,	  those	  that	  include	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  micro-­‐level	  processes	  involved	  in	  missions	  of	  this	  kind	  demonstrated	  a	  much	  greater	  awareness	  of	  the	  complexity	  and	  intricacy	  of	  the	  everyday	  experience	  of	  international	  police	  officers.	  This	  study	   intends	   to	   contribute	   in	  a	   similar	  way	  by	  allowing	  members	  of	   the	  PPF	   to	  explain	   their	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experience	   under	   RAMSI	   and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   reveal	   more	   about	   how	   the	   larger	   questions	  surrounding	   police-­‐led	   peace-­‐building	   emerge	   at	   the	   community-­‐level.	   Thus,	   there	   is	   some	  significant	  value	  in	  focusing	  the	  research	  in	  this	  way.	  However,	  it	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  that,	  in	  doing	   so,	   an	   important	   variable	   in	   the	   overall	   policing	   experience,	   that	   is,	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  efforts	  are	  received	  by	  the	  community,	  will	  not	  be	  fully	  surveyed.	  	  A	  further	  limitation	  is	  the	  sole	  focus	  on	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  within	  the	  PPF.	  Again,	  this	  is	  due	   to	   the	   logistical	   barriers	   associated	   with	   gaining	   access	   to	   all	   contributing	   police	  organisations.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	   the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police	  were	  the	   lead	  agency	  and,	  as	  such,	   constituted,	   by	   a	   significant	  margin,	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   PPF.	   At	   any	   one	   time,	   the	   New	  Zealand	  Police	  contingent	  consisted	  of	  roughly	  35	  officers	  in	  a	  mission	  of	  350.	  A	  more	  complete	  and	  well-­‐resourced	   study	  would	   likely	   look	   to	   involve	   the	  AFP,	   as	  well	   as	   other	   international	  contingents,	  due	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  deployment.	  This	  limitation	  again	  required	  that	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  research	  be	  relatively	  narrow	  and	  not	  attempt	   to	  engage	   in	  any	  kind	  of	  comprehensive	  review	   of	   the	   policing	   mission	   as	   a	   whole.	   While	   the	   practical	   limitations	   were	   the	   primary	  reason	  for	  this,	  there	  are	  some	  benefits	  that	  come	  out	  of	  it.	  While	  numerically	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  contribution	  is	  small,	  their	  role	  puts	  them	  in	  both	  an	  important	  and	  interesting	  position	  in	  that	  it	  requires	  them	  to	  work	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  both	  the	  local	  community	  and	  the	  much	  larger	  Australian	  contingent.	  The	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  website	  describes	  their	  role	  as	  such:	  	  
New	   Zealand	   police	  were	   deployed	   under	   RAMSI	   to	   act	   as	   part	   of	   an	   international	   police	  
force	  to	  help	  in	  the	  conviction	  and	  arrest	  of	  several	  corrupt	  police	  members	  in	  top	  levels	  of	  
police	   management.	   Since	   then,	   they	   have	   worked	   in	   an	   operational	   policing	   capacity	  
alongside	  the	  RSIP	  	  
This	   role	  makes	   the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  contingent	  a	  useful	   case	   to	  study	  both	   the	  horizontal	  and	   vertical	   dimensions	   of	   post-­‐conflict	   community	   policing.	   As	   one	   part	   of	   a	   much	   larger	  operation,	   their	   relations	   with	   other	   national	   policing	   contingents,	   that	   is;	   the	   degree	   of	  horizontal	   interoperability,	   are	   important	   for	   building	   a	   coherent	   and	   consistent	   approach	  across	   the	   RAMSI	   mission.	   This	   introduces	   a	   way	   of	   examining	   the	   relationship	   between	  different	  policing	  contingents	  associated	  with	  the	  mission	  and	  understanding	  more	  about	  how	  these	  aspects	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  policing	  affect	  a	  police	  peace-­‐keeper’s	  task.	  In	  addition,	  their	  role	  as	  street-­‐level	  peacekeepers	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  presents	  an	  opportunity	  to	  study	  their	  relations	  with	   the	   community,	   particularly	   the	   unique	   challenges	   associated	   with	   the	   transition	   from	  internal	   (New	  Zealand)	   to	  external	   (Solomon	  Islands)	  and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   this	  affects	   their	  task	  as	  peace-­‐builders.	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The	  Experiences	  of	  International	  Police	  Peace-­‐builders	  
‘Communities’	  in	  Conflict	  The	   first	   research	   question	   attempts	   to	   explore	   how	   individual	   police	   officers	   adapted	   to	   the	  local	   operating	   environment	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   and	   how	   their	   understanding	   of	   that	  environment	  shaped	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  work	  building	  communities	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  It	  asks:	  
How	  do	  international	  police	  officers	  adapt	  to	  the	  local	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  context	  
and	   how	   does	   their	   understanding	   of	   that	   context	   shape	   the	   approach	   they	   take	   towards	  
engaging	  local	  communities?	  
The	  question	  aims	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  challenges	  that	  RAMSI	  officers	  face	  as	  they	  adapted	  to	  the	  complexity	  and	  intricacy	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities.	  It	  stems	  from	  observations	  in	  the	   literature	   regarding	   the	   sometimes	  unclear	   focus	   of	   community	  policing	   and	   the	  need	   for	  community	   police	   officers	   to	   understand	   the	   complexities	   of	   community-­‐building	   so	   as	   to	  encourage	  the	  development	  of	  a	  more	  cohesive	  social	  network.	  Learning	  more	  about	  how	  New	  Zealand	  police	  officers	  adapted	  to	  the	  cultures	  and	  communities	  they	  encountered	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  will	  provide	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  local	  level	  patterns	  of	  peace-­‐building	  and	  the	  challenges	  of	   having	   international	   police	   officers	   lead	   that	   process.	   	   The	   interviews	   with	   New	   Zealand	  Police	   officers	   about	   their	   experiences	   reveal	   a	   number	   of	   interesting	   observations	   about	   the	  socio-­‐political	  and	  cultural	  Solomon	  Islands	  context	  that	  both	  helped	  and	  hindered	  their	  ability	  to	  operate	  effectively	  as	  community	  police	  officers	  in	  that	  environment.	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  question	  asks	  how	  officers	  adapted	  to	  the	  local	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  context	   in	   Solomon	   Islands.	   Understanding	   the	   perspective	   of	   officers	   on	   the	   ground	   is	  important	   as	   it	   this	   perspective,	   rather	   than	   that	   that	   of	   the	   academic	   literature	   or	   policy-­‐makers,	  that	  will	  have	  the	  most	  significant	  effect	  on	  how	  the	  policing	  programme	  is	  carried	  out.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  question	  therefore	  asks	  how	  officers’	  perspectives	  shaped	  their	  work	  as	  police	  officers	  in	  those	  communities.	  Given	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  factional	  conflict	  and	  communal	  violence	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  it	   is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  work	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  encouraged,	  or	  perhaps	  hindered,	  peace-­‐building	  at	  the	  community	  level.	  	  On	   being	   deployed	   to	   Solomon	   Islands,	   officers	   encountered	   a	   diverse	   array	   of	   cultures	   and	  communities;	  all	  of	  whom	  have	  their	  own	  experience	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  their	  own	  pathway	  to	  peace.	  Adapting	  to	  this	  context,	  and	  operating	  effectively	  within	  it,	  was	  a	  challenge	  faced	  by	  all	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  and	  one	  that	  was	  almost	  entirely	  new	  to	  them.	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Considering	   their	   role	   as	   peace-­‐builders,	   it	   is	   appropriate	   to	   begin	   by	   exploring	   their	  experiences	  with,	  and	  observations	  of,	  the	  conflict	  that	  saw	  them	  deployed	  to	  Solomon	  Islands.	  Chapter	  two	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  gave	  a	  brief	  outline	  that	  showed	  ‘ethnic’	   violence	   between	   the	   IFM	   and	  MEF	   gradually	   giving	  way	   to	   a	  more	   general	   sense	   of	  lawlessness	  and	  instability.	  This	  depiction	  comes	  from	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  Tensions	  but	   says	   little	   about	   the	   experience	   of	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   officers	   serving	   on	   the	   ground.	  Knowing	   more	   about	   how	   they	   perceived	   their	   operating	   environment	   is	   useful	   for	   a	   more	  developing	   a	  more	   complete	   picture	   of	   how	   ‘communities’	   are	   conceived	  within	   post-­‐conflict	  policing	  missions.	  	  Former	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   Commissioner	   and	   former	   Commissioner	   of	   the	   Royal	   Solomon	  Islands	   Police,	   Peter	   Marshall,	   highlighted	   the	   sometimes	   unstable	   nature	   of	   the	   political	  environment	   in	  Solomon	   Islands.	   In	  discussing	   this	   instability,	   the	  Commissioner	   (r)	   cited	   the	  findings	  of	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  produced	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  April	  2006	  riots:	  
[T]he	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  made	  the	  point	  very	  clearly	  that	  anything	  that	  involves	  political	  
issues,	   whether	   they	   be	   by-­‐elections,	   national	   general	   elections	   or	   whatever,	   causes	   great	  
“excitement”	  –	  that	  was	  the	  word	  that	  was	  used.	  So	  we	  had	  to	  be	  very,	  very	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
nuances	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   Solomon	   Islands...	   They	   were	   very,	   very	   disparate,	   very	  
parochial	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  provinces,	  but	  more	  importantly,	  parochial	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  tribal	  
affiliations	   and	   their	   villages.	   And	   there	   was	   always	   that	   testiness:	   the	   rawness	   from	   the	  
Tension	   period,	   1999-­‐2003	   between	  Malaita	   and	   Guadalcanal.	   Issues	   that	  we	   had	   to	   deal	  
with	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   land	   tenure	   and	   squatters	   and	   all	   that	  went	  with	   it:	   these	  were	   new	  
challenges	  for	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  to	  have	  to	  walk	  that	  fine	  line.	  
There	  was	   therefore	  a	  need	   for	  New	  Zealand	  Police	   to	  be	  aware	  of	   the	  potential	   to	  upset	   this	  delicate	  balance.	   In	   their	   responses	   it	   seems	   there	  was	  an	  awareness	  among	  officers	   that	   any	  peace	  that	  had	  been	  established,	  even	  several	  years	  after	  RAMSI’s	  arrival,	  was	  still	   fragile	  and	  that	  minor	  issues	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  cause	  significant	  agitation	  and	  disruption	  for	  the	  peace-­‐building	  process.	  Looking	  more	  closely,	  however,	  reveals	  some	  interesting	  findings	  in	  regards	  to	  the	   influence	   that	   the	   ‘Tensions’	   and	   national	   political	   events	   had	   on	   the	   experience	   of	   New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  were	  deployed	  at	  RAMSI’s	  outset	  while	  others	  were	  only	  sent	  more	  recently,	  in	  some	  cases	  nearly	  10	  years	  since	  the	  mission	  was	  first	  established.	  Because	  of	  this	   difference,	   it	   might	   be	   expected	   that	   officers	   deployed	   in	   the	   initial	   stages	   encountered	  more	  of	   the	  ethnic	   tension	  and	   lawlessness	  of	   the	  Tension	  period	   than	   later	  contingents.	  This	  was	   certainly	   the	   case	   for	   some	   of	   the	   officers	  who	   noted	   that	   their	   tasks	   in	   the	   early	   stages	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focused	   mainly	   around	   peace-­‐keeping	   and	   spoke	   little	   of	   the	   peace-­‐building	   or	   capacity	  development	   work	   that	   RAMSI	   transitioned	   to	   in	   later	   stages.	   One	   officer,	   stationed	   on	   the	  Weather	  Coast	   in	  2003	  described	  how,	   in	   line	  with	  RAMSI’s	  mandate	  at	  that	  time,	  the	  focus	  of	  much	  of	  his	  work	  was	  on	  re-­‐establishing	  security.	  He	  described	  this	  approach:	  “RAMSI	  sent	  the	  message	  out	  that	  they	  were	  there	  and	  they	  weren’t	  going	  to	  be	  mucked	  around.	   It	  was:	   ‘we’re	  not	  going	  to	  take	  any	  nonsense’.”	  	  The	   focus	   in	   these	   early	   stages	   reflects	   the	   established	   pattern,	   whereby	   physical	   security	   is	  prioritised	   over	   other	   objectives	   in	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   a	   mission	   and	   reflects	   the	   sense	   of	  fragility	   that	   characterises	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   a	   brokered	   or	   enforced	   peace.	   	  Most,	   if	   not	   all,	  missions	  of	   this	   type	  begin	  with	  some	  kind	  of	   ‘security	  pause’	  before	  moving	  on	   to	  social	  and	  economic	  initiatives.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	  it	   is	  also	  worth	  noting	  the	  many	  cases	  in	  which	  this	  pattern	  was	  not	  evident;	  that	  is,	  the	  cases	  where	  officers	  deployed	  in	  the	  initial	  stages	  saw	  little	  evidence	  of	  tension	  and	  others	  where	   officers	   deployed	   in	   later	   stages	   noticed	   it	   manifesting	   in	   certain	   areas.	   When	   asked	  about	  the	  effect	  that	  local	  militia	  had	  on	  policing	  in	  the	  early	  stages,	  one	  officer	  stationed	  on	  the	  Weather	  Coast	   (a	  hotbed	  of	  violence	  prior	   to	  RAMSI’s	  arrival)	   said	   this:	   “I	  didn’t	   really	   see	  or	  hear	  much	  of	  them.	  I	  knew	  that	  they	  were	  there	  but	  didn’t	  really	  see	  much	  of	  them.	  Nothing	  they	  did	  generated	  any	  work	  for	  me	  or	  the	  local	  cops.”	  Likewise,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  same	  question,	  an	  officer	   deployed	   to	   Honiara	   in	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   RAMSI	   simply	   stated:	   “We	   didn’t	   have	   any	  problems	  in	  that	  respect.”	  These	   cases,	   in	   some	  ways,	   reverse	   traditional	   understandings	   of	   the	   peace-­‐building	   process	  (including	   RAMSI’s	   approach)	   and	   highlight	   the	   nuances	   and	   variations	   in	   that	   process.	   The	  finding	  should	  serve	  to	  caution	  against	  too	  rigid	  an	  approach	  to	  peace-­‐building;	  identifying	  the	  need	   for	   vigilance	   at	   all	   stages	   of	   a	   mission	   and	   highlighting	   the	   various	   opportunities	   for	  grassroots	  peace-­‐building	  to	  begin	  as	  soon	  as	  foreign	  intervention	  is	  initiated.	  	  A	   further	  point	   to	  note	   is	   the	  number	  of	  officers	  who	  saw	  very	   little	  sign	  of	   tension,	  ethnic	  or	  otherwise,	  because	  they	  were	  posted	  to	  an	  area	  unaffected	  by	  the	  conflict.	  Given	  how	  disparate	  settlements	   in	   the	   Solomon	   Islands	   are,	   many	   of	   the	   officers	   interviewed	   were	   stationed	   in	  places	  where	  the	  Malaitan-­‐Guale	  divide,	  and	  its	  political	  and	  economic	  repercussions,	  had	  little	  relevance.	  Officers	  posted	  to	  the	  outer	  extremities	  of	  the	  Islands	  spoke	  little,	  if	  at	  all,	  about	  the	  Malaitan-­‐Guale	  divide	  or	   the	  militant	   factions.	  One	  officer	  described	   this	  situation	  as	   it	  was	   in	  Kirakira:	  	  
You	   were	   living	   in	   a	   community	   where	   whatever	   happens	   in	   Honiara	   or	   Canberra	   or	  
Wellington	  has	  very	   little	  effect	  on	   these	  people.	  You	  can	  make	  all	   the	   rules	  you	  want	  and	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lock	  up	  anyone	  you	  want	  in	  Honiara.	  It	  might	  filter	  back	  to	  the	  island	  because	  there	  is	  some	  
relation	  there	  or	  some	  political	  connection	  but	  it	  wouldn’t	  have	  a	  huge	  impact.	  If	  there	  was	  
an	  impact,	  it	  would	  take	  weeks	  or	  months	  to	  get	  there.	  
A	  further	  comment	  was	  made	  by	  an	  officer	  deployed	  in	  various	  roles	  across	  the	  Islands:	  	  
[B]ecause	  there	  were	  no	  Guadalcanal	  people	  on	  Malaita,	  it	  wasn’t	  that	  noticeable	  at	  the	  time	  
we	  were	  there.	  I	  didn’t	  really	  see	  much	  of	  that	  at	  all.	  In	  Honiara,	  it	  wasn’t	  evident...	  I	  found	  
that	  they	  were	  quite	  isolated.	  They	  got	  a	  lot	  of	  information	  through	  from	  Auki.	  But	  nothing	  
that	  really	  had	  an	   impact.	   I	   couldn’t	   say	   that	   they	  had	  any	  political	   influence	  at	  all.	  When	  
they	  had	  the	  riots,	  it	  was	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  community.	  The	  bigger	  community	  didn’t	  
really	  care.	  	  
This	  was	  a	  common	  point;	  that	  while	  riots	  or	  violence	  in	  Honiara	  may	  have	  attracted	  headlines,	  they	   had	   little	   effect	   on	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   community	   work	   for	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   officers	  stationed	   there.	   The	   geographic	   separation	   between	   communities	  was	   such	   that	   national	   and	  international	   political	   affairs	   had	   little	   relevance	   to	   the	   lives	   of	   local	   people.	   As	   an	   officer	   in	  Rennell	   and	   Bellona	   illustrated,	   even	   at	   supposedly	   high-­‐risk	   times,	   it	   was	   difficult	   to	   see	  evidence	  of	  the	  tension	  that	  had	  once	  dominated	  the	  political	  agenda:	  	  
We	  had	  local	  government	  elections	  and	  there’s	  always	  the	  potential	  for	  tension	  around	  that.	  
I	   arranged	   for	   additional	   staff	   from	   Honiara	   to	   come	   down.	   It	   was	   about	   increasing	   the	  
policing	  presence.	  But	  again,	  it	  was	  far	  enough	  away	  from	  Honiara	  that	  the	  political	  dramas	  
weren’t	  really	  significant.	  	  	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  officers	  interviewed	  stated	  that	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  incidents	  they	  dealt	  with	  stemmed,	  not	  from	  conflict	  at	  the	  national	  political	  level,	  but	  from	  issues	  arising	  locally.	  In	  these	  communities,	  officers	  spoke	  of	  problems	  stemming	  for	  domestic	  violence	  and	  alcohol	  with	  the	  ‘Tensions’	   being	   distant	   and,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   irrelevant.	   Even	   an	   officer	   stationed	   on	   the	  Weather	  Coast,	  the	  centre	  of	  much	  of	  the	  violence	  from	  1998-­‐2003,	  said	  he	  saw	  no	  evidence	  of	  ethnic	   or	   sectarian	   hostility,	   instead	   spending	   most	   of	   his	   time	   responding	   to	   general	   crime	  reports	  and	  visiting	  remote	  outposts.	  	  All	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  mentioned	  alcohol,	  drugs	  and	  family	  violence	  as	  being	  key	  drivers	  of	  the	  work	  they	  were	  required	  to	  do.	  When	  asked	  what	  he	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  key	  issues	  facing	  Solomon	  Islands	  during	  his	  deployment,	  one	  officer	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  ‘ethnic’	  conflict,	  instead	  saying	  this:	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I	  said	  before	  that	  they	  have	  a	  problem	  with	  domestic	  violence,	  particularly	  with	  the	  fathers	  
beating	  their	  kids.	   I	  attended	  a	   lot	  of	  homicides	  where	  the	  kids	  had	  died.	  That’s	  where	  you	  
have	  to	  change	  that	  attitude	  and	  basically	  look	  after	  the	  family.	  They’re	  starting	  to	  get	  a	  bit	  
of	  a	  drug	  problem;	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  cannabis	  problem,	  in	  particular.	  They	  grow	  their	  own	  cannabis	  
like	  people	  do	  here.	  But	  meth	  was	  beginning	  to	  become	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  problem	  when	  I	  was	  there.	  
They	  get	  onto	  homemade	  brew.	  A	  lot	  of	  the	  domestic	  violence	  comes	  from	  that.	  
Again,	  such	  findings	  highlight	  the	  intricacy	  of	  the	  peace-­‐building	  process	  and	  reinforce	  the	  need	  for	  effective	  community	  policing	   in	  such	  contexts.	  While	   the	   ‘ethnic’	   conflict	  may	  have	  carried	  some	   political	   significance,	   it	   was	   far	   less	   relevant	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   it	   presented	   at	   the	  community	  level.	  The	  above	  examples	  demonstrate	  the	  need	  to	  recognise	  underlying	  social	  and	  economic	  factors	  that	  weaken	  community	  cohesion	  in	  contexts	  such	  as	  these.	  	  	  Beyond	   these	   challenges,	   officers	   were	   required	   to	   understand	   and	   adapt	   to	   the	   diversity	   of	  local	  cultures.	  This	  meant	  understanding	  how	  those	  communities	  functioned,	  the	  customs	  that	  guided	  their	   functioning	  and	  how	  those	  customs	  could	  be	  harnessed	   in	  a	  way	  that	  built	  peace	  and	   lent	   legitimacy	   to	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system.	  Many	   found	   this	   challenging	  although	   their	  responses	  indicate	  a	  willingness	  to	  adapt	  and	  find	  ways	  of	  empowering	  local	  communities	  and	  local	   cultures.	   Officers	   demonstrated	   a	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   the	   communities	   they	  interacted	  with	  and,	  in	  their	  responses,	  tended	  to	  go	  beyond	  simplistic	  portrayals	  of	  village	  life;	  instead	  speaking	  of	  its	  diverse	  nature	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  was	  undergoing	  change.	  	  	  	  A	  key	  point	  of	  difference	  noticed	  by	  many	  officers	  was	  that	  between	  the	  unique	  cultures	  seen	  in	  remote	   villages	   in	   the	   outer	   islands	   and	   the	  more	   fluid	   social	   climate	   of	  Honiara.	  Most	   of	   the	  officers	   interviewed	   had	   some	   kind	   of	   experience	   with	   both	   and	   they	   recognised	   that	   while	  traditional	   structures	   maintain	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   legitimacy	   in	   remote	   areas,	   they	   have	   been	  largely	  broken	  down	  in	  the	  squatter	  settlements	  and	  migrant	  communities	  based	  in	  and	  around	  the	  capital.	  	  Even	  in	  remote	  island	  communities,	  officers	  noted	  that	  communities	  were	  undergoing	  a	  degree	  of	  change.	  In	  Rennell	  and	  Bellona,	  one	  officer	  made	  the	  following	  observation:	  	  	  
Every	  time	  we	  went	  somewhere,	  I	  would	  go	  and	  liaise	  with	  the	  head	  person	  in	  that	  area.	  In	  
many	  respects,	  those	  traditional	  structures	  were	  breaking	  down.	  They	  weren’t	  as	  strong	  as	  
they	  had	  previously	  been.	  There	  would	  be	  elders	  within	  the	  community	  that	  were	  respected	  
but	  there	  wasn’t	  necessarily	  a	  chief	  that	  people	  looked	  up	  to	  or	  who	  exercised	  control	  over	  a	  
village.	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Other	  officers	  made	  similar	  comments,	  highlighting	  the	  sense	  of	  fluidity	  that	  characterised	  local	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities.	  They	  identified	  the	  challenges	  that	  individuals,	  especially	  young	  people	   faced	   as	   they	   tried	   to	   navigate	   this	   complex	   and	   rapidly	   changing	   social	   climate.	   One	  officer	  in	  Gizo	  discussed	  their	  observations	  of	  the	  wantok	  system	  by	  saying:	  
In	   Gizo	   itself,	   it	   was	   still	   present	   but	   it	   was	   less	   evident	   than	  when	  we	  went	   to	   the	   outer	  
islands	  where	  they	  were	  pretty	  much	  all	   living	  as	  they	  had	  done	  for	  hundreds	  of	  years.	  The	  
Chief	  is	  like	  a	  god	  and	  there’s	  a	  lot	  of	  respect.	  But	  it’s	  the	  whole	  big-­‐city	  thing	  that	  when	  you	  
get	  out	  of	  that	  nurtured	  environment	  where	  your	  customary	  role	  is	  very	  clear	  and	  you	  get	  to	  
the	  city	  and	  it’s	   less	  clear	  because	  there’s	  all	  of	  these	  other	  Western	  influences	  that	  kind	  of	  
muddy	  the	  waters	  a	  bit.	  	  
This	  is	  positive	  given	  the	  concerns	  raised	  earlier	  regarding	  how	  communities	  are	  conceived	  in	  the	  community	  policing	  model	  and	  in	  peace-­‐building	  generally.	  As	  discussed	  in	  earlier	  chapters,	  contributors	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   community-­‐building	   identify	   the	   potential	   for	   a	   ‘community’	  focus	   to	   retrench	   or	   embed	   exclusive	   forms	   of	   community	   and,	   through	   this,	   undermine	   the	  development	  of	  a	  more	  peaceful	  social	  network.	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  little	  reason	  for	  concern	  in	  the	   case	   of	   RAMSI	   based	   on	   the	   findings	   from	   the	   interviews	   conducted	   here.	   Officers	  recognised	   that	   there	  was	  more	   to	   Solomon	   Islands	   than	   ‘Malaitans’	   and	   ‘Guale’	   and	   adapted	  their	  approach	  to	  local	  communities	  to	  respect	  this.	  The	  above	  example	  in	  Rennell	  and	  Bellona	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  Officers	  had	  to	  recognise	  that	  while	  the	  chiefly	  system	  was	  fundamental	  to	  authority	   and	   order	   in	   some	   communities,	   in	   others,	   they	   had	   to	   look	   for	   other	   avenues	   to	  engage	  the	  people	  in	  that	  area.	  	  	  	  	  	  As	   discussed	   earlier,	   churches	   and	   religious	   organisations	   are	   active	   in	   the	   Solomon	   Islands	  political	  sphere	  and	  have	  acted	  as	  an	  important	  link	  between	  the	  national	  and	  local	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	   historically.	   Numerous	   observers	   have	   described	   the	   important	   role	   that	   religious	  groups	  played	  during	  the	  conflict	  and	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  reconciliation	  process	  (Fraenkel	  2004;	   Zaku	   2006).	   They	   describe	   the	   church’s	   role	   as	   being	   one	   of	   peace-­‐builder;	   helping	   to	  bring	  warring	  parties	   together	  and	  provide	  aid	   to	  victims.	  Former	  Police	  Commissioner	  Peter	  Marshall	  described	  their	  role	  as	  being	  central	  to	  community	  cohesion:	  	  
The	  churches	  are	  the	  glue	  that	  keep	  the	  societies	  together	  in	  many	  ways...	  Sunday	  mornings:	  
there	   are	   church	   bells,	   hundreds	   of	   people	   in	   their	   finest	   going	   to	   church	   and	   that	   has	   a	  
strong	  resonance,	  even	  letters	  to	  the	  editor	  have	  that	  sort	  of	  religious	  twist	  to	  [them].	  
However,	  their	  role	  in	  the	  peace-­‐building	  process	  diminished	  as	  both	  national	  and	  international	  actors	   focused	   their	   efforts	  more	   exclusively	   on	   the	  militant	   groups.	  When	   asked	   about	   this,	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former	  Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Phil	   Goff,	   stated	   that	   the	   feeling	   of	   the	   Australia	   and	  New	  Zealand	  governments	  was	  that	  by	  late	  1999	  the	  violence	  had	  escalated	  to	  a	  point	  where	  it	  was	  beyond	   the	   capabilities	   of	   the	   churches	   to	   manage,	   let	   alone	   resolve.	   This,	   he	   believed,	  necessitated	  an	  international	  response	  more	  directly	  focused	  on	  the	  militant	  groups	  (seen	  in	  the	  Townsville	   Peace	   Agreement)	   and	   then	   later,	   a	   comprehensive	   ‘strengthened	   assistance’	  package	  (seen	  in	  RAMSI).	  	  Despite	   this,	   churches	   continue	   to	   function	   as	   a	   foundation	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   community	  development	  in	  many	  communities	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  and	  their	  importance	  was	  recognised	  by	  several	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed.	  Their	  interactions	  with	  the	  churches	  provide	  an	  interesting	  insight	  into	  how	  they	  adapted	  to	  living	  and	  working	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities.	  	  Several	  officers	  interviewed	  made	  a	  conscious	  effort	  to	  visit	  the	  churches	  as	  a	  way	  of	  interacting	  with	   local	   people	   and	   encouraging	   their	   development	   as	   an	   important	   component	   of	   civil	  society.	   One	   officer	   stationed	   in	  Malu’u	   explained	   the	   value	   of	   the	   churches	   in	   establishing	   a	  relationship	  with	  the	  community:	  	  
When	  I	  first	  got	  there,	  the	  first	  thing	  I	  did	  was	  go	  to	  all	  the	  churches.	  I’m	  not	  a	  religious	  guy.	  
But	  some	  of	  the	  churches	  I	  went	  to,	  no	  other	  white	  men	  had	  been	  to	  before.	  In	  respect	  to	  the	  
community,	  they	  were	  fantastic.	  You	  could	  hear	  their	  frustrations	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Solomon	  
Islands	  Police.	  They	  complained	  that	  they	  weren’t	  doing	  anything	  and	  were	  lazy.	  
As	  with	  other	  actors,	  however,	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  church	  is	  never	  one-­‐dimensional	  and	  former	  Police	  Commissioner	  Peter	  Marshall,	  while	  acknowledging	   the	  various	  good	  works	   the	  church	  had	  achieved,	  also	  expressed	  some	  concern	  regarding	  their	  reluctance	  to	  condemn	  some	  of	  the	  more	  serious	  issues	  undermining	  peace	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  namely	  domestic	  violence.	  On	  this,	  the	  Commissioner	  (r)	  stated:	  
I	   think	   it’s	   fair	   comment	   to	   say	   that	   the	   churches	   haven’t	   really	   been	   as	   strong	   in	   their	  
condemnation	  or	  outrage	  in	  terms	  of	  issues	  that	  have	  occurred	  and	  they	  have	  probably	  (not	  
wanting	   to	   step	   into	   the	   political	   arena	   because	   the	   politics	   there	   are	   very	   dynamic,	  
unforgiving	  and	  mercurial)	  but	  they	  have	  kept	  a	  pretty	  straight	  line.	  I	  think	  there	  is	  probably	  
more	  the	  churches	  could	  do.	  
Out	   in	   remote	   communities,	   some	   officers	   opted	   to	   give	   the	   churches	   some	   distance;	  acknowledging	  their	  importance	  but	  preferring	  not	  to	  engage	  them	  as	  partners	  to	  resolve	  crime	  or	   build	   peace.	   One	   officer	   spoke	   of	   some	   of	   the	   difficulties	   that	   engaging	  with	   the	   churches	  posed	  for	  a	  sole-­‐charge	  officer	  in	  a	  remote	  location:	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[The	   churches]	  were	   active	   in	   the	   Solomons	   and	   there	  were	   very	   strong	   church	   groups	   in	  
Rennell	  and	  Bellona	  where	  I	  was.	  I	  didn’t	  attend	  any.	  Basically,	  if	  I	  had	  chosen	  to	  attend	  one	  
church,	  then	  you	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  alienating	  the	  other	  groups.	  The	  alternative	  was	  attending	  
every	  church	  and	  I	  didn’t	  fancy	  going	  down	  that	  track	  either.	  	  
Several	  others	  expressed	  a	  similar	  view,	  stating	  that	  they	  saw	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  churches	  to	  the	  local	  people	  but	  felt	  no	  need	  to	  attend	  services	  or	  speak	  with	  church	  leaders.	  	  Whether	  their	  reasons	  were	  personal	  or	  professional,	  the	  preference	  of	  these	  officers	  to	  remain	  separate	   from	   the	   church	   is	   an	   interesting	   finding.	   Given	   the	   observations	   of	   many	   in	   the	  academic	  literature	  as	  to	  the	  value	  of	  churches	  to	  the	  peace-­‐building	  effort	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  it	  would	   seem	   as	   though	   an	   opportunity	   was	  missed	   by	   those	   officers	   who	   did	   not	   establish	   a	  relationship	   with	   them.	   In	   an	   environment	   where	   police	   resources	   are	   tightly	   stretched	   and	  confidence	  in	  the	  justice	  system	  is	  low,	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  local	  churches	  would	  likely	  have	  been	   valuable.	   A	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   the	   church	   leaders,	   as	   the	   centre	   of	   many	   remote	  Solomon	   Islands	   communities,	   may	   have	   been	   a	   valuable	   ally	   acting	   as	   intermediaries	   and	  helping	  to	  adapt	  and	  translate	  RAMSI’s	  message	  to	  local	  villagers.	  These	  kinds	  of	  relationships	  are	   valuable	   both	   for	   individual	   officers	  who	  may	   struggle	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	   intricacies	   of	   local	  networks	  but	  also	  more	  broadly	  for	  the	  police	  and	  justice	  system	  who,	  by	  necessity,	  must	  rely	  on	  the	  input	  of	  other	  agencies	  to	  help	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  fight	  crime	  and	  maintain	  social	  order.	  More	  long-­‐term,	  this	  relationship	  could	  have	  helped	  to	  empower	  churches	  and	  communities	  to	  work	  as	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   contribute	   to	   the	   wider	   process	   of	   nation-­‐building	   that	   will	   long	  outlast	  RAMSI.	  	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  here	  to	  evaluate	  the	  work	  done	  by	  officers.	  Instead,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  learn	   about	   their	   experience,	   and	   the	   responses	   from	   officers	   who	   chose	   not	   to	   engage	   the	  churches	  do	  carry	  an	  important	  lesson;	  that	  is,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  police	   ‘wearing	  too	  many	  hats’.	  While	  there	  are	  certain	  benefits	  that	  have	  been	  outlined	  above,	  the	  officers’	  responses	  highlight	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  limitations	  on	  the	  range	  of	  efforts	  that	  officers	  can	  make,	  especially	  in	  a	  context	  that	  is	  fragile,	  constantly	  changing	  and	  unfamiliar	  to	  officers.	  To	  both	  build	  and	  manage	  a	   proper	   working	   relationship	   with	   churches	   and	   church	   leaders	   would	   likely	   have	   taken	  significant	  time	  and	  required	  a	  range	  of	  skills	  on	  the	  part	  of	  officers.	  Even	  travelling	  to	  churches	  in	  the	  area	  may	  have	  been	  difficult	  given	  the	  distance	  and	  lack	  of	  basic	  transport	  infrastructure.	  The	   former	  Commissioner’s	   concerns,	   likewise,	   highlight	   some	  of	   the	  pitfalls	   of	   establishing	   a	  relationship	  with	  organisations	  whose	  perspectives	  on	  human	  rights	  may	  differ	  from	  those	  that	  RAMSI	   are	   trying	   to	   encourage.	   The	   findings,	   therefore,	   highlight	   the	   need	   for	   caution	   in	  expecting	  such	  an	  approach	  from	  international	  police	  officers.	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An	  area	   that	  all	  officers	  had	   to	  adapt	   to	  and	   interact	  with	  was	   the	  wantok	  system.	   In	  much	  of	  their	  work	  the	  wantok	  system	  was	  central	  and	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  respondents	  recognised	  it	  as	  an	  important	  hallmark	  of	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  social	  space	  but	  one	  which,	  for	  them,	  required	  some	  careful	  navigation.	  While	  officers	  recognised	  the	  benefit	  of	  tight	  social	  links,	  they	  also	  noted	  that	  these	  links	  could	  work	  against	  the	  efforts	  of	  Police:	  	  
Well	   the	  wantok	   is	   like	   the	  Maori	  whanau.	   It’s	   just	   the	   family	   structure.	   It’s	   very	   big	   over	  
there	  and	  you	   could	  put	   it	   in	   line	  with	   the	  Maori	  whanau	  here.	   It	   doesn’t	  matter	  what	  an	  
offender	  has	  done,	  the	  wantok	  will	  look	  after	  him.	  It	  depends	  on	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  leader	  of	  
the	  wantok.	  It	  depends	  on	  how	  strong	  he	  is	  and	  what	  role	  he	  has	  within	  the	  family	  as	  to	  what	  
will	  happen	  with	  that	  offender.	  	  	  	  
It	   was	   common	   for	   officers	   to	   highlight	   the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   the	   wantok	   system,	   as	   one	  officer	  stated:	  	  
The	  wantok	   system	  was	  a	  problem	  everywhere.	   If	   you	  had	  a	   constable	   that	  was	   from	   that	  
island	  then	  policing	  that	  island	  was	  a	  real	  problem.	  
However,	  with	  time,	  officers’	  experience	  in	  these	  remote	  communities	  led	  many	  to	  recognise	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  customary	  justice	  systems	  and	  the	  continuing	  fragility	  of	  the	  formal	  justice	  sector.	  For	   several	   of	   them,	   customary	   hearings	   provided	   an	   opportunity	   to	   discuss	   the	   role	   of	   the	  formal	  justice	  system	  and	  the	  work	  that	  RAMSI	  was	  doing	  in	  building	  its	  capacity.	  One	  example,	  from	  an	  officer	  attending	  a	  customary	  hearing	  regarding	  the	  local	  Chief’s	  son,	  demonstrated	  the	  value	   in	   talking	   to	   local	   communities	  about	   changes	   taking	  place	  at	   the	   institutional	   level	  and	  how	   they	  might	   have	   an	   impact	   locally.	   Involving	   RSIPF	   officers	   in	   these	   discussions	   further	  allowed	   for	   interaction	   between	   established	   local	   customs	   and	   the	   changing	   institutional	  structure.	   	   For	   the	   officer	   involved,	   the	   experience	   was	   valuable	   in	   both	   a	   professional	   and	  personal	  sense:	  	  
[The	  customary	  law	  hearing]	  was	  very	  interesting	  because	  that	  was	  the	  way	  they	  wanted	  to	  
deal	  with	  it.	  It	  ended	  up	  costing	  the	  Chief’s	  son	  a	  lot	  of	  money,	  pigs	  and	  food.	  It	  was	  actually	  
quite	  an	  awesome	  experience	  to	  be	  involved	  in.	  It	  was	  resolved	  and	  the	  son	  wasn’t	  killed.	  My	  
RSIP	  guy	  came	  with	  me	  to	  that.	  The	  whole	  village	  was	  there	  and	  people	  had	  come	  for	  miles	  
because	  it	  was	  the	  Paramount	  Chief.	  My	  RSIP	  spoke	  for	  about	  half	  an	  hour	  and	  just	  spoke	  to	  
them	  about	  family	  violence	  and	  the	  way	  the	  law	  was	  changing.	  A	  whole	  lot	  of	  the	  elders	  had	  
been	  injured	  and	  they	  thought	  that	  justice	  should	  be	  done.	  But	  the	  way	  that	  the	  Paramount	  
Chief	  and	  the	  RSIP	  guy	  dealt	  with	  it	  was	  well	  received	  by	  all	  and	  they	  were	  happy	  that	  they	  
right	  thing	  had	  been	  done.	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It	  was	  clear	  to	  officers	  across	  the	  New	  Zealand	  contingent,	  that	  kastom	  and	  communal	  systems	  of	  justice	  would	  have	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  both	  in	  establishing	  peace	  and	  in	  maintaining	  the	  justice	  system	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  The	  challenges	  associated	  with	  resurrecting	  and	  embedding	  a	  Western-­‐style	  centralised	  justice	  system	  were	  highlighted	  by	  many	  who	  were	  interviewed.	  They	  highlighted	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  customary	  justice	  but	  showed	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  finding	  and	  utilising	  the	  positives	  so	  as	  to	   lessen	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  official	   justice	  system	  and	  encourage	  local	  communities	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  justice	  process.	  	  The	   pattern	   often	   varied	   according	   to	   the	   location	   that	   officers	   were	   posted	   to	   with	   officers	  based	  in	  rural	  outposts	  relying	  on	  kastom	  far	  more	  extensively	  than	  those	  stationed	  in	  Honiara.	  Moves	   to	   utilise	   customary	   justice	   mechanisms	   are	   fraught	   with	   potential	   dangers,	   some	   of	  which	   will	   be	   explored	   further	   in	   later	   sections.	   Here,	   however,	   it	   is	   worthy	   to	   note	   many	  officers	  demonstrated	  a	  particularly	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	   local	   cultures	  and	  some	  of	   the	  dangers	  in	  relying	  too	  heavily	  on	  local	  justice.	  They	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  shortcomings	  of	  
kastom	  in	  appropriately	  dealing	  with	  criminal	  behaviour	  but	  often	  went	  to	  the	  effort	  of	  looking	  for	   ways	   to	   mitigate	   those	   risks	   and	   thereby	   build	   a	   more	   local	   and	   more	   legitimate	   justice	  system.	  The	   findings	   here	   serve	   to	   downplay	   the	   significance	   of	   cultural	   difference	   in	   international	  peace-­‐building	  missions.	  While	   the	   literature	   raised	   concerns	   about	   the	  potential	   for	   harm	   to	  arise	  out	  of	  interactions	  between	  international	  police	  and	  local	  communities,	  the	  experience	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  demonstrate	  the	  ability	  of	  individual	  officers	  to	  adapt	  to	  and	   carefully	   negotiate	   the	   finer	   points	   of	   the	   local	   social,	   political	   and	   cultural	   landscape.	  Officers	  recognised	  the	  diversity	  of	   local	  communities	  and	  sought	  to	  account	  for	  that	  diversity	  by	  engaging	  with	  both	  traditional	  and	  more	  recent	  local	  institutions.	  	  	  Outreach	  and	  Inequality	  The	  second	  question	  asks:	  
What	  strategies	  do	   international	  police	  employ	  to	   interact	  and	  engage	  with	  the	   local	  population	  
and	  how	  do	  these	  strategies	  aim	  to	  contribute	  to	  an	  effective	  and	  equitable	  partnership	  between	  
officers	  and	  citizens?	  It	  aims	  to	  understand	  how	  an	  equal	  and	  fair	  policing	  service	  is	  delivered	  in	  circumstances	  where	  there	   is	   the	   potential	   for	   close	   partnerships	   between	  police	   and	   community	   to	   favour	   certain	  actors	  and	  deny	  others.	  In	  particular,	  it	  aimed	  to	  explore	  the	  strategies	  used	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  service	  provided	  by	  New	  Zealand	  Police	   in	  Solomon	  Islands	  was	   fair	  and	  reached	  out	   to	  all	  of	  those	   who	   needed	   it.	   The	   literature	   highlighted	   how	   issues	   of	   equality	   and	   fairness	   are	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sometimes	   undermined	   if	   police-­‐community	   partnerships	   simply	   reflect	   existing	   power	  imbalances	   or	   accentuate	   the	   barriers	   faced	   by	   isolated	   parts	   of	   the	   community.	   While	   a	  community-­‐oriented	   policing	   style	   necessitates	   close	   ties	   with	   community	   leaders	   and	   other	  influential	  people,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   those	  relationships	  do	  not	  work	  against	   the	   interests	  of	  others	  in	  the	  community,	  whose	  concerns	  may	  be	  less	  audible	  but	  still	  require	  a	  thorough	  police	  response.	   To	   prevent	   this	   requires	   a	   genuine	   effort	   on	   the	   part	   of	   police	   forces	   to	   engage	   all	  citizens	  and	  inform	  them	  of	  the	  role	  they	  can	  play	  in	  reducing	  crime	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Solomon	  Islands,	  building	  peace.	  In	  Solomon	  Islands,	  part	  of	  that	  effort	  would	  look	  to	  involve	  strategies	  that	   reach	   out	   to	   groups,	   notably	   women	   and	   children,	   whose	   concerns	   might	   otherwise	   be	  marginalised	  or	  ignored.	  	  	  The	   concerns	   raised	   around	   unequal	   access	   to	   police	   services	   are	   particularly	   relevant	   in	  Solomon	   Islands	  given	   the	  significant	   social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  barriers	   that	  prevent	  many,	  especially	  women	   and	   children,	   from	   receiving	   equal	   protection	   under	   the	   law.	   Reports	   from	  Amnesty	  International	  describe	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  women	  and	  children	  in	  Honiara’s	  slums	  and	  the	   casual	   attitude	   towards	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	   in	   the	   country.	   Amnesty	   International’s	  (2011:4)	  2011	  Submission	  to	  the	  UN	  Periodic	  Review	  	  reported	  this	  story:	  	  
On	  11	  August	  2010...a	  woman	  was	  beaten	  by	  her	  husband	  in	  one	  of	  Honiara’s	  main	  streets,	  in	  
full	   view	   of	   three	   police	   officers	   in	   a	   police	   vehicle.	   The	   officers	   did	   not	   intervene,	   but	  
attended	  to	   the	  woman	  after	   the	  beating.	  They	  did	  not	  arrest	   the	  perpetrator.	  The	  officers	  
refused	  to	  take	  her	  statement	  at	  the	  scene	  and	  asked	  her	  to	  come	  to	  the	  police	  station	  to	  give	  
her	  statement.	  	  
The	  report	  also	  pointed	  out	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  Public	  Solicitor’s	  Officer	  to	  represent	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  unless	  victims	  could	  provide	  physical	  and	  visible	  evidence	  of	  the	  crime.	  For	  international	  police	  to	  reach	  beyond	  these	  barriers	  requires	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  both	  identify	  the	  problem	  and	  devise	  effective	  solutions.	  	  It	  was	  clear	  to	  most	  officers	  that	  barriers	  of	  this	  kind	  were	  hindering	  access	  to	  police	  services	  for	  women	  and	  children	  in	  the	  villages	  they	  were	  based	  in.	  One	  spoke	  of	  how	  it	  was	  practice,	  on	  entering	  a	  village,	  to	  speak	  with	  the	  men	  first	  and	  seek	  their	  permission	  before	  interacting	  with	  local	  women:	  	  
You	  go	   into	   a	   local	   village	   and	   you	  have	   to	   speak	   to	   the	  males	   first.	   You	  don’t	   talk	   to	   the	  
females.	  Once	  you’ve	  spoken	  to	  the	  males	  and	  they’re	  relaxed,	  then	  you	  can	  talk	  to	  the	  wives	  
and	  the	  kids.	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This	   example	   demonstrates	   the	   potential	   for	   international	   policing	   to	   further	   entrench	   the	  barriers	   facing	  women	  and	   children.	  By	   adhering	   to	   the	  protocols	   of	   patriarchy,	   international	  police	   officers,	   both	   implicitly	   and	   explicitly,	   lend	   it	   a	   degree	   of	   legitimacy.	   Their	   interaction	  with	   men	   over	   the	   women	   sends	   a	   powerful	   message	   as	   to	   who	   holds	   proper	   authority.	   In	  practical	   terms,	   this	  message	  may	   be	   enough	   to	   discourage	  women	   or	   children	   from	   coming	  forward	  with	  reports	  of	  crime.	  It	  also	  places	  them	  in	  an	  even	  more	  vulnerable	  position,	  should	  they	  themselves	  be	  accused.	  	  However,	  with	  both	   the	  officer	  cited	  above	  and	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  group	   interviewed,	   it	  appeared	  that	   such	   gestures	   were	   kept	   to	   a	   minimum,	   and	   that	   officers	   were	  more	   than	   aware	   of	   the	  significant	  barriers	  facing	  women	  and	  children	  in	  local	  communities.	  	  In	  most	   of	   the	   interviews	   conducted	   here,	   the	   tight-­‐knit	   and	   patriarchal	   nature	   of	   families	   in	  Solomon	   Islands	  was	  noted	  and	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   it	  was	  preventing	  police	   from	  picking	  up	  on	  violent	   or	   abusive	   behaviour	   in	   that	   environment.	   The	   issue	   was	   particularly	   concerning	   for	  officers	   dealing	   with	   cases	   of	   sexual	   violence,	   where	   customary	   justice	   mechanisms	   saw	   the	  issue	   negotiated	   between	   the	   heads	   of	   the	   victim’s	   and	   offender’s	   family,	   often	   with	   little	  involvement	   of	   the	   victim	   or	   the	   police.	   As	   described	   earlier,	   there	   are	   numerous	   benefits	   to	  customary	   justice	  mechanisms	   and	   there	  was	   enthusiasm	   on	   the	   part	   of	   New	   Zealand	   Police	  officers	   to	   utilise	   them.	   However,	   it	   was	   evident	   that	   there	   were	   cases	   where	   New	   Zealand	  officers	   felt	   that	   that	   response	  was	   incapable	   of	   providing	   a	   fair	   justice	   process	   to	   people	   in	  rural	  areas.	  Often,	  monetary	  reconciliation	  was	  enough	  for	  the	  issue	  to	  be	  considered	  resolved	  by	   the	   local	   figures	   of	   authority.	   One	   officer	   stationed	   at	   Malu’u	   expressed	   a	   form	   of	  helplessness	  at	  this	  situation:	  
In	  their	  cultures,	  someone’s	  daughter	  could	  be	  raped	  and	  they	  would	  be	  angry.	  Shell	  money	  
could	  make	  up	  for	  all	  of	  that	  and	  calm	  the	  situation	  down.	  So	  that’s	  how	  they	  operate.	  In	  the	  
case	   of	   [one]	   rape	   victim,	   the	   victim’s	   father	   was	   telling	   us	   that	   she	   was	   an	   imbecile.	   So	  
there’s	  that	  mentality	  and	  whether	  it’s	  right	  or	  wrong,	  that’s	  the	  way	  it	  works.	  
Officers	   based	   in	   Honiara	   spoke	   less	   about	   the	   barriers	   facing	   women	   and	   children	   but	   did	  highlight	  other	  issues	  affecting	  equality	  in	  treatment	  by	  the	  police	  and	  the	  wider	  justice	  system.	  Firstly,	  officers	  spoke	  of	  how	  people	  in	  Honiara	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  charged	  with	  crimes	  in	  the	   formal	   justice	   system	  as	   the	   logistical	   constraints	  were	  much	   lower	   than	   those	  associated	  with	  charging	  people	  in	  remote	  areas.	  	  Despite	   RAMSI’s	   efforts	   to	   encourage	   a	   fair	   and	   impartial	   policing	   service,	   there	   remains	   a	  reluctance	   to	   pursue	   charges	   against	   people	   of	   influence.	   One	   situation,	   relayed	   by	   an	   officer	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based	   in	   Kukum,	   highlighted	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   issue,	   in	   particular	   the	   very	   real	   fear	   that	   the	  individual	  police	  officers	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  feel	  at	  having	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  jobs:	  
I	  was	  working	  with	  some	  RAMSI	  police	  officers	  from	  the	  Cook	  Islands.	  We	  stopped	  a	  person	  
driving	  who	  was	   intoxicated.	   He	  was	   the	   Ombudsman.	  We	   took	   him	   back	   and	  we	   had	   no	  
hesitation	   taking	   him	   back	   even	   though	   he	   made	   it	   loud	   and	   clear	   that	   he	   was	   the	  
Ombudsman.	  Solomon	  Islands	  Police	  officers	  would	  have	  been	  very	  scared	  to	  deal	  with	  him.	  
We	  took	  him	  back	  to	  the	  Kukum	  Police	  station	  and	  informed	  them	  of	  who	  we	  had.	  You	  could	  
see	  straight	  away	  that	  they	  were	  very,	  very	  uncomfortable...	  I	  can’t	  remember	  if	  we	  left	  him	  
there	  or	  were	  called	  away	  to	  something	  but,	   sure	  enough,	  when	  we	  had	  returned	   later	  on,	  
they	  had	  let	  him	  go.	  
Another	  officer	  told	  a	  similar	  story	  about	  a	  former	  militant	  in	  Honiara:	  
One	   of	   the	  major	   instigators	   of	   the	   violence	   over	   there	   lived	   in	   Honiara.	   He	   ran	   a	   construction	  
business.	  He	  lived	  there	  and	  they	  knew	  who	  he	  was	  and	  there	  were	  all	  of	  these	  charges	  against	  him.	  
They	  don’t	  lock	  him	  up	  because	  it	  will	  cause	  too	  much	  strife.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  noticed	  local	  RSIPF	  officers	  would	  favour	  members	  of	   their	   local	   wantok	  meaning	   that	   reports	   of	   some	   crimes	  would	   often	   be	   ignored	   or	   never	  recorded	   if	   they	   involved	   an	   officer’s	   family	   member.	   One	   officer,	   a	   detective	   investigating	  historic	  homicide	  cases,	  stated:	  	  
Within	  the	  police	  over	  there,	  the	  thing	  that	  you	  have	  to	  watch	  is	  how	  the	  family	  connections	  
influence	  people’s	  decisions.	  A	  lot	  of	  the	  information	  comes	  from	  hearsay	  and	  it’s	  what	  family	  
members	  say.	  It’s	  not	  necessarily	  coming	  from	  the	  offender.	  So	  you	  have	  to	  weigh	  things	  up	  
really	  carefully	  and	  look	  at	  things	  from	  different	  angles	  and	  think	  outside	  the	  square	  when	  
dealing	  with	  people.	  	  
These	   examples	   illustrate	   how	   an	   emphasis	   on	   community	   strength	   and	   respect	   of	   local	  hierarchies	  can	  undermine	  the	  justice	  process	  for	  individuals.	  While	  there	  is	  always	  a	  balance	  to	  be	  achieved	  between	  individual	  rights	  and	  broader	  social	  harmony,	  it	  is	  worthwhile	  to	  note	  the	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  balance	  can	  be	  undermined	  at	  the	  street	  level	  and	  how	  that	  affects	  the	  path	  to	  justice	  and	  peace	  for	  groups	  that	  struggle	  to	  gain	  a	  fair	  hearing	  in	  the	  political	  and	  public	  space.	  	  In	   much	   of	   this,	   there	   was	   very	   little	   that	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   felt	   they	   were	   able	   to	   do	   to	  improve	  the	  situation.	  In	  their	  mentoring	  role,	  they	  aimed	  to	  encourage	  an	  impartial	  approach	  to	  policing	  but	   it	  was	   apparent	   that	  many	   felt	   it	  was	   the	   expectations	  of	   the	   local	   community	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that	  were	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  problem,	  with	  many	   locals	  believing	   that	   that	  was	  how	  both	   the	  justice	   system	   and	   wider	   society	   should	   operate.	   For	   that	   reason,	   there	   was	   a	   sense	   of	  powerlessness	  among	  many	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed.	  	  One	  case,	  however,	  demonstrated	  the	  potential	  for	  change	  and	  the	  role	  that	  international	  police	  officers	   could	   play	   in	   helping	   to	   facilitate	   that	   change.	   A	   female	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   officer,	  stationed	  in	  Gizo,	  spoke	  of	  how	  a	  small	  group	  of	  local	  female	  RSIPF	  officers	  came	  to	  her	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  establishing	  a	  women’s	  refuge	  facility	  in	  Western	  Province.	  After	  being	  approached,	  the	  officer	  helped	  to	  provide	  administrative,	  as	  well	  as	  motivational,	  support:	  
They	  wanted	  to	  create	  a	  house	  or	  refuge	  type	   thing.	   I	  picked	  that	  up	  and	  ran	  with	   them.	   I	  
tried	  to	  give	  as	  much	  advice	  as	  I	  could	  on	  how	  to	  approach	  it.	  They	  just	  started	  with	  wanting	  
a	  house	  and	  all	  these	  other	  things.	  I	  just	  told	  them	  to	  work	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  and	  build	  up	  towards	  
a	   house.	   We	   went	   down	   the	   track	   of	   bringing	   in	   the	   community	   by	   talking	   to	   churches	  
because	  churches	  are	  good	  over	  there.	  Other	  community	  groups	  and	  NGOs	  were	  helpful.	  We	  
got	  a	  kind	  of	  committee	  together	  and	  documented	  a	  common	  purpose	  so	  that	  they	  had	  goals.	  
Her	   work	   in	   this	   area	   is	   an	   example	   of	   the	   vital	   role	   that	   international	   police	   can	   play	   in	  encouraging	   and	   empowering	   locals	   to	   bring	   about	   change.	   It	   shows	   the	   lengths	   that	   are	  sometimes	  required	  of	  individual	  officers	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  able	  to	  reach	  beyond	  existing	  power	  structures	  and	  affect	  substantive	  progress	  for	  the	  people	  most	  in	  need.	  	  Much	  of	  this	  work	  rested	  upon	  a	  strong	  personal	  relationship	  between	  the	  officers	  and	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officer’s	  responses	  show	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  empathy	  for	  the	  women	  and	  the	  cause	  that	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  push:	  
The	   two	   main	   women	   that	   approached	   me	   had	   both	   been	   victims	   of	   family	   violence	  
themselves	   and	   one	   of	   them	  was	   still	   in	   that	  marriage.	   I	   became	   really	   good	   friends	  with	  
them	  and	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  with	  them	  and	  we	  would	  have	  good	  discussions	  about	  it.	  They	  
tried	  to	  make	  me	  understand	  that	  this	  was	  the	  way	  it	  was	  and	  that	  it	  wasn’t	  custom	  but	  that	  
it	  was	  accepted.	  But	  they	  could	  see	  that	  it	  wasn’t	  right	  ...[I]tried	  to	  instil	  in	  those	  women	  that	  
they	  actually	  could	  have	  a	  voice	  and	  could	  work	  towards	  making	  things	  better.	  
The	  case	  also	  demonstrates	  some	  of	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  this	  work.	  While	  the	  effort	  was	  genuine	  and	  there	  was	  a	  real	  desire	  for	  change	  from	  within	  the	  small	  group	  of	  women	  who	  raised	  the	  idea,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  there	  were	  significant	  obstacles	  in	  the	  way	  and	  that,	  ultimately,	  these	  obstacles	  would	   undermine	   the	   effort	   of	   the	   local	  women.	   According	   to	   the	  New	   Zealand	   Police	   officer	  involved,	  resistance	  came	  from	  several	  quarters.	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Local	  people,	  government	  officials,	   church	   leaders	  and	  even	  colleagues	  within	   the	  RSIPF	  were	  identified	  as	  being	   the	  primary	  barriers.	  The	   idea	  of	   a	   facility	   for	   victims	  of	   sexual	   abuse	  and	  domestic	   violence	   was	   a	   source	   of	   tension	   for	   those	   who	   favoured	   a	   more	   conservative	  approach	   to	   family	  and	  community	  relations.	  There	  was,	  according	   to	   the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officer	  involved,	  a	  real	  fear	  that	  the	  facility	  would	  undermine	  social	  harmonies	  by	  encouraging	  women	  to	  leave	  their	  families.	  She	  described	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation	  by	  saying:	  	  
[It	  was]	  the	  thought	  that	  maybe	  this	  was	  aimed	  at	  breaking	  families	  up,	  which	  is	  not	  unlike	  
how	  it	  is	  here.	  People	  think	  that	  all	  the	  refuges	  do	  is	  break	  families	  up.	  It	  wasn’t	  about	  that.	  
It	  was	  about	  providing	  a	  respite.	  In	  the	  refuge,	  they	  wanted	  to	  have	  counselling	  and	  medical	  
and	  psychological	  support	  that	  could	  help	  mend	  families	  but	  I	  guess	  it’s	  just	  the	  psyche.	  
The	  officer	  expressed	  her	  disappointment	  that	  the	  refuge	  facility	  was	  not	  able	  to	  be	  established,	  despite	   receiving	   funding	   from	   an	   Australian	   non-­‐government	   organisation.	   The	  disappointment	   left	   the	  officer	   sceptical	  of	   future	  progress	   in	  Solomon	   Islands	  and	  concerned	  for	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  women	  in	  that	  area.	  	  Cases	  such	  as	  these	   illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  that	  a	  community-­‐led	  policing	  model	  can	  have	   in	   engaging	   all	   parts	   of	   a	   community.	   The	   same	   actors	   that	   allow	   international	   police	  access	  to	  a	  community	  can	  also	  work	  to	  limit	  that	  community’s	  access	  to	  resources	  beyond	  their	  own.	   Such	   actions	   can	   have	   serious	   implications	   for	   the	   safety	   and	   security	   of	   those	  who	   are	  deprived	   but	   preventing	   them	   goes	   well	   beyond	   the	   mandate	   of	   international	   police.	   The	  example	   above	  highlights	   the	   flaw	   in	  using	   a	   community-­‐oriented	  model	   in	   a	   context	   such	   as	  this.	   Even	  when	   the	  model	   functions	  well,	   and	   local	   community	  members	   feel	   empowered	   to	  report	   concerns	   to	   international	   police,	   there	   remain	   powerful	   social	   and	   political	   structures	  seeking	   to	   preserve	   the	   status	   quo.	   For	   individual	   officers,	   this	   can	   be	   a	   disheartening	   and	  disillusioning	   process.	   Even	   well-­‐intentioned	   and	   well-­‐conceived	   initiatives,	   such	   as	   the	   one	  above,	  will	  struggle	  to	  survive	  if	  they	  challenge	  existing	  power	  structures	  in	  local	  communities.	  	  	  	  	  A	   further	   lesson	   to	   be	   drawn	   from	   these	   findings,	   however,	   is	   the	   value	   of	   strong	   personal	  relationships	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  trust	  (discussed	  further	  in	  the	  next	  section)	  that	  enables	  victims	  to	  feel	  comfortable	  with	  reporting	  their	  stories	  to	  international	  police.	  Much	  of	  RAMSI’s	  work	  has	  been	   dominated	   by	   international	   best	   practice	   on	   policing	   and	   peace-­‐building;	   combining	  strategies	   for	   institutional	   capacity	   development	   with	   well-­‐resourced	   and	   well-­‐organised	  personnel.	   The	   officers’	   efforts	   here	   demonstrated	   an	   ability	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   technical	  requirements	  of	  peace-­‐building	  and	  embrace	  the	  interpersonal	  component	  in	  a	  way	  not	  set	  out	  in	   any	   of	   RAMSI’s	   programmes.	   This	   required,	   more	   than	   anything,	   a	   strong	   personal	  commitment	   to	   the	  welfare	  and	  well-­‐being	  of	   local	  women.	  The	  officer’s	  ability	   to	   identify	   the	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issue	  and	  their	  commitment	  to	  seeing	  it	  resolved	  was	  crucial	  to	  improving	  the	  police	  service	  to	  a	  small,	  but	  vulnerable,	  group	  of	  women	  and	  children	   in	  Solomon	   Islands.	   In	   this	   respect,	  while	  the	  refuge	  centre	  may	  never	  have	  been	  established,	  the	  commitment	  shown	  by	  the	  officer	  may	  have	  had	  some	  success	  in	  empowering	  those	  women	  who	  may	  have	  otherwise	  said	  nothing	  of	  the	   abuse	   they	   suffered.	   In	   such	   a	   context,	   successes	   like	   these	   should	   serve	   to	   highlight	   the	  value	  officers	  who	  are	  willing	  and	  able	   to	  go	  beyond	   the	   technical	   components	  of	   community	  policing	   and	   embrace	   the	   personal	   element.	   It	   was	   this	   element	   that	   allowed	   the	   issue	   of	  domestic	  violence	  to	  be	  raised	  in	  a	  way	  that	  may	  have	  otherwise	  never	  occurred.	  	  	  Trust	  In	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  question	  two,	  the	  third	  research	  question,	  on	  trust,	  looks	  to	  understand	  what	  efforts	  were	  made	  by	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  to	  build	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  the	  community	  in	  which	  they	  operated.	  The	  question	  asks:	  	  
What	  efforts	  were	  made	  by	  the	  international	  police	  to	  overcome,	  alter	  or	  reinforce	  existing	  
perceptions	   of	   the	   police	   and	   how	   were	   these	   efforts	   adapted	   to,	   and	   affected	   by,	   local	  
context?	  
It	  builds	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  previous	  two	  questions	  but	  focuses	  in	  particular	  on	  how	  officers	  exercised	  and	  constrained	  their	  power	  and	  what	  they	  believed	  was	  an	  appropriate	  role	   for	  an	  international	  police	  officer	  to	  play	  in	  local	  Solomon	  Islands	  communities.	  	  Gaining	   a	   community’s	   trust	   can	   be	   challenging	   for	   police	   forces	   in	   any	   context.	   As	   outlined	  earlier,	   the	   community	   policing	   literature	   questioned	   the	   ability	   of	   police	   forces	   to	   overcome	  entrenched	  distrust	  and	  highlighted	  how	  existing	  perceptions	  of	  police	  can	  pose	  difficulties	  for	  officers	  trying	  to	  build	  relationships	  with	  the	  public.	  The	  issues	  are	  no	  less	  significant	  for	  New	  Zealand	   Police	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   where	   many	   in	   the	   RSIPF	   misused	   their	   power	   and,	   as	   a	  result,	  lost	  much	  of	  the	  people’s	  confidence.	  There	  is	  therefore	  a	  need	  for	  sensitivity	  on	  the	  part	  of	   foreign	  police	  as	  well	  as	  a	  recognition	  of	   the	  position	  of	  power	   they	  occupy	  over	   their	  host	  community.	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  whether	  international	  police	  officers	  will	  be	  treated	   with	   the	   same	   suspicion	   as	   their	   local	   counterparts	   or	   regarded	   highly	   by	   the	   local	  population	  because	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  independence.	  	  Since	  RAMSI’s	  arrival,	  trust	  in	  the	  police	  force	  has	  been	  measured	  by	  the	  Annual	  People’s	  Survey	  (see,	   for	   example:RAMSI	   2011).	   The	   surveys	   illustrate	   high	   levels	   of	   support	   for	   RAMSI’s	  presence	  in	  the	  country.	  A	  majority	  of	  people	  across	  Solomon	  Islands	  reported	  that	  they	  would	  be	  comfortable	  reporting	  a	  crime	  to	  the	  PPF.	  Trust	  in	  the	  RSIPF,	  however,	  remains	  relatively	  low	  with	  40	  per	   cent	  of	   respondents	   expressing	   reluctance	   to	   report	   crimes	   to	   them	  because	  of	   a	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belief	  that	  it	  will	  not	  bring	  about	  a	  satisfactory	  resolution	  (RAMSI	  2009).	  The	  number	  of	  people	  who	  believe	  that	  the	  RSIPF	  treat	  people	  fairly	  and	  with	  respect	  has	  steadily	  declined	  since	  2007	  (RAMSI	  2009).	  It	  is	  difficult	  for	  the	  RSIPF	  to	  operate	  effectively	  over	  the	  long-­‐term	  without	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  people	  and	  this	  continues	  to	  lag	  behind	  support	  for	  the	  PPF	  by	  a	  significant	  margin.	  	  Looking	  deeper	  into	  the	  issue	  reveals	  that	  trust	  figured	  very	  heavily	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  of	  RAMSI.	  Officers	  had	  to	  be	  constantly	  aware	  of	  the	  position	  of	  power	  they	  occupied	  and	  exercise	  their	  authority	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reassured,	  rather	  than	  threatened,	  the	  local	  population.	  In	  2005,	  an	  Australian	  Federal	  Police	  officer	  deployed	   in	  Solomon	   Islands,	  Louise	  Curragh,	   told	   reporters:	  "We	  are	  given	  a	  lot	  of	  power	  and	  authority.	  Sometimes	  we	  have	  to	  take	  a	  step	  back.	  We	  can't	  be	  dictators.	   Otherwise	  we	   could	   destroy	   this	   country	   (Dusevic	   2005).”	   It	   appears	   that	   a	   similar	  awareness	  prevailed	  within	   the	  New	  Zealand	   contingent	  with	   respondents	   stressing	   the	  need	  for	   international	   police	   to	   exercise	   caution	   and	   avoid	   exerting	   dominance	   both	   over	   the	   local	  community	   and	   local	   police.	   The	   concern	  was	   present	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   the	  mission.	  Minister	   of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  at	  the	  time	  Phil	  Goff	  highlighted	  the	  difficult	  balance	  that	  had	  to	  be	  achieved:	  	  
[Y]ou	  were	  always	  having	  to	  ask	  the	  question	  too;	  do	  we	  have	  the	  mandate	  actually	  to	  take	  
this	  next	  step	  because	  we	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  this	  country?	  This	   is	  not	  our	  country...	  we	  
had	  quite	  a	   lot	   of	   public	   sympathy	  but	  we	  knew	   that	   it	  was	   really	   important	   to	   keep	   that	  
broad	  public	  sympathy	  because	  if	  we	  ever	  lost	  that,	  then	  our	  position	  in	  the	  Solomons	  would	  
be	  pretty	  untenable.	  And	  I	  think	  RAMSI	  right	  through	  pretty	  much	  maintained	  that	  level	  of	  
on-­‐the-­‐ground	   public	   support	   for	   what	   we	   were	   trying	   to	   do.	   People	   understood	   that	   we	  
were	  there	  for	  the	  right	  reason	  not	  the	  wrong	  reason.	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  a	  similar	  attitude	  was	  present	  within	  the	  officers	  at	  the	  street	  level.	  Many	  expressed	  a	  sense	  of	  reluctance	  at	  having	  to	  police	  in	  that	  environment	  as	  they	  believed	  that,	  ethically,	  it	  was	  not	  their	  position	  to	  be	  doing	  so.	  	  In	  both	  their	  work	  as	  community	  officers	  and	  as	  mentors,	  officers	  found	  themselves	  in	  positions	  where	  they	  had	  to	  exercise	  caution	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	   imposing	  their	  values	  upon	   local	  people.	  Every	  day,	  police	  officers	  are	  forced	  to	  exercise	  discretion	  in	  their	  judgment.	  How	  to	  decide	  on	  such	  matters	  was	  complicated	  by	  a	  feeling	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  place	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  to	  be	  ruling	  on	  what	  were	  essentially	  issues	  of	  ‘right’	  and	  ‘wrong’.	  	  One	  officer,	  based	  in	  Kirakira,	  could	  see	  that	  there	  was	  some	  moral	  ambiguity	  about	  the	  work	  and	  spoke	  of	  the	  need	  for	  respect	  and	  tolerance	  when	  deployed	  in	  such	  a	  role:	  
In	  some	  ways	  it’s	  a	  kind	  of	  arrogance	  on	  our	  part	  to	  impose	  our	  values	  on	  their	  society	  but	  
that’s	  what	  we’re	  doing	  and	  that’s	  what	  we’re	  still	  doing.	  We’re	  still	  trying	  to	  get	  across	  that	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bashing	  your	  wife	  isn’t	  right.	  But	  it’s	  like	  telling	  a	  Catholic	  that	  the	  Buddhist	  faith	  is	  the	  right	  
way	  to	  go.	  It’s	  difficult	  to	  instil	  that	  and	  you	  can’t	  do	  it	  instantly.	  Even	  in	  our	  society	  now,	  we	  
still	  have	  guys	  that	  beat	  their	  wives.	  We’re	  not	  perfect.	  So	  how	  do	  you	  encourage	  that	   in	  a	  
population	  and	  a	  belief	  system	  that	  has	  had	  it	  for	  generations.	  You	  have	  to	  be	  tolerant	  about	  
those	  sorts	  of	  things.	  
Another	  described	  his	  approach	  by	  saying:	  	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  it’s	  their	  country.	  That’s	  what	  I	  tried	  to	  instil.	  I	  told	  them:	  “I’m	  here.	  I	  
don’t	  want	  to	  tell	  you	  what	  to	  do	  because	  it’s	  your	  country.	  You	  tell	  me	  what	  you	  need	  and	  I’ll	  
try	  and	  help	  you	  to	  get	  there.”	  
While	  the	  issue	  of	  trust	  was	  a	  difficult	  one	  for	  many	  officers,	  most	  felt	  they	  were	  able	  to	  build	  upon	  the	  positive	  esteem	  in	  which	  the	  mission	  was	  held.	  They	  went	  about	  this	  in	  various	  ways.	  It	   appears	   from	   their	   responses	   that	   their	   efforts	   to	   build	   trust	  were	   less	   about	   strategy	   and	  more	  about	  general	  sociability.	  This	  meant	  relying	  on	  basic	  social	  skills,	  rather	  than	  professional	  policing	   skills	   and	   involved	   conversing,	   interacting	   and	   playing	   with	   people	   as	   a	   way	   of	  reassuring	   them	  of	   their	  positive	   intentions.	  Travelling	   to	   remote	  villages,	   some	  of	  which	  had	  not	  been	  visited	  by	  a	  police	  officer	  for	  many	  years,	  was	  a	  small	  step	  taken	  by	  many	  officers	  but	  one	  which	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  in	  establishing	  a	  rapport	  between	  local	  people	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers.	  Once	  there,	  officers	  could	  make	  inquiries	  or	  seek	  out	  complainants	  but,	  in	  many	  cases,	  did	  little	  more	  than	  play	  football	  or	  “chew	  the	  fat”.	  In	  other	  places	  officers	  went	  beyond	  what	   would	   usually	   be	   expected	   of	   them	   as	   police	   and	   engaged	   communities	   in	   much	   more	  informal	  ways.	  These	  gestures,	  it	  seems,	  were	  crucial	  to	  establishing	  a	  rapport	  with	  local	  people	  and,	  through	  this,	  trust.	  Police	  Commissioner	  Peter	  Marshall	   spoke	  of	   the	   close	   affinity	  between	  New	  Zealand	  officers	  and	  Solomon	   Islanders	  and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   this	  was	  helped	  by	   the	  neighbourhood	  parties,	  discos	  and	  barbecues	  organised	  by	  the	  New	  Zealand	  contingent.	  For	  many,	  their	  work	  extended	  beyond	  their	  hours	  on-­‐duty,	  as	  the	  Police	  Commissioner	  describes:	  	  	  
As	   with	   most	   RAMSI	   Police	   representatives,	   New	   Zealanders	   did	   a	   lot	   in	   their	   own	   time,	  
raising	  money,	   organising	   books	   and	  medical	   supplies	   and	   there	  was	   an	   off-­‐duty	   element	  
which	  was	  very	  much	  appreciated.	  
Some	  officers	  spoke	  of	  bringing	  back	  local	  officers	  to	  the	  PPF	  base	  at	  Guadalcanal	  Beach	  Resort	  for	   a	   meal	   while	   others	   spent	   their	   time	   conversing	   with	   locals	   late	   at	   night.	   In	   these	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interactions	  it	  was	  often	  the	  most	  simple	  of	  gestures	  that	  were	  the	  most	  important.	  Officers	  felt	  comfortable	  that	  the	  way	  they	  treated	  local	  people	  would	  be	  reciprocated	  towards	  them.	  	  	  One	   officer’s	   experience	   in	   particular	   is	   testament	   to	   the	   value	   of	   this	   approach	   in	   gaining	  people’s	  trust.	  The	  officer,	  stationed	  in	  Malu’u,	  spoke	  of	  how	  a	  man	  named	  Alex	  came	  to	  form	  a	  strong	  bond	  with	  the	  officer,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Alex	  was	  known	  to	  have	  shot	  several	  people	  dead	   in	   a	   Honiara	   hospital	   and	   was	   wanted	   by	   the	   Australian	   Federal	   Police.	   Numerous	  operations	   led	   by	   the	  Australian	  military	   had	   failed	   to	   capture	   him	  due	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   local	  support,	  yet	  he	  continued	  to	  associate	  with	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officer,	  at	  one	  point	  taking	  him	  on	  a	  walk	  into	  the	  bush	  to	  show	  him	  the	  graves	  of	  former	  local	  chiefs.	  The	  officer	  described	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  relationship	  by	  saying:	  
Alex	  became	  a	  good	   friend	  of	  mine	  and	  he	  was	  quite	   valuable.	   I	  was	  getting	  quite	  a	   lot	  of	  
intel	  from	  him.	  I	  told	  him	  about	  this	  guy	  and	  he	  told	  me	  that	  he	  could	  get	  a	  meeting...	  All	  that	  
this	  guy	  wanted	  was	  his	  money	  and	  the	  police	  acknowledged	  that	  they	  owed	  him	  this	  money.	  
If	   he	   was	   paid,	   he	   would	   give	   himself	   up.	   I	   told	   Honiara	   that	   he	  would	   only	   speak	   to	  me	  
because	  of	  the	  trust.	  A	  few	  weeks	  later,	  an	  operation	  with	  helicopters	  and	  boats	  failed	  to	  find	  
him	  again.	  	  
Another	  officer	  described	  an	  effort	  he	  made	  to	  support	  a	  local	  Chief	  to	  encourage	  the	  youth	  in	  his	  village	  to	  play	  sport.	  	  
Soccer	  is	  very	  big	  over	  there.	  I	  spoke	  to	  the	  Chief	  and	  he	  wanted	  to	  get	  something	  going	  for	  
the	  youth	  who	  had	  nothing	  to	  do.	  So	  for	  two	  days,	  I	  took	  the	  RSIP	  guy	  and	  the	  Tongan	  guy	  
with	  me	  and	  we	  took	  all	  our	  tools	  out	  there.	  We	  had	  a	  weed-­‐whacker	  and	  spades	  and	  shovels	  
and	   had	   a	   working	   bee	   for	   two	   days.	   We	   turned	   a	   half-­‐size	   football	   field	   into	   a	   full-­‐size	  
football	  field	  that	  was	  flat.	  We	  must	  have	  shifted	  trailer-­‐loads	  of	  soil.	  And	  we	  cut	  trees	  down	  
and	  turned	  it	  into	  a	  beautiful	  big	  soccer	  field.	  We	  got	  the	  community	  involved	  and	  the	  youth	  
involved	  so	  it	  was	  good.	  
The	  officer’s	  experience	  demonstrates	  the	  very	  practical	  steps	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  build	  trust	  between	   an	   international	   police	   contingent	   and	   the	   host	   community.	   It	   also	   demonstrates,	  however,	   the	  numerous	  other	  benefits	  that	   flow	  from	  that	  relationship.	   In	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  officer	  noted	  the	  value	  inherent	  in	  getting	  the	  community	  involved	  in	  providing	  a	  facility	  for	  their	   young	   people.	   Through	   the	   rapport	   that	   had	   been	   established,	   local	   people	   felt	   more	  comfortable	  and	  more	  capable	  of	  engaging	  with	  him	  and	  his	  RSIPF	  counterparts:	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[W]ith	  the	  soccer	  field,	  I	  got	  people	  to	  talk	  because	  of	  it.	  That’s	  what	  it	  was	  all	  about.	  If	  there	  
was	  an	  issue,	  a	  lot	  of	  times	  they	  won’t	  tell	  you	  because	  they	  don’t	  know	  how	  you’ll	  react.	  
As	  with	  inequality	  and	  fairness,	   it	  was	  often	  what	  the	  officers	  did	  outside	  of	  their	  professional	  role	  that	  was	  the	  most	  valuable	  in	  engaging	  local	  communities.	  Here,	  lending	  a	  hand	  to	  establish	  a	  facility	  for	  local	  youth	  had	  implications	  far	  beyond	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  recreation	  area	  for	  youth.	  By	   encouraging	   people	   to	   talk,	   the	   effort	   helped	   to	   establish	   a	   more	   positive	   relationship	  between	   that	   community	   and	   the	   police,	   both	   national	   and	   international.	   Building	   these	  relationships	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  community	  policing	  model	  because	  they	  contribute	  positively	  to	  both	  community	  safety	  and	  development.	  In	  this	  case,	  however,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  there	  is	  also	  a	  positive	  flow-­‐on	  effect	  for	  peace-­‐building.	  While	  this	  effect	  was	  not	  directly	  measured	  here,	  the	  officer’s	   observations	   that	   people	   talked	  more	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   effort	   certainly	   provides	   an	  indication	   that	   this	   community-­‐oriented	   approach	   was	   encouraging	   the	   development	   of	   a	  stronger	   social	   network	   and,	   through	   this,	   contributing	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   sustainable	  peace.	  	  The	  finding	  also	  highlights	  the	  difficult	  nature	  of	  establishing	  trust	  between	  international	  police	  and	   local	   communities	   in	   that	   it	   cannot	  be	  easily	  achieved	   through	  any	  kind	  of	  programmatic	  design.	   The	   decentralised	   organisational	   structure	   (discussed	   below)	   certainly	   helped	   by	  stationing	  officers	  in	  remote	  communities	  and	  affording	  them	  the	  freedom	  to	  interact	  with	  local	  communities.	   However,	   it	   was	   the	   personal	   attributes	   and	   interpersonal	   skills	   of	   individual	  officers	   that	  was	   crucial	   to	   the	  development	  of	   trust.	   The	   simple	   act	   of	   treating	  people	   in	   the	  way	   that	   they	   themselves	  would	  expect	   to	  be	   treated	  may	  seem	  insignificant.	  But	   in	  a	  context	  where,	   historically,	   relationships	   between	   police	   and	   the	   community	   have	   been	   fragile,	   it	   is	  these	   simple	   gestures	   that	   have	   the	  most	   powerful	   effect.	   The	   finding	   highlights	   the	   need	   to	  deploy	   officers	   with	   these	   inter-­‐personal	   qualities;	   without	   officers	   like	   this,	   the	   more	  substantive	  work	  of	  community-­‐building	  is	  impossible.	  As	  one	  officer	  stated:	  	  
[O]ut	   in	   the	  outpost,	   it	  was	  community	  policing	  at	   its	  best.	  You	   look	  at	   things	   from	  a	   local	  
perspective	   and	   you	   start	   them	   down	   that	   track	   because	   controlling	   the	   streets	   is	   only	  
compliance;	  it’s	  not	  commitment.	  Cooperation	  and	  Coordination	  The	  final	  question	  asks:	  
How	   do	   international	   police	   officers	   manage	   their	   relationships	   with	   other	   contributing	  
agencies	  (including	  other	  national	  policing	  contingents,	  local	  police	  and	  military	  support)	  so	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as	   to	   ensure	   a	   consistent	   and	   co-­‐ordinated	   policing	   service	   is	   provided	   to	   the	   host	  
community?	  
It	  looks	  at	  the	  challenges	  of	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  faced	  by	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  in	   their	   interaction	   with	   other	   policing	   contingents.	   Deployed	   as	   both	   frontline	   staff	   or	   as	  advisors,	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   officers	   were	   tasked	   with	   building	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   Royal	  Solomon	   Islands	   Police	   Force;	   a	   task	   that	   involved	   not	   only	   the	   re-­‐building	   of	   organisational	  structures	   but	   also	   the	   re-­‐establishing	   of	   a	   professional	   police	   ethic	   throughout	   the	  organisation.	  	  
Capacity	  and	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  Royal	  Solomon	  Islands	  Police	  Force.	  Building	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   RSIPF	   has	   been	   one	   RAMSI’s	   primary	   goals	   since	   the	   mission’s	  deployment	  and	  this	  meant	  it	  was	  important	  that	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  built	  a	  productive	  professional	   relationship	   with	   those	   of	   the	   RSIPF.	   Coordinating	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	   two	  organisations	   and	   implementing	   a	   cohesive	   policing	   strategy,	   however,	   did	   prove	   challenging	  for	  many	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  here.	  	  Policing	   in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  both	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐conflict,	  has	  been	  affected	  by	   low	  institutional	  capacity	  and	  minimal	  state	  resourcing.	  While	  RAMSI	  was	  able	  to	  provide	  some	  support	   in	  this	  regard,	   the	   logistical	   challenges	   of	   deploying	   skilled	   staff	   and	   resources	   to	   remote	   locations	  across	   Solomon	   Islands	   meant	   that	   the	   RSIPF	   faced	   a	   severe	   shortage	   of	   equipment	   and	  competent	  officers.	  In	  remote	  outposts,	  officers,	  both	  local	  and	  international,	  struggled	  to	  reach	  villages	  within	  their	  jurisdiction	  due	  to	  the	  shortage	  of	  suitable	  transport	  and	  fuel.	  Many	  of	  the	  RSIPF	  staff	  lacked	  even	  basic	  Police	  equipment	  such	  as	  a	  notebook,	  pen	  or	  uniform.	  Computers	  were	  present	  in	  some	  outposts	  and	  could	  be	  used	  to	  type	  up	  reports,	  however,	  the	  lack	  of	  basic	  communication	   infrastructure	   meant	   they	   were	   of	   little	   benefit.	   One	   officer	   tasked	   with	  managing	  the	  Kukum	  Traffic	  Base	  told	  of	  how,	  of	  the	  31	  staff	  based	  there,	  only	  13	  had	  a	  driver’s	  licence.	   Most	   significant	   was	   the	   shortage	   of	   police	   housing,	   which	   officers	   were	   entitled	   to	  under	   their	   employment	   agreements.	   Commissioner	   Peter	   Marshall	   cited	   this	   as	   the	   most	  significant	   shortage	   limiting	   the	   development	   of	   a	   professional	   and	   capable	   police	   force	   in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  Not	  only	  did	  a	  lack	  of	  police	  housing	  undermine	  the	  operational	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  RSIPF,	  it	  also	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  wantok	  influences	  to	  be	  ameliorated.	  	  The	  shortages	  were	  a	  significant	  source	  of	   frustration	  for	  many	  New	  Zealand	  officers	  based	  in	  remote	   areas	   of	   Solomon	   Islands.	   They,	   along	   with	   the	   RSIPF	   counterparts,	   were	   more	   than	  willing	   to	   make	   the	   journey	   to	   remote	   communities	   if	   they	   had	   been	   provided	   with	   the	  appropriate	  means	  to	  do	  so:	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The	  biggest	  challenge	  was	  lack	  of	  resources.	  Because,	  unfortunately,	  the	  RSIP	  are	  not	  funded	  
to	  do	  their	  job.	  They	  just	  don’t	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  do	  it.	  Case	  in	  point	  was	  the	  boat	  [at	  my	  
outpost]	  in	  Lofung	  which	  was	  not	  suitable.	  I	  was	  there	  in	  October	  and	  their	  fuel	  had	  run	  out.	  
Their	   next	   allocation	   wasn’t	   until	   January.	   So	   from	   November	   to	   January,	   how	   are	   they	  
supposed	  to	  do	  their	   job	  when	  to	  do	   it	   they	  need	  a	  boat?	  They’ve	  got	  guys	  who	  are	  willing	  
and	  keen	  and	  able	  but	  they’re	  not	  resourced	  to	  do	  it.	  
The	  resource	  shortages	   faced	  by	  the	  RSIPF	  sat	  within	  a	  much	  broader	  set	  of	  challenges	   facing	  the	   justice	   system	   as	   a	   whole.	   New	   Zealand	   officers	   continually	   expressed	   frustration	   at	   the	  difficulty	  of	  proceeding	  with	   even	  minor	   charges	  knowing	   that	   the	   justice	   system	  was	   largely	  incapable	  of	  dealing	  with	  cases	  in	  a	  timely	  fashion.	  One	  officer,	  stationed	  in	  Rennell	  and	  Bellona,	  outlined	  the	  sense	  of	  futility	  that	  many	  officers	  expressed	  in	  their	  capacity	  development	  work:	  
Where	  we	  were,	  we	  would	  prosecute	  offenders	  [and]	  the	  travelling	  magistrate	  would	  come	  
round	  once	  or	  twice	  a	  year.	  You	  might	  have	  an	  offence	  that	  happened	  in	  January,	  that	  wasn’t	  
going	  to	  be	  heard	  until	  June.	  You	  would	  have	  to	  summons	  people	  to	  an	  unknown	  date.	  When	  
you	   found	   out	   when	   the	  Magistrate	   was	   going	   to	   turn	   up,	   you	   had	   to	   go	   around	   and	   re-­‐
summons	  everybody	  and	  if	  you	  wanted	  to	  get	  them	  to	  turn	  up,	  you	  would	  have	  to	  go	  and	  pick	  
them	   up,	   be	   they;	   witnesses,	   defendants,	   or	   victims.	   We	   could	   do	   that	   because	   we	   had	   a	  
Participating	  Police	  Force	  vehicle	  but	   the	  Solomon	   Islands	  Police	  Force	  did	  not	  have	   those	  
resources.	  So	  in	  terms	  of	  sustainability;	  it’s	  not	  sustainable.	  
Sustainability	  was	  a	   concern	   for	  many	  New	  Zealand	  officers	  who	   felt	   that	   the	   level	  of	   funding	  and	  resourcing	  required	   to	  sustain	   the	  system	  RAMSI	  was	  attempting	   to	  establish	  was	  simply	  unrealistic	  for	  Solomon	  Islands	  at	  that	  time.	  The	  support	  provided	  by	  Australia	  and	  other	  Pacific	  partners	  was	   acknowledged	   as	   being	  of	   huge	  benefit	   in	   the	   short-­‐term,	   however,	   few	  officers	  interviewed	   could	   see	  how	  RAMSI’s	   level	   of	  mobility	   and	   capability	   could	  be	  mirrored	  by	   the	  RSIPF	   on	   RAMSI’s	   withdrawal.	   Resources	   shortages	   and	   huge	   logistical	   challenges	   were,	   as	  highlighted	  above,	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  RSIPF	  but	   instead	  pervaded	  the	  wider	   justice	  system	  and	  indeed	  much	  of	  the	  public	  service.	  	  The	   logistics	   involved	   in	   resurrecting	   a	   functioning	   professional	   police	   force	   in	   such	   an	  institutionally	  weak	   and	   geographically	   disparate	   country	  meant	   that	   a	   lack	   of	   resources	  was	  not	  far	  from	  most	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers’	  experiences	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  However,	  what	  featured	  even	  more	  strongly	  in	  the	  accounts	  from	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  was	  a	  serious	  lack	  of	  confidence	  among	  both	  frontline	  and	  management	  staff	  in	  the	  RSIPF.	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The	   morale	   of	   the	   force	   had	   been	   severely	   undermined	   during	   the	   violent	   period	   of	   the	  Tensions.	  Former	  Police	  Commissioner	  Peter	  Marshall	  described	  the	  poor	  state	  that	  the	  RSIPF	  was	  in	  upon	  RAMSI’s	  arrival:	  
[T]hey	  were	  pretty	  bruised	  and	  battered	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  very	  recent	  2003	  culmination	  of	  
the	   Tension	   period	   and	   these	   were	   people	   who	   had	   turned	   on	   themselves.	   The	   former	  
Commissioner	   had	   been	   assassinated	   in	   Auki	   by	   a	  man	   called	   Sae	  who	   is	   still	   on	   the	   run.	  
There	   were	   all	   sorts	   of	   beatings	   by	   Police	   officers	   against	   other	   Police	   officers	   and	  
communities	  against	  Police	  officers....	   [During	  the	  Tensions]	  the	  RSIPF	  had	  been	  directly	  or	  
indirectly,	   legitimately	  or	   illegitimately,	  responsible	   for	  the	  deaths	  of	  around	  30-­‐50	  people,	  
shootings	  and	  so	  forth...	  So	  they	  were	  a	  dispirited,	  dysfunctional,	  defeated	  organisation.	  	  
Most	   frontline	  officers	   interviewed	  agreed	   that	  officer	  morale	  within	   the	  RSIPF	  was	  very	   low.	  Because	  of	   the	   lack	  of	  morale	   (and	   in	  many	   cases	  because	  of	   a	   lack	  of	  pay),	   officers	  had	   little	  motivation	   to	   commit	   to	   their	   role	   in	   a	   professional	   manner.	   In	   turn,	   the	   community’s	  expectations	   of	   the	   RSIPF	  were	   low,	  meaning	   that	   there	  was	   little	   consequence	   for	   staff	  who	  failed	  to	  perform	  their	  duties	  in	  a	  professional	  manner.	  As	  one	  officer	  stated:	  	  
When	   I	   first	  arrived;	   the	   staff	   sometimes	   turned	  up,	   they	  were	   sometimes	   in	  uniform,	   they	  
sometimes	  stayed	  all	  day,	  and	  sometimes	  they	  did	  some	  work.	  	  
Rather	   than	   dismiss	   this	   as	   laziness	   or	   incompetence,	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   saw	   the	   lack	   of	  enthusiasm	   as	   stemming	   from	   a	   lack	   of	   confidence;	   that	   is,	  many	   RSIPF	   staff	   felt	   themselves	  incapable	  of	  performing	  the	  tasks	  they	  had	  been	  trained	  to	  do.	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	  work	   of	  many	  New	   Zealand	   Police	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   became	  more	   about	  confidence-­‐building	  than	  capacity-­‐building.	  Most	  officers	  interviewed	  said	  that	  while	  there	  were	  shortages	  of	  skills	  and	  resources	  in	  some	  areas,	  their	  primary	  goal	  was	  to	  encourage	  individual	  officers	  so	  that	  they	  felt	  capable	  to	  conduct	  the	  work	  required	  of	  them.	  They	  noted	  local	  officers	  often	  knew	  how	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  task	  but	  lacked	  the	  impetus	  to	  perform	  it	  themselves.	  Leadership	  was	   often	   poor	  with	  management-­‐level	   officers	   having	   little	   control	   over	   their	   staff	   and	   very	  little	  motivation	  to	  improve	  the	  service	  provided	  to	  the	  community.	  	  In	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases,	  the	  impressions	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  had	  of	  local	  police	  were	  very	  positive,	  and	  often	  reflected	  a	  personal	  investment	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  RSIPF	  officers	  they	  dealt	  with.	  One	  officer,	  working	  in	  forensics,	  said	  this	  of	  his	  RSIPF	  counterparts:	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What	  I	   found	  mostly	  was	  that	  they	  were	  very	  intelligent	  and	  they	  picked	  up	  on	  things	  very	  
quickly.	  But	  whether	  they	  had	  the	  gumption	  to	  take	  it	  any	  further	  was	  another	  matter.	  A	  lot	  
of	  the	  time,	  they	  relied	  on	  other	  people	  to	  do	  it.	  
In	   cases	   such	   as	   this,	   the	   ability	   to	  mentor,	   rather	   than	  direct,	   local	   staff	   became	   increasingly	  important	  as	  a	  way	  of	  building	  self-­‐confidence	  within	  individual	  officers	  and,	  through	  this,	   the	  capacity	   of	   the	   organisation	   as	   a	  whole.	   This	  mentoring	   role	  was	   described	   by	   one	   officer	   as	  such:	  
Often	  you	  would	  go	  to	  an	  incident	  and	  they	  would	  want	  you	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  role.	  But	  I	  would	  
guide	   them	   through	   how	   to	   do	   it.	   I	   remember	   one	   wanted	   me	   to	   take	   a	   statement	   but	  
because	  he	  was	  so	  quiet	  and	  didn’t	  have	  any	  confidence,	  I	  got	  him	  to	  do	  it	  with	  me	  there.	  He	  
was	   really	   happy	   after	   that.	   He	   sort	   of	   felt	   that	   he	   had	   really	   accomplished	   something.....I	  
think	   passing	   on	   knowledge	   and	   skills	   and	   letting	   them	   know	   that	   they	   can	   do	   the	   job	   –	  
building	   their	   confidence	   -­‐	   [was	   my	   biggest	   success].	   And	   I	   saw	   it	   in	   some	   of	   the	   guys	   I	  
worked	  with	   in	  the	  Solomon	  Islands	  Police.	   I	  got	   the	   impression	  when	  I	   left	   that	   they	  were	  
better	  police	  officers	  than	  they	  were	  before	  RAMSI	  got	  there	  and	  I	  hope	  that	  carries	  on.	  	  
Another	  officer,	  based	  at	  the	  Kukum	  Traffic	  Base,	  described	  running	  a	  traffic	  check	  point	  outside	  the	  station	  every	  morning.	  The	  check	  point,	  the	  officer	  described,	  was	  of	  little	  practical	  benefit	  as	   offenders	   were	   unlikely	   to	   be	   caught	   in	   that	   location.	   It	   was,	   however,	   a	   way	   for	   officers	  stationed	  there	  to	  become	  accustomed	  to	  proactively	  engaging	  with	  the	  community;	  proving	  to	  both	  themselves	  and	  the	  wider	  public	  that	  they	  could	  perform	  the	  tasks	  required	  of	  them.	  This	   focus	  on	   confidence-­‐building	  meant	   encouraging	  officers	   to	   take	  pride	   in	   their	  work	  and	  strive	  to	  meet	  the	  standards	  expected	  of	  them	  as	  a	  professional	  police	  force.	  It	  required	  officers	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  technical	  and	  organisational	  components	  of	  capacity	  development	  and	  show	  a	  personal	   commitment	   to	   the	   professional	   development	   of	   individual	   officers;	   a	   commitment	  which	  flowed	  not	  from	  policy	  or	  strategic	  directives	  but,	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases,	  from	  the	  close	  rapport	  between	  RSIPF	  officers	  and	  their	  New	  Zealand	  advisors.	  	  While	  there	  was	  much	  that	  challenged	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  in	  their	  role,	  the	  personal	  bonds	  between	  themselves	  and	  the	  RSIPF	  staff	  they	  advised	  enabled	  them	  to	  navigate	  much	  easier	  the	  complex	   political	   and	   bureaucratic	   environment	   in	   which	   the	   mission	   was	   conducted.	   These	  complexities	  were	   particularly	   acute	   for	   some	   of	   the	   female	   officers	   interviewed.	   One	   female	  staff	  noted	   that	   the	  gender	  divide	  appeared	   to	  be	  significant	   for	  some	  of	   the	  men	  she	  worked	  with.	  She	  stated:	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Some	  of	  the	  men	  weren’t	  as	  friendly.	  The	  ones	  I	  worked	  with	  certainly	  were	  but	  if	  there	  was	  a	  
crossover	  with	  the	  different	  sections	  that	  I	  didn’t	  get	  to	  work	  with	  very	  often	  then	  they	  were	  
just	  a	  bit	  reserved.	  Not	  unfriendly,	  just	  reserved.	  It	  could	  have	  been	  the	  female	  thing.	  	  
As	   with	   other	   challenges,	   however,	   the	   solution	   often	   came	   down	   to	   relationship-­‐building.	  Another	  female	  officer	  described	  her	  situation	  by	  saying:	  
I	  was	  concerned	  about	  going	  into	  a	  situation	  where	  I	  had	  a	  Solomon	  Islander,	  an	  older	  male	  
with	  rank	   in	  the	  Police	   force,	  and	  I	  was	  supposed	  to	  go	   in	  as	  an	  advisor,	  and	  as	  a	  younger	  
woman,	  and	  tell	  him	  what	  he	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  doing.	  We	  worked	  around	  that.	  In	  terms	  of	  
managing	   that	   situation,	   it	  was	  about	   relationship-­‐building	   initially.	  That	  meant	   trying	   to	  
get	  him	  onside.	  After	  that	  I	  tried	  to	  avoid	  being	  directive.	  So	  rather	  than	  saying	  “This	  is	  what	  
needs	  to	  happen...”,	  I	  would	  approach	  it	  in	  a	  less	  direct	  way	  and	  we	  would	  have	  a	  discussion	  
about	  what	  we	  would	   like	  to	  see	  happening	  and	  what	  changes	  could	  be	  made	  to	  make	  the	  
job	  easier.	  
The	  everyday	  challenges	  of	  operating	  as	  an	  international	  police	  officer	  were	  often	  mitigated	  due	  to	  the	  support	  provided	  by	  local	  counterparts.	  In	  turn,	  it	  was	  only	  with	  the	  trust	  and	  respect	  of	  RSIPF	  staff	  that	  officers	  found	  they	  were	  able	  to	  make	  progress	  in	  improving	  the	  functioning	  of	  local	  police	  stations	  and	  ultimately	  advance	  the	  mission’s	  goals.	  	  These	   personal	   bonds	   between	   international	   and	   local	   staff	   transcend	   strategic	   or	   tactical	  considerations	   but	   were	   crucial	   to	   the	   maintenance	   of	   peace	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   and	   the	  progression	  of	  RAMSI’s	  mandate.	   In	   cases	   such	   as	   Solomon	   Islands,	  where	   fragile	   institutions	  and	   decentralised	   command	   structures	   have	   in	   the	   past	   allowed	   for	   the	   denigration	   of	  professionalism	   and	   the	   disintegration	   of	   organisational	   unity,	   these	   personal	   relationships	  formed	  the	  bond	  that	  tied	  individual	  officers	  to	  the	  staff	  they	  worked	  alongside.	  While	  they	  may	  seem	  insignificant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  the	  RSIPF	  and	  Solomon	  Islands	  as	  a	  whole,	  in	  many	  cases	  it	  appears	  that	  these	  personal	  bonds	  were	  the	  only	  link	  between	  RAMSI’s	  peace-­‐building	  mandate	  and	  local	  community	  life	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  	  The	  simple	  act	  of	   imbuing	  officers	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging	  within	  Police	  culture	  was	  of	  vital	  importance	   in	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  professional	  ethic	  within	  the	  RSIPF.	   In	  strategic	  terms,	   it	  forms	   part	   of	   the	   intangible,	   and	   often	   unseen,	   challenges	   of	   capacity	   development	   but	   one	  which	  can	  ultimately	  determine	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  mandate.	  In	  Solomon	  Islands,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  role	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  played	  in	  building	  relationships,	  both	  on-­‐	  and	  off-­‐duty,	  provided	  a	  first	  step	  for	  the	  RSIPF	  that	  could	  not	  have	  easily	  been	  achieved	  using	  technical	  models	  or	  best-­‐practice	  peace-­‐building	   templates.	  This	  personal	  component	  was,	   in	  many	  ways,	  an	   incidental	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outcome	  of	  the	  mission	  but	  one	  which	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  crucially	  important	  in	  establishing	  the	   impetus	   for	   progress	   and	   change	   within	   the	   professional	   ethic	   of	   the	   RSIPF	   and	   the	  communities	  they	  serve.	  	  
Coordination,	  Compatibility	  and	  the	  Community	  Policing	  Ethic	  While	   the	   interface	   between	   international	   and	   local	   police	   was	   of	   critical	   importance	   to	   the	  ongoing	  success	  of	  the	  mission’s	  work,	  more	  immediate	  challenges	  lay	  in	  how	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  coordinated	  and	  coherent	  policing	  style	  within	  the	  PPF	  itself.	  While	  these	  challenges	  are	  often	  of	  a	   logistical	   or	   administrative	   nature,	   the	   focus	   here	   is	   on	   the	   compatibility	   between	   different	  approaches	  to	  community	  and	  community-­‐building.	  For	  New	  Zealand	  Police,	  the	  challenge	  lay	  in	  integrating	   their	  understanding	  of	  community	  policing	   into	   that	  of	   the	  much	   larger	  Australian	  contingent,	  represented	  primarily	  by	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police.	  	  The	   task	  of	   integrating	  various	  national	  contingents	  under	  one	  mission	  mandate	   is	  a	  common	  problem	  facing	  missions	  of	  this	  kind	  (Rubinstein	  et	  al.	  2008),	  and	  one	  that	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  frontline.	   At	   a	   planning	   level,	   former	  Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Phil	   Goff,	   spoke	   of	   how	   the	  relationship	   between	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand,	   as	   it	   pertained	   to	   the	   conflict	   in	   Solomon	  Islands,	   had	   always	   been	   a	   cooperative	   one.	   The	   Minister	   worked	   closely	   with	   Australian	  Foreign	   Minister,	   Alexander	   Downer,	   to	   devise	   an	   appropriate	   response	   to	   the	   violence	   and	  build	   regional	   support	   for	   the	   action.	   Concerns	   regarding	   Australian	   dominance	   have	   been	  voiced	   in	   various	   forums	   since	   the	   outset	   of	   the	  mission	   and	   there	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   an	  element	  of	  this	  at	  the	  planning	  level	  with	  the	  former	  Minister,	  Phil	  Goff,	  commenting:	  
I	   think	   that	   the	  Australian	  government	  was	  worried	  at	   the	   time	   that	  we	  were	  going	   to	  do	  
another	  Bougainville.	  I	  don’t	  know	  why	  they	  were	  worried	  about	  that	  because	  what	  we	  did	  
in	   Bougainville	   had	   been	   incredibly	   effective.	   But	   the	   Australians	   felt	   they	   were	   the	   pre-­‐
eminent	  country	  in	  the	  Pacific	  and	  really	  it	  was	  their	  responsibility	  and	  that	  they	  should	  be	  
doing	   it.	  So	  that	  created	  a	   little	  bit	  of	   tension.	  But	  we	  worked	  closely	  with	  the	  Australians.	  
They	  were	  able	  to	  do	  what	  we	  couldn’t	  do	  because	  they	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  do	  it.	  
A	  further	  issue	  was	  the	  identification	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  by	  way	  of	  a	  ‘Kiwi’	  badge;	  a	  symbol	  used	  widely	  by	  both	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  and	  military	  when	  deployed	  abroad.	  There	  appears	  to	   have	   been	   some	   trepidation	   at	   the	   planning	   level	   regarding	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   being	  identified	  in	  such	  a	  way.	  Former	  Police	  Commissioner	  Peter	  Marshall	  stated:	  	  
They	  wore	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  uniform.	  They	  wore	  the	  RAMSI	  insignia	  but	  they	  also	  had	  
the	   big	   kiwi	   to	   identify	   them	   as	   being	   Kiwi/New	   Zealand	   Police	   officers.	   This	   was	   an	  
important	   point	   from	   our	   position.	   Initially	   there	   was	   some	   sort	   of	   discussion	   from	   the	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RAMSI	  administration	  as	  to	  whether	  New	  Zealand	  should	  have	  the	  kiwi	  but	  we	  insisted	  upon	  
it	  and	  that	  was	  good.	  
As	   is	  discussed	  below,	   the	  badge	  became	  an	   important	  point	  of	  difference	  between	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  staff	  and	  one	  that	  was	  easily	  identified	  by	  the	  local	  community.	  Despite	  this	  difference,	  the	  Commissioner	  spoke	  highly	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police	  (as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  other	  national	  contingents)	  and	  commended	  their	  leadership	  of	  the	  mission	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  At	   the	   street	   level,	   the	   advanced	   operational	   compatibility	   of	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   and	  Australian	  Federal	  Police	  was	  critical	  to	  securing	  the	  security	  situation	  and	  maintaining	  order	  in	  areas	  previously	  dominated	  by	   the	  militias.	  New	  Zealand	  officers	   interviewed	   spoke	  highly	  of	  the	  competency	  and	  capabilities	  of	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police	  as	  well	  as	  those	  officers	  from	  other	   Pacific	   contingents.	   The	   operation	   as	   a	   whole	   was	   well	   resourced	   by	   the	   Australian	  military	   and	   many	   New	   Zealand	   officers	   told	   how	   much	   of	   their	   work	   would	   have	   been	  impossible	  without	  the	  support	  of	  their	  Australian	  counterparts,	  both	  military	  and	  civilian.	  The	  compatibility	  between	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  police	  contingents	  is	  reflective	  of	  a	  history	  of	   close	   ties	   between	   the	   two	   organisations	   and,	   more	   broadly,	   the	   overarching	   context	   of	  collegiality	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  However,	   while	   operational	   and	   organisational	   compatibility	   was	   achieved	   and	   maintained	  throughout	   the	  operation,	   it	   seems	   that	  a	   consistent	  approach	   to	  community	  engagement	  and	  capacity	  development	  was	  more	  difficult	   to	  attain.	  Many	  of	   the	  officers	   interviewed	  discussed	  the	   differences	   in	   approach	   to	   community	   policing	   between	   themselves	   and	   the	   Australian	  Federal	  Police.	  They	  believed	  the	  AFP	  officers	  were	  less	  popular	  with	  both	  the	  local	  community	  and	   the	  RSIPF.	  One	  officer,	   tasked	  with	  visiting	  villages	   across	   the	  Weather	  Coast,	   had	   this	   to	  say:	  
It	  was	  unique	   to	   find	  myself	   in	   the	  position	  of	  Team	  Leader	  on	   the	  Weather	  Coast	  and	   it’s	  
purely	   because	   the	   locals	   preferred	   to	   deal	   with	   Kiwis	   as	   opposed	   to	   Australians.	   They	  
weren’t	   shy	   in	   saying	   that	   they	   were	   arrogant	   and	   that	   they	   didn’t	   like	   them.	   There	   was	  
certainly	  ill-­‐feeling	  towards	  the	  Australians	  who	  were	  trying	  to	  tell	  them	  what	  to	  do.	  I	  think	  
they	  saw	  us	  as	  being	  a	  bit	  different.	  We’re	  not	  big	  brother,	  we’re	  not	  right	  next	  door,	  we	  don’t	  
have	  a	  vested	  interest,	  and	  we’re	  more	  approachable.	  That	  was	  the	  view	  that	  I	  got	  from	  the	  
Chiefs	  that	  I	  was	  dealing	  with.	  	  
A	   ‘dictatorial’	   policing	   style	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   enthusiasm	   to	   engage	   the	   community,	   participants	  believed,	   was	   the	   main	   cause	   for	   the	   poor	   reputation	   of	   Australian	   Police	   among	   the	   local	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population:	   “They	   would	   come	   in	   and	   say	   ‘[T]his	   is	   how	   you	   do	   things’”.	   Some	   officers	   also	  highlighted	  the	  experience	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  have	  had	  in	  working	  in	  and	  with	  a	  multi-­‐cultural	  society.	  They	  stated	  that,	   in	  general	  terms,	  New	  Zealanders	  are	  more	  familiar	  engaging	  people	  from	   different	   cultures,	   namely	   Maori	   and	   Pacific	   Island,	   and	   this	   helped	   when	   it	   came	   to	  interacting	  with	  local	  Solomon	  Islanders.	  One	  officer,	  of	  Polynesian	  descent,	  commented:	  
For	   me,	   we	   were	   there	   to	   win	   hearts	   and	   minds	   but	   because	   I	   come	   from	   a	   Polynesian	  
background,	  it	  did	  help	  to	  open	  doors.	  Just	  being	  a	  Maori	  and	  a	  Kiwi	  opened	  so	  many	  doors.	  
We	  used	  to	  have	  kiwis	  painted	  on	  our	  trucks	  and	  it	  took	  a	  while	  until	  the	  Australians	  realised	  
that	  the	  only	  trucks	  not	  getting	  bottles	  thrown	  at	  them	  were	  the	  Kiwi	  ones...But	  that	  was	  the	  
sort	  of	  privilege	  that	  the	  Kiwis	  worked	  with.	  	  
It	  was	  a	   similar	   situation	   for	  officers	  with	  no	  Polynesian	  or	  Maori	   ancestry	  yet	  who	  wore	   the	  Kiwi	  badge	  on	  their	  uniform:	  
I	  think	  that’s	  what	  made	  my	  job	  easy	  because	  I	  had	  a	  Kiwi	  on	  my	  uniform.	  As	  soon	  as	  people	  
saw	  that,	  there	  was	  a	  different	  attitude	  towards	  you.	  Even	  though	  I	  was	  a	  white,	  bald	  guy;	  it	  
didn’t	  matter	  as	  long	  as	  I	  had	  a	  Kiwi.	  They	  knew	  they	  could	  talk	  to	  me	  because	  they	  knew	  I	  
would	  listen.	  
Most	  officers	  said	  the	  kiwi	  badges	  they	  wore	  were	  their	  greatest	  asset	  as	  it	  had	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	   how	   they	   were	   perceived	   by	   the	   locals.	  With	   the	   RSIPF,	   Australian	   officers	   tended	   to	   get	  frustrated	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  action	  from	  the	  local	  officers	  and,	  in	  response,	  would	  either	  become	  demanding	  or	  lose	  interest	  in	  capacity-­‐building.	  	  The	   differing	   experiences	   between	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   in	   this	   regard	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   need	   for	   cultural	   sensitivity	   and	   understanding	   is	   paramount	   when	  deployed	   in	   a	   role	   such	   as	   this.	   It	   also	   further	   reinforces	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  mutual	   respect	   between	   international	   and	   local	   staff.	   Many	   officers	   told	   of	   how	   they	   felt	  reluctant	  to	  be	  deployed	  in	  a	  role	  that	  saw	  them	  advising	  Solomon	  Islanders	  on	  how	  to	  police	  their	  own	  communities.	  They	  stressed,	  however,	  that	  conflict	  was	  avoided	  because	  of	  the	  regard	  in	  which	  they	  were	  held	  by	  local	  communities	  and	  because	  of	  the	  regard	  in	  which	  they	  held	  local	  staff.	  The	  point	  was	  made	  well	  by	  one	  officer	  who	  commented:	  
You’re	   working	   in	   an	   environment	   where	   you	   have,	   literally,	   strangers	   coming	   into	   your	  
country	  and	  telling	  you	  to	  do	  your	  job	  a	  particular	  way,	  which	  often	  conflicts	  with	  what	  you	  
have	   always	   known.	   Our	   attitudes	   to	   crime	   and	   social	   conflicts	   differ	   significantly	   from	  
theirs.	  That	  message	  isn’t	  going	  to	  get	  across	  without	  a	  degree	  of	  respect.	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Again,	   the	   findings	   here	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   looking	   beyond	   the	   technical	   aspects	   of	  capacity-­‐development	   and	   peace-­‐building.	   In	   logistical	   and	   operational	   terms,	   the	   Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  contingents	  were	  well	  coordinated.	  Achieving	  this	  kind	  of	  coherence	  in	  regard	   to	   their	   respective	   approaches	   to	   community	   policing	   was	   much	   more	   difficult	   and	  created	   a	   noticeable	   discrepancy	   in	   the	   two	   forces	  were	   treated	   by	   the	   local	   population.	   The	  close	  personal	  rapport	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  had	  with	  the	  RSIPF	  staff	  and	  with	  the	  local	  population	  went	  some	  way	  towards	  ameliorating	  the	  challenges	  they	  faced	  as	  an	  international	  police	  force	  in	  a	  diverse	  and	  fragile	  local	  context.	  	  Conclusion	  The	  analysis	  produced	  mixed	  results	  in	  answer	  to	  the	  questions	  posed	  in	  the	  literature	  review.	  In	  some	  areas,	  the	  issues	  raised	  in	  the	  wider	  literature	  could	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  experiences	  of	  New	  Zealand	   Police	   officers	   deployed	   in	   Solomon	   Islands.	   The	   difficulties	   of	   achieving	   a	   coherent	  approach	  to	  community	  engagement	  across	  the	  mission	  is	  one	  example	  in	  which	  the	  literature’s	  concern	  appears	  warranted.	  A	  further	  example	  is	  that	  whereby	  officers	  sought	  to	  seek	  out	  the	  Chiefs	  or	  Big	  Men	  in	  a	  village	  before	  speaking	  to	  the	  others.	  While	   it	  appears	  that	  such	  efforts	  were	   driven	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   respect	   local	   cultures,	   there	   remains	   the	   potential	   for	   such	   an	  approach	  to	  send	  a	  powerful	  message	  to	  those	  not	  in	  positions	  of	  authority,	  notably	  women	  and	  children,	  as	  to	  their	  role	  in	  the	  peace-­‐building	  process.	  	  In	  other	   areas,	   there	  appears	   to	  be	   less	   cause	   for	   concern	  based	  on	   the	   information	  provided	  here.	   A	   key	   concern	   raised	   in	   the	   literature	   was	   the	   potential	   for	   a	   community-­‐oriented	  international	  force	  to	  further	  entrench	  simplistic	  social	  boundaries	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  contribute	  to	  harmful	   forms	  of	   social	   cohesion.	   Instead,	   officers	   showed	  a	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	   the	  complexities	   and	   diversity	   of	   local	   communities.	   They	   identified	   the	   key	   hallmarks	   of	   local	  communities	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   these	   changed	   from	   village	   to	   village.	   They	   also	   made	  observations	   regarding	   how	   these	   communities	  were	   undergoing	   change	   in	   response	   to	   both	  internal	   and	   external	   influences.	   This	   understanding	   was	   important,	   not	   only	   for	   avoiding	  conflict,	   but	   also	   for	   gaining	   trust.	   Many	   of	   the	   officers	   spoke	   of	   the	   closeness	   between	  themselves	  and	  the	  communities	  they	  worked	  in.	  The	  relationship	  was	  based	  on	  simple	  gestures	  and	  personal	  touches.	  There	  were	  concerns	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  international	  police	  to	  overcome	   existing	   negative	   attitudes	   towards	   the	   Police,	   given	   the	   history	   of	  mistrust	   in	   the	  RSIPF.	  While	  there	  will	  always	  be	  issues	  in	  this	  regard,	  the	  examples	  highlighted	  here	  served	  to	  allay	   much	   of	   the	   concern	   in	   this	   regard.	   The	   lengths	   officers	   went	   to	   to	   support	   these	  communities	   demonstrates	   the	   importance	   of	   people	   in	   the	   peace-­‐building	   process.	   	   This	  finding,	  as	  well	  as	  others,	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  concluding	  chapter.	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Conclusion	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  was	  to	  understand	  more	  about	  the	  experience	  of	  individual	  police	  officers	  deployed	  as	  part	  of	  an	  international	  post-­‐conflict	  peace-­‐building	  mission.	  Where	  other	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  theoretical	  and	  logistical	  implications	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  policing,	  few	  studies	   have	   looked	   into	   how	   police	   staff	   on	   the	   ground	   deal	   with	   the	   changes	   in	   role	   and	  responsibility.	  	  The	  Regional	  Assistance	  Mission	  to	  Solomon	  Islands	  was	  used	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  examine	  how	  officers	   from	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   adapted	   and	   engaged	   with	   the	   unique	   social,	   political	   and	  cultural	  environment	  presented	  to	  them	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  To	  assess	  this,	  an	  effort	  was	  made	  to	   explore	   in	   some	   depth	   both	   the	   context	   of	   community	   life	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   and	   the	  components	  of	  the	  policing	  style	  that	  defined	  much	  of	  RAMSI’s	  work.	  	  The	   first	   chapter,	   “Communities	   and	  Conflict	   in	   Solomon	   Islands”,	   spent	   some	   time	   reviewing	  Solomon	   Islands’	   recent	   history	   and	   analysing	   various	   perspectives	   on	   the	   sources	   of	   violent	  conflict	   that	   came	   to	   a	   head	   in	   1998.	   The	   chapter	   found	   that,	   contrary	   to	   the	   common	  media	  portrayal	  of	   the	  conflict,	  ethnicity	  was	  a	  poor	  explanation	  for	  the	  sources	  of	  grievance	  and	  for	  the	   inability	   of	   the	   conflict	   to	   be	   contained.	   Instead,	   it	   was	   the	   culmination	   of	   a	   number	   of	  political	   and	   economic	   factors	   that	   served	   to	   empower	   certain	   factions	   within	   the	   Solomon	  Islands	   public	   sphere.	   Politically,	   governments	   remained	   remote	   from	   the	   people	   they	  controlled	   and	   their	   survival	   often	   relied	   on	   a	   tenuous	   coalition	   of	   disparate,	   sometimes	  divergent,	   interests.	   Economically,	   decades	   of	   foreign	   ownership	   of	   primary	   industry	   had	  created	   an	   unsustainable	   cycle	   of	   extraction.	   The	   economy	   provided	   little	   in	   the	   way	   of	  government	  revenue	  or	  export	  earnings	   for	   the	   fragile	  Solomon	   Islands	  state.	   It	  did,	  however,	  have	   a	   powerful	   social	   effect	   by	   encouraging	   the	   large-­‐scale	   migration	   of	   Malaitans	   to	  Guadalcanal.	  The	  influx	  placed	  strain	  on	  traditional	  land	  ownership	  systems	  and	  saw	  the	  fabric	  of	  many	  small	  Guale	  communities	  torn	  by	  land	  sales	  that	  did	  not	  account	  for	  customary	  rights	  or	  the	  long-­‐term	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  community.	  	  With	   time,	   a	   small	   group	  of	  Guale	  politicians,	   led	  by	  Ezekiel	  Alebua,	  made	  use	  of	   the	  growing	  sense	  of	  unease	  regarding	  Guadalcanal’s	  changing	  social	  and	  cultural	  landscape.	  The	  formation	  of	   the	  Guadalcanal	  Revolutionary	  Army	  (later	   the	   Isatabu	  Freedom	  Movement)	  was	  a	   catalyst	  not	   only	   for	   violent	   conflict	   but	   also	   for	   the	   development	   of	   an	   ethnic	   frame	   as	   a	   vehicle	   for	  explaining	  that	  conflict.	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Multiple	  factors	  contributed	  to	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  the	  ethnic	  frame	  to	  explain	  the	  increasing	  violence.	  The	  formation	  of	  the	  Malaitan	  Eagle	  Force,	  again	  a	  loose	  coalition	  of	  diverse	  actors	  and	  interests,	  created	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  fundamental	  divide	  between	  the	  residents	  of	  Malaita	  and	  those	   of	   Guadalcanal.	   It	  was	   a	   perception	   held	   by	   both	   the	   government	   and	   the	   international	  media,	  whose	  simple	  portrayal	  of	  the	  conflict	  had	  a	  powerful	  effect	  on	  the	  way	  it	  was	  eventually	  treated	  by	  international	  actors.	  	  The	  continued	  violence	  and	  the	  failure	  to	  devise	  an	  indigenous	  peace-­‐building	  strategy	  saw	  the	  formation	   of	   the	   Regional	   Assistance	  Mission	   to	   Solomon	   Islands;	   a	   police-­‐led	   peace-­‐building	  mission	  with	  a	  strong	  regional	  contingent	  and	  an	  open-­‐ended	  mandate.	  	  	  	  For	  many	   academic	   observers,	   the	   deployment	   of	   a	   police-­‐led	   contingent	   to	   Solomon	   Islands	  raised	   questions	   as	   to	   the	   direction	   of	   peace-­‐building	   strategy	   in	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   world.	   The	  distinction	   between	   internal	   and	   external	   was	   blurred,	   it	   seemed,	   by	   the	   extension	   of	  constabulary	  authority	   into	   the	   foreign	  policy	   space	   (Greener	  2009a;	  Hameiri	  2009a;	  Hegarty	  2005).	  	  This	  research	  aimed	  to	  examine	  that	  interaction	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  as	  it	  occurred	  in	  its	   most	   overt	   form;	   that	   is,	   the	   interaction	   between	   international	   police	   officers	   and	   local	  communities.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  Tension	  period	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  provided	  some	  background	  as	  to	  the	  context	  locally.	  However,	  to	  understand	  more	  about	  the	  issues	  associated	  with	  policing	  this	  context,	  the	  literature	  on	  community	  policing	  was	  reviewed.	  	  The	   community	   policing	   literature	   was	   used	   here	   because	   of	   its	   focus	   on	   the	   interaction	  between	   police	   officers	   and	   local	   neighbourhoods.	   The	   literature	   documented	   the	   history	   of	  modern	  policing;	  showing	  that	  engaging	  with	  social	  and	  cultural	  diversity	  is	  a	  challenge	  that	  has	  been	  faced	  by	  police	  departments	  across	  the	  world	  for	  decades.	  The	  community	  policing	  model	  developed	   out	   of	   this	   process	   and	   represented	   an	   attempt	   to	   engage	   with	   neighbourhood	  residents	  on	  issues	  of	  crime	  control	  in	  ways	  not	  seen	  during	  the	  reform	  era.	  The	  new	  model	  set	  out	   an	   ambitious	   programme	   of	   philosophical,	   strategic,	   tactical	   and	   organisational	   change.	  While	   community	   policing	   was	   contentious	   within	   certain	   departments,	   its	   popularity	   with	  policy-­‐makers	   and	  police	   chiefs	   saw	   it	   utilised	   across	   the	  US,	  Europe,	   Scandinavia,	  Asia,	   Latin	  America	  and	  Australasia,	  	  A	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  community	  policing	  helped	  to	  identify	  the	  core	  components	  of	  the	  model	   and	   some	   of	   the	   practical	   measures	   taken	   to	   mobilise	   it.	   However,	   the	   literature	   also	  raised	  concern	  as	  to	  some	  of	  the	  personal,	  professional	  and	  political	  implications	  of	  utilising	  the	  model.	  These	  concerns	  were	   first	  outlined	  and	  explored	   in	   terms	  of	  how	  they	  manifested	   in	  a	  domestic	  setting.	  It	  was	  then	  necessary	  to	  consider	  how	  these	  issues	  might	  present	  within	  the	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context	  of	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  peace-­‐building	  mission	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  This	  review	  produced	  four	  core	  questions	  which	  became	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  research	  going	  forward.	  Those	  questions	  were:	  	  	  	  	  1. How	   do	   international	   police	   officers	   adapt	   to	   the	   local	   social,	   political	   and	   cultural	  context	  and	  how	  does	  their	  understanding	  of	  that	  context	  shape	  the	  approach	  they	  take	  towards	  engaging	  local	  communities?	  2. What	   strategies	   do	   international	   police	   employ	   to	   interact	   and	   engage	   with	   the	   local	  population	  and	  how	  do	  these	  strategies	  aim	  to	  contribute	  to	  an	  effective	  and	  equitable	  partnership	  between	  officers	  and	  citizens?	  3. What	   efforts	   were	   made	   by	   the	   international	   police	   to	   overcome,	   alter	   or	   reinforce	  existing	  perceptions	  of	   the	  police	  and	  how	  were	   these	  efforts	  adapted	   to,	   and	  affected	  by,	  local	  context?	  4. How	  do	  international	  police	  officers	  manage	  their	  relationships	  with	  other	  contributing	  agencies	   (including	   other	   national	   policing	   contingents,	   local	   police	   and	   military	  support)	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   a	   consistent	   and	   co-­‐ordinated	  policing	   service	   is	  provided	   to	  the	  host	  community?	  Together,	   the	   questions	   aimed	   to	   understand	   more	   about	   how	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   interactions	  between	  international	  police	  officers	  and	  local	  community	  residents	  might	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  search	  for	  a	  sustainable	  peace	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  a	  small	  sample	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  who	  had	  served	  in	  Solomon	   Islands	  explored	   their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	   interactions	  with	   the	   local	   community	  and	  with	  local	  Police	   staff.	  There	  was	  significant	  variation	  across	   the	  sample;	  officers	  were	  deployed	  at	  different	   times,	   to	   different	   locations	   and	   took	   on	   vastly	   different	   roles	   while	   they	   were	  deployed.	   	  However,	  all	  had	  a	   frontline	  component	   to	   their	   job	   that	  saw	  them	  working	   in	  and	  engaging	   local	   neighbourhoods.	   Their	   experiences	   in	   this	   space	   produced	   some	   interesting	  findings.	  	  	  	  The	  focus	  of	  question	  one	  was	  how	  officers	  adapted	  to	  their	  operating	  environment	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  Adjusting	  to	  the	  local	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  context	  was	  challenging	  for	  many	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed.	  Former	  Police	  Commissioner	  Peter	  Marshall	  discussed	  the	  complexity	  of	   the	   task	   facing	   New	   Zealand	   officers	   on	   their	   deployment	   by	   highlighting	   the	   fragility,	   or	  “excitement”,	  that	  characterised	  political	  and	  social	  affairs.	  New	  Zealand	  Police,	  he	  argued,	  faced	  an	  entirely	  new	  challenge	   in	  having	   to	  balance	   the	   interests	  of	   a	  highly	  diverse	  and	  disparate	  population	  and	  build	  peace.	  	  Within	   this	  context,	   it	  was	  surprising	   that	  officers	  experienced	   little	  of	   the	  ethnic	  conflict	   that	  had,	   according	   to	   international	   media,	   defined	   the	   Tension	   period.	   New	   Zealand	   Police	  interviewed	  instead	  argued	  that	  much	  of	  the	  political	  tension	  playing	  out	  in	  Honiara	  had	  little,	  if	  any,	   effect	   locally.	   Even	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   the	  Weather	  Coast,	   officers	   stated	   that	  most	   of	   their	  work	  was	  generated	  by	  local	  issues,	  namely	  alcohol	  and	  drug	  use	  and	  domestic	  violence.	  In	  this	  respect,	   officers	   described	   how	   their	   role	   reverted	   to	   being,	   in	  many	  ways,	   similar	   to	   that	   of	  their	  role	  in	  New	  Zealand;	  that	  is,	  one	  of	  policing	  rather	  than	  peace-­‐building.	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The	   finding	   is	   significant	   in	   light	   of	   concerns	   raised	   in	   the	   literature	   review	   regarding	   the	  potential	   for	   the	   community	   focus	   of	   international	   police	   officers	   to	   reinforce	   or	   re-­‐ignite	  harmful	   expressions	   of	   social	   cohesion.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   New	   Zealand	   Police,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  Malaitan-­‐Guale	   divide	   that	   was	   so	   central	   to	   narratives	   of	   conflict	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	   a	   few	  years	  prior,	  was	  largely	  irrelevant	  in	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work.	  Far	  from	  reinforcing	  this	  narrative,	  New	   Zealand	   Police	   appear	   to	   have	   assisted	   in	   the	   restoration	   of	   peace	   by	   looking	   for	   issues	  arising	  in	  local	  communities,	  not	  in	  media	  reports.	  Adjusting	   to	   the	  unique	   social,	   political	   and	   cultural	   climate	  of	   Solomon	   Islands	  did,	  however,	  present	   some	   challenges.	   Officers	   expressed	   mixed	   views	   when	   discussing	   their	   interactions	  with	  churches	  and	  with	  the	  local	  wantok	  system.	  Some	  avoided	  becoming	  involved,	  while	  others	  made	  extra	  effort	   to	   engage	   these	   institutions	  and	   there	  were	  both	  personal	   and	  professional	  reasons	   for	   these	   differing	   stances.	   The	   finding	   highlighted,	   however,	   the	   breadth	   of	   the	   task	  facing	  the	  officers.	  Often	  acting	  as	  the	  sole	  representative	  of	  RAMSI	  in	  a	  particular	  area,	  it	  was	  difficult	  for	  officers	  to	  form	  a	  relationship	  with	  each	  and	  every	  social	  or	  cultural	  institution	  that	  operated	   there.	   ‘Wearing	   too	  many	  hats’	   can	  be	  a	  problem	   facing	   individual	  officers	   in	   such	  a	  context.	  	  Overall,	   however,	   the	  officers	   interviewed	   showed	  a	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	   the	   social	   and	  political	  climate	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  Rather	  than	  seizing	  on	  simplistic	  portrayals	  of	  community	  life,	  they	  recognised	  that	  social	  connections	  and	  customs	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  were	  diverse	  and	  multi-­‐layered.	  The	  nature	  and	  limits	  of	  a	  community	  changed	  depending	  on	  the	  wider	  context,	  constantly	   expanding	   and	   retracting	   in	   response	   to	   a	  myriad	  of	   social,	   political	   and	   economic	  influences.	   	  To	  account	  for	  this,	  officers	  needed	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  changing	  power	  dynamics	  in	  these	   communities.	   Where	   Chiefs	   or	   Big	   Men	   may	   have	   been	   easy	   to	   identify	   in	   some	  communities,	  in	  others	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  authority	  was	  more	  diffuse.	  Rural	  areas	  and	  remote	  islands	   varied	   significantly	   from	  one	   another,	   as	   did	   the	  more	   urbanised	   communities	   in	   and	  around	  Honiara.	  Acknowledging	  these	  variations	  was	  an	  important	  step	  for	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers.	   Not	   only	   was	   it	   important	   for	   ensuring	   that	   local	   populations	   were	   treated	   with	   a	  degree	   of	   respect,	   but	   also	   for	   identifying	   strategies	   for	   community-­‐led	   peace-­‐building	   and	  capacity	  development.	  The	  case	  of	  one	  officer	  using	  a	  customary	  justice	  hearing	  to	  discuss	  the	  role	  of	  RAMSI	  and	  the	  future	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  presents	  just	  one	  example	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  New	  Zealand	  officers	  sought	  to	  link	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  with	  RAMSI’s	  overarching	  mandate.	  	  Once	  officers	  had	  adapted	  to	  this	  environment,	  they	  needed	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  work	  engaged	  communities	   in	   a	   way	   that	   was	   fair	   and	   that	   allowed	   for	   equal	   access	   to	   the	   peace-­‐building	  process.	   This	  was	   the	   focus	   of	   question	   two.	   The	   question	   drew	   from	   concerns	   raised	   in	   the	  literature	   that	   highlighted	   how	   a	   close	   partnership	   between	   police	   and	   community	  members	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may	   serve	   to	   privilege	   some	   and	   dis-­‐empower	   others.	   The	   problem	   is	   of	   particular	   concern	  when	  Police	  aim	  to	  utilise	  certain	  members	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  community	  whose	  interests	  may,	  as	   a	   result,	   be	   favoured	  over	   the	   interests	  of	  others.	   In	   Solomon	   Islands,	   a	  number	  of	   groups,	  namely	   women	   and	   children,	   face	   barriers	   in	   accessing	   government	   services	   and	   equal	  protection	  under	  the	  law.	  There	  is	  the	  potential,	  therefore,	  for	  the	  work	  of	  international	  police	  officers	  to	  further	  entrench	  those	  barriers	  by	  partnering	  with	  those	  sections	  of	  the	  community	  who	  established	  the	  barriers	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  There	  was	  some	  evidence	  of	  this	  occurring	  in	  Solomon	  Islands	  with	  one	  officer	  describing	  how	  they	  would	  always	  approach	  the	  men	  in	  a	  village	  and	  receive	  their	  approval	  before	  interacting	  with	   the	   women	   and	   children.	   While	   this	   likely	   reflects	   a	   desire	   to	   show	   respect	   for	   local	  customs	   and	   local	   authorities,	   it	   can	   also	   send	   a	   powerful	   message	   to	   those	   marginalised	  sections	   of	   a	   community.	   However,	   it	   appeared	   that	   most	   officers	   were	   able	   to	   identify	   the	  potential	   for	   this	   to	   occur.	  Many	   spoke	   of	   the	   different	  ways	   in	  which	   local	   power	   structures	  interfered	  with	  what	  they	  would	  regard	  as	  a	  fair	  police	  service.	  	  Most	   obvious	   to	   the	   officers	   interviewed	   here	   was	   the	   way	   in	   which	   women	   in	   some	  communities	  were	  treated.	  The	  case	  of	  one	  officer,	  who	  tried	  to	  support	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  domestic	   violence	   refuge	   facility,	   was	   described	   in	   some	   depth.	   The	   case	   showed	   how	  disheartening	  the	  work	  of	  international	  policing	  can	  be,	  especially	  when	  local	  power	  structures	  work	  to	  thwart	  the	  efforts	  of	  well-­‐intentioned	  officers	  trying	  to	  help.	  However,	  the	  example	  also	  showed,	  that	  while	  the	  initiative	  was	  unsuccessful,	  the	  issue	  of	  domestic	  violence	  was	  raised	  in	  a	  way	  that	  may	  never	  have	  occurred	  without	  the	  personal	  commitment	  of	  that	  officer	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	   of	   local	   women.	   This	   personal	   commitment	   extended	   beyond	   anything	   outlined	   in	  RAMSI’s	  official	  programme,	  yet	  it	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  crucial	  in	  achieving	  some	  of	  the	  small	  successes	  that	  international	  police	  had	  in	  their	  work.	  	  The	  third	  research	  question	  centred	  on	  trust.	  Issues	  regarding	  trust	  featured	  heavily	  in	  the	  work	  of	   the	   officers	   interviewed	   here.	   Most	   recognised	   that	   a	   delicate	   balance	   had	   to	   be	   achieved	  given	   the	   history	   of	   fragile	   relationships	   between	   the	   RSIPF	   and	   its	   people.	   RAMSI’s	   People’s	  Surveys	  have	  consistently	  identified	  low	  levels	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  RSIPF	  and	  a	  reluctance	  to	  report	  crime	  to	  RSIPF	  officers.	  	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  felt	  a	  sense	  of	  reluctance	  to	  be	  in	  the	  position	  they	  were,	  feeling	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  place	  for	  New	  Zealanders	  to	  be	  guiding	  the	  development	  of	  Solomon	  Islands	  and	  its	  future.	  The	  feeling	  was	  further	  accentuated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  New	  Zealand	  suffered	  from	  many	  of	   the	   same	   problems	   associated	   with	   domestic	   violence,	   alcohol	   and	   drugs	   that	   Solomon	  Islands	  did.	  Defining	  and	  acting	  upon	  ‘right’	  and	  ‘wrong’	  in	  such	  a	  context	  became	  a	  difficult	  task	  for	  many	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed.	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To	  address	  this,	  officers	  fell	  back	  on	  their	  more	  intuitive	  inter-­‐personal	  skills,	  making	  an	  effort	  to	   engage	   locals	   in	   conversation	   and	   treating	   people	   how	   they	   themselves	   would	   like	   to	   be	  treated.	  These	  efforts,	  often	  occurring	  outside	  of	  work	  hours,	  meant	   that	  officers	  were	  able	   to	  build	  a	  rapport	  with	  local	  people.	  This	  rapport,	  as	  one	  example	  from	  Malu’u	  illustrated,	  meant	  that	   even	   high-­‐profile	   former	   militants	   were	   keen	   to	   interact	   and	   engage	   with	   New	   Zealand	  Police.	  It	  also	  meant	  that	  when	  decisions	  did	  have	  to	  be	  made;	  they	  were	  handled	  in	  a	  way	  that	  showed	  respect	  for	  local	  people	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  relationships	  that	  had	  been	  built.	  These	   relationships	  may	   seem	   insignificant,	   however,	   they	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	  many	  communities	  by	  encouraging	  people	  to	  talk	  to	  each	  other	  and	  talk	  with	  Police.	  These	  small	  scale	  successes	   form	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  community	  policing	  model	  and	  contribute	  positively	   to	  peace-­‐building	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  The	  effort	  one	  officer,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  colleagues	  from	  the	  RSIPF	  and	  Tongan	  Police,	   invested	  to	  build	  a	  soccer	  pitch	  showed	  the	   importance	  that	   individual	  officers	  placed	   on	   these	   relationships.	   Operating	   at	   the	   very	   grassroots	   of	   the	   peace-­‐building	   effort,	  these	  officers	  saw	  even	  the	  smallest	  gestures	  as	  having	  an	  important	  effect	  in	  the	  development	  and	   safety	   of	   local	   communities.	   These	   relationships	   were	   built	   not	   on	   official	   operating	  strategies,	  but	  on	  trust.	  	  The	  fourth	  question	  examined	  issues	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  different	  policing	  contingents	  involved	  in	  RAMSI.	  It	  looked	  at	  the	  relationships	  New	  Zealand	  officers	  had	  with	  the	  counterparts	  in	  the	  RSIPF.	  It	  was	  immediately	  apparent	  to	  all	  of	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  that	  the	  RSIPF	   faced	   a	   severe	   shortage	   of	   resources	   and	   that	   the	   level	   of	   mobility	   and	   functionality	  maintained	  by	  RAMSI	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  be	  sustained	  beyond	  its	  departure.	  These	  shortages,	  many	  believed,	  prevented	  willing	  and	  able	  RSIPF	  staff	  from	  performing	  their	  job	  to	  the	  best	  of	  their	  abilities.	  However,	  what	  an	  even	  greater	  number	  of	  officers	  interviewed	  identified,	  was	  a	  lack	   of	   self-­‐confidence	   that	   pervaded	   the	   organisation.	   Staff	   at	   all	   levels	   lacked	   confidence	   in	  their	  ability	  to	  do	  the	  job	  in	  the	  way	  they	  had	  been	  trained.	  Officers	  interviewed	  believed	  it	  may	  have	  been,	  in	  some	  ways,	  a	  lingering	  symptom	  of	  the	  Tension	  years	  that	  had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  morale.	  Others	  felt	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  confidence	  stemmed	  from	  the	  challenges	  facing	  the	  wider	  justice	  system	  and	  the	  feeling	  among	  many	  that,	  even	  if	  a	  job	  was	  done	  right,	  the	  justice	  system	  still	  may	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  deal	  with	  it	  in	  the	  manner	  required.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  confidence	  among	  staff	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  RSIPF,	  many	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  described	  their	  role	  as	  being	  more	  of	  a	  mentoring	  position.	  By	  this,	  they	  meant	  that	  they	  sought	  to	   encourage	   and	  motivate	   individual	   officers	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   tasks	   required	   of	   them,	   rather	  than	   dictate	   orders	   or	   demand	   action.	   This	   mentoring	   style	   drew	   from	   the	   strong	   personal	  relationships	   that	   worked	   to	   negate	   tension	   and	   avoid	   issues	   where	   they	   may	   have	   been	  typically	   expected.	   Female	  officers,	   deployed	   to	   advise	  male	   officers	  who	  were	  older	   and	  of	   a	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higher	   rank,	   was	   a	   particularly	   interesting	   case	   demonstrating	   the	   value	   of	   strong	   personal	  relationships	  and	  the	  New	  Zealand	  style	  of	  mentoring	  rather	  than	  directing.	  This	  approach	  came	  to	  be	  a	  key	  point	  of	  difference	  for	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  and	  one	  that	  had	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  the	  way	  they	  were	  perceived	  and	  treated	  by	  the	  local	  population.	  	  New	  Zealand	  Police	   found	   it	   challenging	   trying	   to	   integrate	   their	   style	   of	   community	   policing	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police.	  While	  the	  Australian	  contingent	  was	  well-­‐resourced	  and	  well-­‐trained,	  there	  was	  a	  sense	  among	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  here	  that	  they	  struggled	  to	  achieve	  the	  same	  level	  of	  support	  among	  the	  local	  populations	  as	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  did.	  At	  the	  planning	  level	  and	  in	  the	  media,	  there	  had	  been	  concerns	  regarding	  Australian	  dominance	  of	  the	  mission.	  Former	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Phil	  Goff,	  spoke	  of	  some	  of	  these	  concerns	  and	  highlighted	   the	   sense	   of	   responsibility	   that	   the	   Australian	   government	   had	   over	   Solomon	  Islands.	  At	  the	  frontline,	  the	  evidence	  gathered	  here	  suggests	  that	  sense	  of	  Australian	  ownership	  over	  the	  mission	  was	  not	  well	  received	  by	  local	  Solomon	  Islanders	  or	  RSIPF	  staff.	  New	  Zealand	  Police	  officers	  commented	  how	  local	  communities	  made	  clear	  to	  them	  that	  the	  Australians	  were	  not	  well	  liked,	  despite	  the	  level	  of	  funding	  and	  resourcing	  they	  were	  providing.	  	  None	  of	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  two	  contingents	  did	  not	  function	  effectively	  alongside	  each	  other.	  In	  operational	  terms,	  the	  two	  forces	  were	  well	  integrated,	  reflecting	  years	  of	  close	  ties	  between	  the	  two	  policing	  organisations.	  However,	  the	  points	  raised	  above	  demonstrate	  the	  challenges	  in	  integrating	  different	  approaches	  to	  community	  policing.	  In	  a	  context	  where	  so	  much	  appears	  to	  have	  hinged	  upon	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  international	  police	  and	  local	  communities,	  it	  is	  concerning	   that	   some	   elements	   within	   the	   international	   contingent	   appear	   to	   have	   been	  received	  quite	  differently	  to	  others.	  	  Future	  efforts	  of	  this	  kind	  should	  look	  to	  integrate	  not	  only	  the	  operational	  and	   logistical	  components	  of	   their	  mission,	  but	  also	   look	  to	  bring	  together	  the	  philosophical	   and	   strategic	  orientations	  of	   the	  different	   contingents	   so	  as	   to	  build	  a	   coherent,	  mutually-­‐supportive	  strategy	  to	  community-­‐policing.	  	  A	   further	   note	   should	   be	   made	   regarding	   the	   methodology.	   The	   semi-­‐structured	   interview	  method	  was	  used	  here	  to	  allow	  officers	  to	  elaborate	  on	  their	  experiences	  and,	   in	  a	  way,	  shape	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  analysis.	  There	  were	  challenges	  associated	  with	  analysing	  their	  experiences	  through	   the	   lens	   provided	   by	   literature	   review.	   Officers	   had	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   views	   and	  expressed	   them	   in	   variety	   of	   ways	   sometimes	   making	   it	   difficult	   to	   identify	   the	   points	   of	  similarity	   or	   difference	   across	   them.	   This,	   however,	   was	   part	   of	   the	   analytical	   process	   and	  ultimately	  allowed	  for	  a	  more	  effective	  canvassing	  of	  viewpoints	  and	  perspectives	  on	  the	  issues	  being	   examined.	   Through	   the	   interview	   process,	   officers	   were	   able	   to	   discuss	   both	   their	  individual	   experiences	   and	   discuss	   how	   they	   related	   to	   the	   wider	   peace-­‐building	   effort	   in	  Solomon	   Islands.	  They	  were	   free	   to	   lay	   the	  emphasis	  where	   they	   felt	   that	   it	  needed	   to	  be	   laid	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and	   often	   made	   the	   effort	   to	   repeat	   the	   experiences	   that	   they	   saw	   as	   being	   central	   to	   their	  understanding	   of	   their	   work.	   Such	   experiences,	   however,	   can	   be	   difficult	   to	   relay	   to	   an	  ‘outsider’,	  or	  someone	  who	  has	  never	  been	  in	  the	  position	  themselves.	  Officers	  often	  took	  time	  to	  consider	  their	  responses	  and	  phrase	  them	  in	  ways	  that	  allowed	  for	  them	  to	  be	  understood	  by	  a	  wider	  audience.	  This	  was	  again	  valuable	  because	  it	  meant	  that	  officers	  could	  provide	  a	  sense	  of	  context	  to	  their	  experiences	  and,	  through	  this,	  give	  a	  more	  detailed	  picture	  of	  what	  they	  were	  sensing	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  officers	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  express	  their	  views	  with	  the	  same	  authenticity	  had	  a	  more	  structured	  interview	  method	  been	  utilised.	   A	   structured	   survey	   would	   likely	   have	   had	   the	   same	   weaknesses	   in	   that	   it	   forces	   a	  response	  that	  may	  not	  reflect	  the	  views	  of	  the	  respondent.	  	  Thus,	  the	  semi-­‐structured	  interview	  was	  invaluable	  in	  allowing	  officers	  to	  relay	  their	  stories	  on	  their	  own	  terms	  and	  in	  ways	  that	  they	  were	  most	  comfortable	  with.	  The	  wealth	  of	  information	  they	  provided	  (over	  50,000	  words	  in	  total)	   is	  testament	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  method	  in	  gaining,	  not	  only	  detail,	  but	  context	  and	  it	  was	  this	  context	  that	  was	  crucial	  to	  learning	  more	  about	  the	  personal	   and	   professional	   challenges	   they	   faced	   in	   their	   everyday	   work	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	  communities.	  	  From	  the	  beginning	   this	   thesis	  has	  been	  clear	   in	   its	   intention	   to	   focus	  on	  a	  small	   range	  of	   the	  issues	  that	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  use	  of	  international	  police	  officers	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  settings.	  It	  aimed	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  literature	  by	  analysing	  just	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  facing	  individual	  police	  officers	  when	  deployed	  in	  such	  a	  role.	  Where	  much	  of	  the	  current	   literature	  seeks	  to	  question	  “...how,	   if	   at	   all,	   the	   rise	   in	   international	   policing	   represents	   any	   kind	  of	   qualitative	   shift	  with	  regards	  to	  broader	  concepts	  of	  intervention	  (Greener	  2009a:5-­‐6)”,	  this	  research	  highlighted	  the	  importance	   of	   local-­‐level	   processes	   in	   building	   peace	   at	   the	   community	   level.	   	   While	   the	  normative	  dimensions	  of	   international	  policing	  are	  of	   critical	   importance,	  academic	  observers	  must	  pay	  attention	   to	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  actions	   that	  give	   the	  practice	   its	  meaning	   for	   the	  people	  who	  are	  subject	   to	   it.	   	  This	  means	  considering	   the	   interaction	  between	  officer	  and	  citizen	  and	  understanding	  how	  those	  interactions	  might	  help	  or	  hinder	  the	  peace-­‐building	  process.	   It	  also	  involves	   considering	  how	   the	   relationships	  between	  different	   components	   of	   a	  mission	  might	  shape	  its	  outward	  appearance.	  Only	  when	  more	  is	  understood	  about	  the	   local-­‐level	  challenges	  of	   international	   policing	   will	   a	   more	   accurate	   picture	   emerge	   as	   to	   its	   suitability	   and	  sustainability	  as	  a	  model	  for	  building	  peace.	  	  Future	   research	   could	   further	   contribute	   to	   academic	   understanding	   of	   these	   challenges	   in	   a	  number	  of	  ways.	  The	  first	  step	  should	  be	  to	  involve	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  actors.	  Here	  the	  focus	  was	  on	   New	   Zealand	   Police	   and	   sample	   size	   was	   relatively	   small.	   Involving	   officers	   from	   other	  national	  contingents	  and	  increasing	  the	  sample	  size	  would	  allow	  for	  more	  robust	  conclusions	  to	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be	  drawn	  about	  how	  perceptions	  varied	  across	  the	  RAMSI	  mission.	  It	  should	  also	  look	  to	  better	  survey	  local	  responses	  to	  international	  policing	  efforts	  in	  a	  way	  not	  attempted	  here.	  The	  RAMSI	  Annual	   People’s	   Survey	   goes	   some	   way	   towards	   providing	   this	   information,	   however,	   more	  detailed	  analysis	  should	   look	  to	  examine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	   local	  communities	   felt	   they	  were	  engaged,	  not	  only	  in	  building	  safety	  and	  security,	  but	  in	  building	  peace.	  	  The	  questions	  asked	  here	  drew	  from	  a	  review	  of	   international	   literature	  but	  were	  driven	  by	  a	  consideration	   of	   local	   context.	   Future	   research	   should	   ultimately	   be	   driven	   by	   those	   same	  considerations;	   that	   is,	  how	  appropriate	   is	   this	  model	   for	  the	  context	   in	  which	   it	   is	  employed?	  The	   context	   in	   Solomon	   Islands	  will	   be	   vastly	  different	   from	   those	   elsewhere	   and	   this	   should	  drive	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   research	   questions.	   However,	   a	   greater	   effort	   to	   integrate	   the	   findings	  from	  different	  case	  studies	  around	  the	  world	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  utility	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  policing	  as	  a	  whole.	  Studies	  such	  as	  that	  conducted	  by	  Greener	  (2009a)	  go	  some	  way	  towards	  achieving	  this.	  Given	  the	  growing	  popularity	  of	  the	  community	  policing	  model,	  it	  is	  vital	   that	   a	   wider	   review	   is	   conducted	   so	   as	   to	   establish	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   using	   it	   in	  diverse	  settings	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Having	  established	  these	  findings,	  a	  final	  note	  is	  required	  on	  the	  wider	  question	  that	  drives	  this	  research;	   that	   is,	   what	   role	   can	   community	   policing	   play	   in	   building	   peace	   in	   post-­‐conflict	  societies?	  	  Chapter	  two	  discussed	  briefly	  the	  linkage	  between	  peace-­‐building	  and	  policing	  and	  highlighted	  the	   importance	   of	   translating	   the	   mission’s	   goals	   into	   action	   at	   the	   neighbourhood	   level.	   It	  identified	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  international	  police	  officer’s	  role	  by	  showing	  how	  they	  operate	  at	   the	   intersection	  of	  a	  number	  of	   local,	  national,	   and	   international	   forces.	  The	   findings	  above	  illustrate	   just	   some	   the	   social,	   political	   and	   cultural	   dimensions	   of	   their	   interactions	   and	   this	  serves	   to	   highlight	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  work	   that	   international	   police	   officers	   carry	   out.	   It	  appears	   that	   individual	   officers	  were	   able	   to	   have	   a	   positive	   impact	   on	   the	   peace	   process	   in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  The	  community	  policing	  model	  was	  a	  key	  enabler	  for	  this	  by	  affording	  officers	  a	  degree	  of	  discretion	  and	  encouraging	   them	   to	   engage	   communities	  on	  a	  personal	   level.	  The	  decentralised	   organisational	   structure	   meant	   they	   were	   active	   across	   Solomon	   Islands;	   in	  remote	   communities,	   some	   of	   which	   had	   never	   been	   visited	   by	   a	   Police	   officer	   before.	   Their	  presence	  offered	  a	  unique	  mechanism	  for	   facilitating	  discussions	  about	   the	  peace	  process	  and	  development	   more	   broadly.	   While	   the	   role	   of	   individual	   officers	   might	   have	   been	   limited	   in	  practical	   terms,	   their	   ability	   to	   encourage	   and	   enable	   these	   conversations	   was	   an	   important	  contribution	  and	  one	  not	  easily	  achieved	  using	  other	  peace-­‐building	  strategies.	  	  Ultimately,	   however,	   the	   successes	   these	   officers	   had	   did	   not	   emerge	   out	   of	   an	   operational	  model.	  A	  recurrent	  theme	  across	  all	  findings	  was	  the	  importance	  of	  personal	  relationships	  in	  the	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peace-­‐building	   process.	   This	   finding	   may	   seem	   insignificant	   compared	   to	   the	   scale	   of	   the	  challenges	   facing	   Solomon	   Islands.	   While	   many	   officers	   found	   the	   isolation	   of	   village	   life	  challenging	  upon	  arrival,	  they	  soon	  found	  that	  local	  people	  were	  welcoming	  and	  enthusiastic	  to	  engage	  the	  officers	  in	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  relationships	  between	  individual	  officers	  and	   local	   communities	  will	  not,	   in	   themselves,	   rebuild	  a	   functioning	   justice	   system	  or	  revive	   the	   economy.	  However,	   in	   a	   context	  where	   institutional	   linkages	  between	  Honiara	   and	  local	  communities	  were	  few	  and	  far	  between,	  these	  personal	  relationships	  acted	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  RAMSI’s	  objectives	   and	   its	  principles.	  The	  officers’	   experiences	   show	   that,	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   a	  strong	   central	   authority	   and	   established	   state	   infrastructure,	   the	   simple	   act	   of	   treating	   local	  people	  the	  way	  they	  themselves	  would	  like	  to	  be	  treated	  was	  vital	  in	  preventing	  disintegration	  and	  a	  resurgence	  of	  violence	  in	  Solomon	  Islands.	  	  Underlying	  the	  immediate	  goal	  of	  peace-­‐keeping	  and	  the	  longer-­‐term	  goal	  of	  peace-­‐building	  in	  Solomon	  Islands,	  was	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  of	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  Police	  officers	  from	  across	  the	  Pacific.	  While	  the	  officers	  interviewed	  here	  constitute	  only	  a	  very	  small	  proportion	  of	  those	  deployed	  since	  RAMSI’s	   inception,	   their	  experiences	  hold	   important	   lessons	   for	  much	  broader	  discussions	   regarding	   post-­‐conflict	   policing	   and	   international	   security.	   At	   all	   levels,	   it	   is	   the	  effort	   of	   individuals	   that	   makes	   mission	   mandates,	   institutional	   structures,	   and	   operational	  strategies	  operate	  effectively	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level.	  Without	  focusing	  on	  the	  efforts	  of	  frontline	  officers	   and	   the	   communities	   they	   engage	  with,	   the	   small	   successes	   and	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   progress	  made	  by	  RAMSI	  could	  well	  be	  overlooked.	  Thus,	  to	  finish,	  while	  the	  technical,	  professional	  and	  political	  aspects	  of	  peace-­‐building	  are	  significant,	  observers	  should	  also	  consider	  the	  scope	  for	  the	   personal	   actions	   of	   individual	   peace-­‐builders	   to	   mediate	   and	   shape	   that	   process	   and,	  through	  this,	  reassert	  the	  value	  of	  people	  in	  the	  process	  of	  building	  peace.	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